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iiAbstract
This thesis consists of four chapters. Each chapter covers a topic in international macro-
economics and monetary policy. The ￿rst chapter investigates the impact of unexpected
monetary policy shocks on exchange rates in a multi-country econometric model. The sec-
ond chapter examines the linkage between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rates
through the monetary policy expectation channel. The third chapter focuses on the interna-
tional transmission of bank and corporate distress. The last chapter unfolds the interest rate
channel of monetary policy transmission in an emerging economy, China, where regulations
and market forces co-exist in this transmission.
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xiiiChapter 1
On the E⁄ects of Monetary Policy
Shocks on Exchange Rates
1.1 Introduction
It has been a long-standing question in both theoretical and empirical macroeconomics how
a change in a country￿ s monetary policy a⁄ects the external value of its currency. The recent
debate surrounding the International Monetary Fund￿ s recommendation to the Central Bank
of Iceland in fall of 2008 to dramatically raise interest rates in an attempt to prevent continued
depreciation of the Iceland Krona is just one example highlighting the continued topicality
of this question.
From the perspective of macroeconomic theory, a - if not the - key contribution towards
resolution of this question still is Dornbusch￿ s (1976) exchange rate overshooting model,
predicting that in response to a contraction of domestic monetary policy, the real exchange
rate - due to a liquidity e⁄ect and a no-arbitrage restriction implied by uncovered interest
parity - will exhibit an impact appreciation, that is followed by a gradual depreciation. This
gradual depreciation continues until the long-run equilibrium - that involves return to the
original real exchange rate equilibrium in line with purchasing power parity - is reached.
In the recent new open economy macroeconomics literature, the exchange rate overshooting
mechanism has been re-examined on the basis of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models that make reference to the three core components of the overshooting mechanism: a
liquidity e⁄ect of monetary policy, an interest parity relation, and long-run purchasing power
1Section 1.1 Chapter 1
parity. To highlight just two contributions to this literature: Steinsson (2008) argues that
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating inter alia staggered price
setting, local currency pricing, home biased preferences and heterogeneous factor markets,
the real exchange rate exhibits peak overshooting in response to a monetary shock after
one or two months, and thereafter decays exponentially, consistent with Dornbusch (1976).
Bergin (2006) estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model inter alia including
monopolistically competitive ￿rms, sluggish price setting, capital accumulation subject to
adjustment costs as well as a risk-premium-augmented interest parity relation, and ￿nds that
the real exchange rate exhibits impact overshooting, followed by a gradual return to long-
run equilibrium. Benigno (2004) argues that the details of the dynamic adjustment pattern
of the real exchange rate after a monetary policy shock depend on the relative degrees of
wage/price stickiness in the domestic and foreign economies, as well as the degree of interest
rate smoothing of monetary policy domestically and abroad.
The predominant strand of the empirical literature (including Clarida and Gali, 1994,
Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995, Kim, 2005, and Scholl and Uhlig, 2008), on the other hand,
has documented that in response to a monetary policy contraction the peak appreciation of
the nominal and real exchange rates occurs with sizeable lag only, that is, the impulse response
function exhibits a hump-shape pattern, the so-called ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting
puzzle￿ . Furthermore, the empirical evidence appears to contradict conditional uncovered
interest parity, and suggests sizeable and persistent arbitrage opportunities in favor of U.S.
bonds after a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock, which has been termed the ￿forward
premium/discount puzzle￿ .1 Figure 1.1 illustrates the ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting
puzzle￿as well as the ￿forward premium puzzle￿ .2 This empirical evidence has been viewed
as so strong that in the open economy macroeconomics literature various mechanisms - such
as limited information processing, distortion of beliefs, and state-dependent pricing - have
been advanced that can account for the ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle￿and/or
the ￿forward premium puzzle￿ ; see, for example, Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Andersen
1The ￿forward premium puzzle￿is separate from unconditional violations of uncovered interest parity as
reviewed, for example, by Engel (1996). It is also worth noting that even papers that have argued that
the ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle￿may be sensitive to the restrictions imposed in identifying
monetary policy shocks, argue that the ￿forward premium puzzle￿ is robust to identi￿cation issues and is
empirically prevalent. See, for example, Faust and Rogers (2003).
2In Section 1.2, we will also relate our paper to previous papers in the literature, speci￿cally Cushman
and Zha (1997), Kim and Roubini (2000), and Bjornland (2009), that have argued that there is no delay of
exchange rate overshooting and/or no evidence of deviations from uncovered interest parity in response to
monetary policy shocks.
2Section 1.1 Chapter 1
and Beier (2005), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), and Landry (2009).
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4Section 1.1 Chapter 1
The common framework of the empirical literature have been bilateral (two-country)
vector autoregressions (VARs) that incorporate key macroeconomic variables for the domestic
economy and one foreign economy, and that identify the exchange rate e⁄ects of a domestic
monetary policy shock primarily on the basis of a Cholesky decomposition involving a Wold
recursive ordering of the variables contained in the VAR. Recent empirical work employing
weaker short-run identi￿cation schemes, namely sign restrictions, argues that the two puzzles
are not tied to the identi￿cation of VARs using Cholesky decompositions; see, in particular,
Scholl and Uhlig (2008).
In this paper, we address the question to what extent previous empirical ￿ndings suggest-
ing the presence of a ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle￿and a ￿forward premium
puzzle￿ may have been caused by two issues: (i) Working with bilateral VARs neglects
to account for multilateral (multi-country) simultaneous adjustments of key macroeconomic
variables in response to monetary policy shocks in one given country - even though such
multi-country adjustments seem to be an essential feature for groups of economies with size-
able multilateral trade and ￿nancial market linkages. (ii) Identifying monetary policy shocks
by imposing short-run restrictions of the form of a Cholesky decomposition tends to be dif-
￿cult to reconcile with macroeconomic theory, and does not take advantage of identi￿cation
restrictions implied by empirically supported long-run relations between the macroeconomic
variables under consideration in the VAR.3 In this paper, then, we specify a multi-country
VAR model for a panel of nine industrial economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States), using monthly data
from 1978 to 2006. On the basis of this multi-country speci￿cation and exploiting empir-
ically supported long-run relationships for the identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks, we
￿nd that U.S. Dollar e⁄ective and bilateral real exchange rates appreciate on impact after
a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock, and that there is no delay in the overshooting
of the U.S. Dollar. Furthermore, after a contractionary monetary policy shock there is no
persistent sizeable deviation from uncovered interest parity, and therefore no sizeable forward
premium. These results are consistent with the real exchange rate e⁄ects of monetary policy
shocks in sticky price open economy models, though the results of this paper also suggest
that it will be insightful to extend various prominent examples of such models - including
3The information content of long-run relations for purposes of model identi￿cation has recently been em-
phasized by Pagan and Pesaran (2008).
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those of Benigno (2004), Bergin (2006), and Steinsson (2008) - so as to capture simultaneous
multi-country adjustments to shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 1.2, we review the empir-
ical models considered in the previous literature, with particular emphasis on a benchmark
model of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). In Section 1.3, we provide a theoretical motivation
for studying multilateral models, and then introduce our empirical multilateral model speci￿-
cation in Section 1.4. We discuss the measurement of monetary policy indicators for the nine
economies we consider as well as the identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks using empiri-
cally supported long-run relations in Section 1.5. We present our empirical results in Section
1.6, and in Section 1.7 provide various comparisons between results from our empirical model
speci￿cation and those employed in the previous literature. Section 1.8, ￿nally, concludes.
Two appendices contain details on the database we have assembled for this paper, as well as
some tables of empirical results.
1.2 Review of the Literature
1.2.1 Methodology of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
Almost all of the empirical models considered in the literature to date on the ￿delayed
exchange rate overshooting puzzle￿ and the ￿forward premium puzzle￿ are bilateral (two-
country) vector autoregressions (VARs).4 We take one of the speci￿cations in Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995) as a benchmark. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) use a bilateral VAR to
model the bilateral relationships of key macroeconomic variables for ￿ve country pairs: the
United States versus France, the United States versus Germany, the United States versus
Italy, the United States versus Japan, and the United States versus the United Kingdom.
For each of these ￿ve country pairs, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) consider a VAR model of
the form of
zt = a0 + a1t +
p X
s=1
Aszt￿s + ut; ut
iid ￿ (0;￿u); (1.1)
4This literature, as noted in the Introduction, includes Clarida and Gali (1994), Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995), Cushman and Zha (1997), Kim and Roubini (2000), Faust and Rogers (2003), Kim (2005), Scholl
and Uhlig (2008), and Bjornland (2009). Some of these papers also include empirical model speci￿cations
for which the ￿foreign country￿variables are speci￿ed as weighted averages of variables across a sizeable set
of foreign countries, subject to exogeneity restrictions. Such model speci￿cations, unlike the model that we
will consider in this paper, still cannot capture simultaneous multi-country adjustments, the hallmark of a
genuinely multilateral model.
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where
zt =
￿
yt Pt y￿
t R￿
t FFRt nbrxt qt
￿0
; (1.2)
with yt denoting U.S. real industrial production, Pt the U.S. consumer price index, y￿
t foreign
real industrial production, R￿
t the foreign nominal short-term interest rate (short-term money
market rate), FFRt the federal funds rate, nbrxt the ratio between U.S. non-borrowed re-
serves and U.S. total reserves, and qt the bilateral real exchange rate (in units of U.S. Dollars
per one unit of foreign currency). All elements of zt, except for the interest rates, are in
logarithms. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) choose the VAR lag order, p, across all country
pairs to be equal to six for the monthly sample from 1974:1 to 1995:5 they are working with.
They identify the monetary policy shock using a Cholesky decomposition involving a Wold
recursive ordering of the variables (this ordering being as in Equation (1.2)), inter alia im-
plying that the Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate taking into account the lagged
values of all the components of zt as well as the current values of U.S. industrial production,
U.S. prices, foreign industrial production, and the foreign short-term interest rate (but not
the real exchange rate).
As has been widely discussed in the literature on monetary policy VARs, monetary policy
shocks in VAR models measure the unexpected change in a monetary authority￿ s monetary
policy stance relative to the information set to which these shocks are orthogonal, here
It =
n
yt; Pt; y￿
t; R￿
t; zt￿s; s ￿ 1
o
: (1.3)
Such unexpected changes can then be due to, for example, (i) discrepancies between the
monetary authority￿ s information set at t and the public￿ s information set at t, the latter
being given by It, (ii) changes in the target values of the variables entering the monetary
authority￿ s monetary policy decisions, and/or (iii) changes in the parameters of the monetary
authority￿ s decision rule (for (ii) and (iii) as long as these changes are not re￿ ected in It).
Selecting the United States versus Germany based bilateral VAR of Equation (1.1) as one
representative example of the analysis of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Figure 1.2 shows
the impulse responses for various key variables after a positive federal funds rate shock (that
is, a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock).5 In regards to exchange rate e⁄ects, the
5To replicate Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), the U.S. monetary policy shock for Figure 1.2 is set to 50
basis points. All impulse response standard error bands reported in this paper are 95% error bands, which we
obtained using a bootstrapping algorithm as described in Kilian (1998).
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bilateral real exchange rate of the U.S. Dollar relative to the Deutsche Mark (qUSD=DM)
overshoots its long-run level with a delay of about three years, termed the ￿delayed exchange
rate overshooting puzzle￿in the literature. The interest rate di⁄erential between the federal
funds rate (FFR) and the German short-term interest rate (RDEU) after the positive federal
funds rate shock exhibits a positive di⁄erence for about 15 months. The forward premium,
de￿ned as in Scholl and Uhlig (2008) as
￿t = ￿FFRt + R￿
t + Qt+1 ￿ Qt; (1.4)
(the one period ex post excess return after a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock for
a U.S. investor from borrowing U.S. Dollars, exchanging these to foreign currency at the
bilateral nominal spot exchange rate, Qt, investing in foreign short-term bonds, and then
exchanging the proceeds back to U.S. Dollar after one period),6 for the United States versus
Germany country pair (￿
USA=DEU
t ) in response to a federal funds rate shock deviates - par-
tially substantially and signi￿cantly - from zero for a little more than one year, indicating size-
able arbitrage opportunities in favor of U.S. bonds. As under conditional uncovered interest
parity in response to a monetary policy shock it would hold that Et
￿
￿t+s
￿
￿Et￿1
￿
￿t+s
￿
= 0,
s ￿ 0, with Et (￿) denoting the conditional expectations operator, this ￿nding is termed the
￿forward premium puzzle￿in the literature. Finally (though not displayed in Figure 1.2), we
can also replicate the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) ￿nding that the impulse responses for
U.S. prices display a positive reaction to the positive federal funds rate shock, rather than fol-
lowing the pattern of a typical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macroeconomic model
with price stickiness, namely of initially failing to respond and after a while beginning to fall.
6Note that this de￿nition of the forward premium involving the ex post future spot exchange rate di⁄ers
from that used in other areas of the international macroeconomics literature, which uses the forward exchange
rate rather than the ex post future spot exchange rate.
8Section 1.2 Chapter 1
F
i
g
u
r
e
1
.
2
:
K
e
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
f
E
i
c
h
e
n
b
a
u
m
a
n
d
E
v
a
n
s
(
1
9
9
5
)
9Section 1.2 Chapter 1
It should again be emphasized that the ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle￿and
the ￿forward premium puzzle￿of Clarida and Gali (1994) and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
have recently been re-a¢ rmed in some key contributions to the literature; see, for example,
Kim (2005) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008). Also, as noted brie￿ y in the Introduction, this
empirical evidence has been viewed as so strong that in the open economy macroeconomics
literature various mechanisms - such as limited information processing, distortion of beliefs,
and state-dependent pricing - have been advanced that can account for the ￿delayed exchange
rate overshooting puzzle￿and/or the ￿forward premium puzzle￿ ; see, for example, Gourinchas
and Tornell (2004), Andersen and Beier (2005), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), and
Landry (2009).
1.2.2 Further Empirical Work
There is a small number of papers in the literature to date, in particular Cushman and Zha
(1997), Kim and Roubini (2000), Faust and Rogers (2003), and Bjornland (2009), that have
argued that there is no empirical support for the ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle￿
and/or the ￿forward premium puzzle￿ .
Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000) consider non-U.S. monetary pol-
icy shocks. Exclusively analyzing countries that can arguably be classi￿ed as small open
economies, they consider short-run monetary policy identi￿cation schemes that - unlike the
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) Cholesky decomposition based identi￿cation scheme - do allow
for monetary policy to contemporaneously respond to changes in the exchange rate. Under
such an identi￿cation scheme, Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000) ￿nd no
empirical support for the ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle￿and/or the ￿forward
premium puzzle￿ . The analyses of Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000)
by construction are not applicable to analyzing the e⁄ects of U.S. monetary policy shocks,
however, and involve short-run identifying restrictions that are rather di¢ cult to justify on
the basis of macroeconomic theory.
Faust and Rogers (2003) impose sign restrictions on the impact impulse response, and
￿nd that the exchange rate impulse response to contractionary U.S. monetary policy shocks
is sensitive to additional - di¢ cult to justify - short-run restrictions required for the identi-
￿cation of U.S. monetary policy shocks, with no robust conclusion about the timing of the
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appreciation peak after a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock being possible.7 As
argued by Scholl and Uhlig (2008), however, if one is to impose sign restrictions for the iden-
ti￿cation of the impact impulse response, one may circumvent having to impose additional -
di¢ cult to justify - short-run identifying restrictions by imposing sign restrictions not only on
the contemporaneous, but also on the future e⁄ects of the shocks. Doing so, Scholl and Uhlig
(2008) re-a¢ rm the ￿delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle￿and the ￿forward premium
puzzle￿in response to U.S. monetary policy shocks.
Bjornland (2009), like Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000), constructs
a VAR model of a small open economy. For her VAR, Bjornland (2009) imposes the restriction
that a monetary policy shock cannot have long-run e⁄ects on the level of the real exchange
rate. This long-run restriction allows Bjornland (2009) to circumvent having to specify short-
run restrictions on the interaction between monetary policy and the real exchange rate of the
type considered by Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000). Our approach, as
we will detail in Section 1.5, involves using a larger number of long-run identifying restrictions,
as is implied by the empirical evidence, and thus indeed uses as few short-run identifying
restrictions as possible. In contrast to Bjornland (2009), for each country we link our long-
run identifying restrictions to empirical evidence on the number of long-run relations among
the variables in our model. Perhaps most important in regards to comparison of our modelling
approach to that of Bjornland (2009), our empirical model speci￿cation does not require a
small open economy assumption, and we can therefore also consider U.S. monetary policy
shocks.
1.3 Multilateral Models: Motivation
In this Section we provide a brief theoretical motivation for working with multilateral rather
than bilateral models when analyzing the exchange rate e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks. The
model we will consider in this Section consider is highly stylized, isolating the instantaneous
exchange rate e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks in a world of three countries as compared to
a world of two countries, rather than providing an elaborate multilateral dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model that would capture the complete set of variables entering our
subsequent empirical analysis.
7As noted in the Introduction, Faust and Rogers (2003) ￿nd the ￿forward premium puzzle￿ , on the other
hand, to be robustly present for the complete set of short-run restrictions they consider.
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To keep the exposition in this Section as simple as possible, we suppose that there are
at most three countries, labelled as countries ￿0￿ , ￿1￿ , and ￿2￿ . Also for simplicity, we
suppose that there are at most three types of ￿nancial assets, bonds of maturity one period
denominated in the currencies of country 0, of country 1, and of country 2, respectively. As
we will consider the exchange rate e⁄ects of changes in monetary policy in country 0, only for
country 0 we distinguish between private investors and monetary authorities. For countries
1 and 2, we only model private investors.8
We will distinguish two model structures: Under model structure ￿M2￿ , we only take into
account two of the three countries, namely country 0 as the domestic economy, and the only
foreign economy being given by country 1. Under model structure ￿M2￿ , therefore, we drop
country 2 from the analysis. Under model structure ￿M3￿ , we model all three countries, with
country 0 again being the domestic economy, but now both country 1 and country 2 being
foreign economies.
We ￿rst describe the two-country world, M2. We have the following time t equilibrium
conditions for the two bonds in this model structure:
Bi0pt + Bi0gt + Bi1t = 0; i = 0;1; (1.5)
where Bi0pt denotes the time t holdings of the bond denominated in the currency of country
i by the private investors in country 0, Bi0gt the time t holdings of the bond denominated
in the currency of country i by the monetary authorities of country 0, and Bi1t the time t
holdings of the bond denominated in the currency of country i by the investors in country
1. Suppose that the private investors in country 0 as well as the investors in country 1
use mean-variance analysis to optimize their portfolio holdings. At the time of solving their
portfolio optimization problems, the investors know the nominal rates of return on the two
bonds (the nominal rate of return for country i from t to t + 1 being denoted by Rit), but
face uncertainty regarding the one-period-ahead spot exchange rate between country 0 and
country 1, and the one-period-ahead prices in both countries. The portfolio optimization
8While the magnitude of the exchange rate e⁄ects of monetary policy changes in country 0 would be
di⁄erent if we captured that central banks in countries 1 and 2 may respond to the monetary policy changes
in country 0, our main point in this Section, namely that the exchange rate e⁄ects of monetary policy changes
in country 0 will in general be mis-measured when considering a bilateral model, is not dependent on our
assumption of there only being private investors in countries 1 and 2.
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problem of the private investors in country 0 is then given by:
max
!10ptjM2
￿
Et
￿
￿0pt
￿
￿ ￿
M2
￿
￿
1
2
￿0pV art
￿
￿0pt
￿
￿ ￿
M2
￿￿
; (1.6)
!10pt
￿ ￿
M2 denoting the weight (under model structure M2) in the time t portfolio of the
private investors in country 0 of the bonds denominated in the currency of country 1, ￿0pt
￿ ￿
￿
M2
denoting the real rate of return from t to t + 1 on the portfolio of the private investors in
country 0 (under model structure M2), ￿0p denoting the coe¢ cient of risk aversion of the
private investors in country 0, and V art (￿) denoting the conditional variance operator at time
t, with
￿0pt =
￿
1 ￿ !10pt
￿
￿
M2
￿
(R0t ￿ ￿0;t+1) + !10pt
￿
￿
M2
￿
R1t +  01;t+1 ￿ ￿0;t+1
￿
; (1.7)
and with ￿0;t+1 denoting the rate of in￿ ation in country 0 at time t + 1,  01;t+1 the rate of
appreciation of the currency of country 1 against the currency of country 0 from t to t + 1,
and
!10pt
￿ ￿
M2 =
Q01tB10pt
B00pt + Q01tB10pt
; (1.8)
Q01t denoting the time t nominal spot exchange rate between countries 0 and 1 (measured
as units of currency of country 0 per one single unit of currency of country 1). Finally, we
suppose that
Et (￿0;t+1) = ￿￿0t; V art (￿0;t+1) = ￿2
￿0; (1.9)
Et
￿
 01;t+1
￿
= ￿ 01t; V art
￿
 01;t+1
￿
= ￿2
 01; (1.10)
and
Covt
￿
￿0;t+1; 01;t+1
￿
= ￿￿0; 01: (1.11)
Note that for simplicity of exposition we do not specify the dependence of the ￿rst and second
moments in (1.9) to (1.11) on underlying macroeconomic and ￿nancial market fundamentals.
While such speci￿cation would be essential for an analysis characterizing the complete time
path of the exchange rates, our focus here is on the time t appreciation of the currency of
country 0 in response to a contractionary change of the monetary policy stance in country
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0 within the two-country model, in contrast to what it would be in a three-country model
to be analyzed below. For this purpose, little is to be gained from specifying how the ￿rst
and second moments in (1.9) to (1.11) depend on macroeconomic and ￿nancial market fun-
damentals.
Solving the optimization problem given by (1.6) to (1.11), it is readily established that
the time t optimal portfolio share of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 by
the private investors in country 0 under model structure M2 is given by
!10pt
￿ ￿
M2 =
R1t + ￿ 01t ￿ R0t
￿0p￿2
 01
+
￿￿0; 01
￿2
 01
: (1.12)
From (1.12), the optimal portfolio share under model structure M2 of the bond denomi-
nated in the currency of country 1 for the private investors in country 0 is a function (i) of
the risk-adjusted excess rate of return of the bond denominated in the currency of country
1 compared to the bond denominated in the currency of country 0, as well as (ii) the hedge
the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 provides against in￿ ation in country 0.
Let us now turn to the three-country world, M3. For the three-country world, we extend
the time t equilibrium conditions in Equation (1.5) to re￿ ect that the bonds denominated
in the currencies of countries 0 and 1 can also be held by the investors in country 2, and to
incorporate the time t holdings of the bond denominated in the currency of country 2, Bi2t:
Bi0pt + Bi0gt + Bi1t + Bi2t = 0; i = 0;1;2: (1.13)
We suppose that beyond the private investors in country 0 and the investors in country
1, the investors in country 2 also use mean-variance analysis to optimize their portfolio
holdings. Mirroring the set-up of the two-country model, at the time of solving their portfolio
optimization problems, the investors know the nominal rates of return on the three bonds,
but face uncertainty regarding the set of one-period-ahead spot exchange rates and the one-
period-ahead prices in all three countries. The portfolio optimization problem of the private
investors in country 0 is now given by:
max
!10ptjM3
;!20ptjM3
￿
Et
￿
￿0pt
￿
￿ ￿
M3
￿
￿
1
2
￿0pV art
￿
￿0pt
￿
￿ ￿
M3
￿￿
; (1.14)
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!10pt
￿ ￿
M3 and !20pt
￿ ￿
M3 denoting the weights (under model structure M3) in the time t portfo-
lio of the private investors in country 0 of the bonds denominated in the currencies of country
1 and country 2, respectively, ￿0pt
￿ ￿
￿
M3
denoting the real rate of return from t to t + 1 on the
portfolio of the private investors in country 0 (under model structure M3), with
￿0pt
￿ ￿
￿
M3
=
￿
1 ￿ !10pt
￿
￿
M3 ￿ !20pt
￿
￿
M3
￿
(R0t ￿ ￿0;t+1)
+
2 X
i=1
!i0pt
￿
￿
M3
￿
Rit +  0i;t+1 ￿ ￿0;t+1
￿
; (1.15)
and with  0i;t+1 the rate of appreciation of the currency of country i against the currency of
country 0 from t to t + 1, and
!i0pt
￿ ￿
M3 =
Q0itBi0pt
B00pt + Q01tB10pt + Q02tB20pt
; i = 1;2; (1.16)
Q0it denoting the time t nominal spot exchange rate between countries 0 and i (measured as
units of currency of country 0 per one single unit of currency of country i). We suppose in
analogy to (1.10) and (1.11) that
Et
￿
 0i;t+1
￿
= ￿ 0it; V art
￿
 0i;t+1
￿
= ￿2
 0i; i = 1;2; (1.17)
and
Covt
￿
￿0;t+1; 0i;t+1
￿
= ￿￿0; 0i; i = 1;2; Covt
￿
 01;t+1; 02;t+1
￿
= ￿ 01; 02: (1.18)
Solving the optimization problem given by (1.14) to (1.18), it is readily established that
the time t optimal portfolio share of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 by
the private investors in country 0 under model structure M3 is given by
!10pt
￿ ￿
M3 =
 
1
1 ￿ ￿2
 01; 02
!" 
R1t + ￿ 01t ￿ R0t
￿0p￿2
 01
+
￿￿0; 01
￿2
 01
!
￿￿2
 01; 02
 
R2t + ￿ 02t ￿ R0t
￿0p￿ 01; 02
+
￿￿0; 02
￿ 01; 02
!#
; (1.19)
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with
￿2
 01; 02 =
￿2
 01; 02
￿2
 01￿2
 02
: (1.20)
>From (1.19), the optimal portfolio share of the bond denominated in the currency of country
1 for the private investor in country 0 under model structure M3 is a function (i) of both
the excess rate of return of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 as well as
the excess rate of return of the bond denominated in the currency of country 2, as well
as (ii) the hedge both the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 as well as the
bond denominated in the currency of country 2 provide against in￿ ation in country 0. The
optimal portfolio share of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1 for the private
investors in country 0 under model structure M3will generally only be the same as it is in
the two-country model, model structure M2, if
￿ 01; 02 = 0: (1.21)
Such an orthogonality restriction on the dynamics of di⁄erent exchange rate pairs is, however,
extremely unlikely to hold in empirical practice.
Also solving under model structure M2 the optimization problem of the investors in
country 1, and under model structure M3 the optimization problems of the investors in
countries 2 and 3, upon substituting the complete set of optimal portfolio shares into the
relevant market clearing condition, (Equation (1.5) under model structure M2 and Equation
(1.13) under model structure M3), and then di⁄erentiating the resultant identities under the
implicit function theorem with respect to Q01t and R0t, it can be shown that9
@Q01t
@R0t
￿
￿ ￿
￿
M2
6=
@Q01t
@R0t
￿
￿ ￿
￿
M3
; (1.22)
unless the orthogonality condition of Equation (1.21) holds, which, again, is extremely un-
likely to be the case in empirical practice. Thus, a bilateral analysis of monetary policy
changes in country 0 that includes only the variables of countries 0 and 1 will generally be
subject to an omitted variables problem. The variables for country 2 generally need to be
included as well. Through calibration-style exercises, we have established that under reason-
able parameterizations of model structures M2 and M3 the instantaneous bilateral and/or
9The algebraic details are described in a note available from the authors upon request.
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e⁄ective exchange rate appreciations for the currency of country 0 caused by a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock in country 0 may in the three-country model be either weaker
or stronger than in the two-country model. The strength of the exchange rate e⁄ects of a
monetary policy change thus seems to be primarily an empirical question.
Rather than augmenting our simple stylized model to capture frictions that within the
model will lead to exchange rate overshooting, in this paper we restrict ourselves to building
and estimating an empirical model heeding the main insight of Equation (1.22): The exchange
rate and forward premium e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks in the presence of more than two
countries will generally be mis-measured in a bilateral (two-country) model. A multilateral
model is called for, capturing the complete spectrum of the relevant cross-country exchange
rate correlations.10
1.4 An Empirical Multilateral Model
1.4.1 A Global Vector Error Correction Model (GVECM)
A common limitation of the empirical models considered in the previous literature on the
exchange rate e⁄ects of monetary policy is that they omit considering the simultaneous nature
of the international spillover e⁄ects that a monetary policy shock will cause. To address this
problem, we work with a Global VAR (GVAR) model as proposed by Pesaran, Schuermann,
and Weiner (2004). Suppose that there are T sample periods, t = 1;2;:::;T, and N + 1
countries, the countries indexed by i = 0;1;2;:::;N. For each country, we wish to model a
vector xit of m country-speci￿c endogenous variables. Stacking the vectors of country-speci￿c
endogenous variables,
xt =
￿
x0
0t; x0
1t; :::; x0
Nt
￿0
; (1.23)
a VAR model in xt obviously would contain ways too many parameters to be estimable unless
the time dimension, T, of each country￿ s data series would by far exceed the cross-sectional
dimension, N + 1. Therefore, rather than letting x￿i;t,
x￿i;t =
￿
x0
0t; x0
1t; :::; x0
i￿1t; x0
i+1;t; x0
i+2;t; :::; x0
Nt
￿0
; (1.24)
10We do not address in this paper the question as to the minimum number of countries that is needed to
avoid sizeable mis-measurement due to an omitted countries bias. The answer to this question is likely to be
sample speci￿c, and in this paper we simply take the approach of working with a panel of major industrial
economies spanning Northern America, Europe as well as East Asia and the Paci￿c.
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enter the set of equations for country i in unrestricted form, the GVAR model involves a
structural cross-country interdependence restriction, namely relating xit ￿only￿to an m￿ ￿1
dimensional vector x￿
it,
x￿
‘it =
N X
j=0
w‘ijx‘jt, with w‘ij = 0 for i = j; ‘ = 1;2;:::;m￿; (1.25)
and where
PN
j=0 w‘ij = 1, for all relevant ‘ and all i, the weights w‘ij re￿ ecting the economic
importance of country j for country i.11 The GVAR model for country i is then given by
xit = ai0 + ai1t +
pi X
s=1
￿isxi;t￿s +
qi X
s=0
￿isx￿
i;t￿s +
di X
s=0
￿isdt￿s + uit; uit
iid (for t)
￿ (0; ￿ui);
(1.26)
where dt is a q ￿ 1 dimensional vector of observed common factors. The vectors of country-
speci￿c foreign variables x￿
i;t￿s account for direct spillovers across countries and may also
proxy the in￿ uence of unobserved common factors across countries. The weights w‘ij entering
the construction of x￿
i;t￿s capture the di⁄erential e⁄ects that di⁄erent foreign countries have
on domestic economy variables, and impose the restriction that the magnitude of the spillovers
from a foreign economy onto the domestic economy is in proportion to the weighting scheme.
The foreign variables and the observed common factors in dt in Equation (1.26) are treated
as weakly exogenous.
In order to distinguish between temporary and permanent shocks, we re-write Equa-
tion (1.26) in error-correction format, rendering the Global Vector Error Correction Model
(GVECM):
￿xit = ai0 + ai1t + ￿izi;t￿1 +
p￿1 X
s=1
￿is￿zi;t￿s + ￿i￿e zit + uit; (1.27)
where
￿i =
￿
￿Im +
Pp
s=1 ￿is;
Pp
s=0 ￿is;
Pp
s=0 ￿is
￿
; zit =
￿
x
0
it; x￿0
it; d
0
t
￿0
; (1.28)
11In this paper, we will use trade weights to construct the w‘ij￿ s. To capture a separate ￿nancial market
channel of cross-country spillovers, one might like to (also) consider ￿nancial capital ￿ ow based weights, in
particular for ￿nancial market variables. As the necessary broad set of bilateral data on ￿nancial capital ￿ ow
based weights at present are not available, we restrict ourselves to trade weights in this paper.
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p = max
i
fpi;qi;dig; ￿is =
￿
￿
Pp
q=s+1 ￿is; ￿
Pp
q=s+1 ￿is; ￿
Pp
q=s+1 ￿is
￿
; (1.29)
e zit =
￿
x￿0
it; d
0
t
￿0
; and ￿i =
￿
￿i0; ￿i0
￿
: (1.30)
The matrix ￿i may be decomposed as ￿i = ￿i￿0
i, where ￿i is the matrix of cointegrating
relations.
It would be an enormous task to simultaneously estimate a system in ￿xt, with each ￿xit
generated by Equation (1.27). The GVECM can, however, be readily estimated on a country-
by country basis if the degree of cross-country dependence of the idiosyncratic shocks, uit, is
su¢ ciently small, so that
N X
j=0
Cov (u‘it;umjt)
N
! 0 as N ! 1, for all i 6= j, ‘ and m. (1.31)
The condition in Equation (1.31), established by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004),
may be viewed as weakening one of Zellner￿ s (1962) conditions under which a seemingly
unrelated equation system can be estimated on an equation-by-equation basis, namely if
the variance-covariance matrix of the system is diagonal. The condition in Equation (1.31)
requires that the cross-country interdependencies asymptotically are captured through the
foreign variables and the observed common factors in dt.12
Upon country-by-country estimation of the GVECM - which can be accomplished using
the methodology of Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000) - for an impulse response analysis it
is necessary to obtain the implied global solution for xt.13 To obtain the global solution in
levels form, note that Equation (1.26) can also be re-written as
Aiyit = ai0 + ai1t +
p X
s=1
Bisyi;t￿s +
di X
s=0
￿isdt￿s + uit; (1.32)
12If the foreign variables and the observed common factors in dt in Equation (1.26) cannot be treated as
weakly exogenous, the GVECM can still be estimated on a country-by-country basis, but the equation system
for country i then will need to include the equations in x
￿0
it and d
0
t.
13Impulse response analysis cannot be carried out on the basis of the GVECM representation in Equation
(1.27), as any innovation in uit in general causes responses of all elements of xt, and thus the foreign variables
entering Equation (1.27) cannot be modelled as being una⁄ected by innovations in uit.
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where
yit =
￿
x
0
it; x￿0
it
￿0
; Ai =
￿
Im; ￿￿i0
￿
; and Bis =
￿
￿is; ￿is
￿
: (1.33)
>From Equation (1.25), it is readily seen that
yit = Wixt; (1.34)
for an appropriately de￿ned weighting and selection matrix Wi. By stacking Equation (1.32)
across all i, the resultant multilateral (￿global￿ ) model can be re-written as
Gxt = a0 + a1t +
p X
s=1
Hsxt￿s +
p X
s=0
￿sdt￿s + ut; (1.35)
where
G =
0
B
B B
B B
B
@
A0W0
A1W1
. . .
ANWN
1
C
C C
C C
C
A
; a0 =
0
B
B B
B B
B
@
a00
a10
. . .
aN0
1
C
C C
C C
C
A
; a1 =
0
B
B B
B B
B
@
a01
a11
. . .
aN1
1
C
C C
C C
C
A
; (1.36)
Hs =
0
B B
B B
B B
@
B0sW0
B1sW1
. . .
BNsWN
1
C C
C C
C C
A
; ￿s =
0
B B
B B
B B
@
￿0s
￿1s
. . .
￿Ns
1
C C
C C
C C
A
; and ut =
0
B B
B B
B B
@
u0t
u1t
. . .
uNt
1
C C
C C
C C
A
: (1.37)
The matrix G can in general be expected to be of full rank, in which case the global solution
in levels form is given by
xt = G￿1a0 + G￿1a1t +
p X
s=1
G￿1Hsxt￿s +
p X
s=0
￿sdt￿s + G￿1ut: (1.38)
The global solution in Equation (1.38) indeed is a VAR for the union of all countries￿sets
of domestic variables. The key feature of the GVAR/GVECM framework is that it allows to
estimate Equation (1.38) indirectly on a country-by-country basis, allowing for the consid-
eration of a larger number of countries and richer country-speci￿c model formulations than
would ever be feasible if it was attempted to estimate Equation (1.38) directly.
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1.4.2 GVECM Variables and Data
We consider the sample period from January 1978 to December 2006 for nine industrial coun-
tries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The vector of domestic variables for each country is given by:
xit =
￿
yit Pit Rm
it Rit Qit
￿0
; (1.39)
where (in all cases for country i at time t) yit denotes the logarithm of real industrial pro-
duction, Pit the logarithm of the consumer price index, Rm
it the monetary policy indicator
(in fractions), Rit the short-term nominal interest rate (typically a three-months treasury-
bill type rate, in fractions), and Qit the e⁄ective nominal exchange rate. The corresponding
country-speci￿c foreign variables are given by:
x￿
it =
￿
y￿
it P￿
it R￿
it Q￿
it
￿0
; (1.40)
each foreign variable de￿ned as in Equation (1.25). Note that we do not construct country-
speci￿c foreign variables for the monetary policy indicator, since for each country the indicator
re￿ ects di⁄erent variables (we will discuss our choice of the monetary policy indicators in
Section 1.5). Following most of the GVAR literature, the weights we use for the construction
of the foreign variables and the e⁄ective exchange rates are average trade weights based on a
middle period in the sample (namely, from January 1991 to December 1993).
The observed common factor dt we specify to be the logarithm of spot world market oil
prices and of a commodity price index for agricultural raw materials.
While it would, of course, be of interest to use a real-time database for our empirical
analysis, due to lack of the required real-time databases for the majority of the countries
in our sample, our data incorporates all data revisions that have been made to date since
initial release of the data. This is consistent with all of the previous empirical papers on the
exchange rate e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks as cited in the Introduction and in Section
2. It should also be noted that the ￿ndings of Croushore and Evans (2006) suggest that key
results regarding the e⁄ects of U.S. monetary policy shocks are the same when real-time data
sets are used as when data sets incorporating data revisions are used.
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1.5 Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks
1.5.1 Monetary Policy Indicators
Let us turn to the issue of measuring the monetary policy shock. First, we need to choose the
indicators that for each country seem to best measure the monetary policy stance. It has been
widely recognized in the literature that monetary aggregates do not represent satisfactory
measures of the monetary policy stance, as changes of monetary aggregates involve various
non-policy in￿ uences and re￿ ect both changes of money demand and money supply.14 Hence
we focus on other variables such as short-term interest rates and reserve ratios. Let us brie￿ y
discuss our choices for each country.
For the United States, we consider two alternatives: the federal funds rate (FFR) and
the ratio between non-borrowed reserves and total reserves (nbrx). The FFR has been the
Federal Reserve￿ s operating target for most of our sample period; announcing the federal funds
target rate has been a major policy signal channel for the Federal Reserve. Thus we believe
that the FFR closely re￿ ects the Federal Reserve￿ s policy stance. This is also supported by
empirical evidence. Bernanke and Mihov (1998), for example, conclude that it seems best to
measure the Federal Reserve￿ s monetary policy stance using the FFR prior to 1979 and nbrx
from 1979 to 1982, and either FFR or nbrx for more recent periods. Therefore, we choose
the FFR for our default analysis, and augment our analysis with nbrx for robustness checks.
For Canada, it appears that the Bank of Canada￿ s overnight rate contains much of the
relevant information about the Bank of Canada￿ s monetary policy stance. The Bank of
Canada announces the target rate for the overnight rate to send policy signals (Armour,
Engert, and Fung, 1996). According to the analysis of Armour, Engert, and Fung (1996), the
path of the overnight rate is consistent with the policy record of the Bank of Canada from
the 1970s, and is preferable compared to use of other alternatives such as the 90-days paper
rate term spread (the 90-days paper rate minus the yield on ten-years or longer maturity
Canadian government bonds). Therefore, we choose the overnight rate as the indicator of
Canadian monetary policy.
For the European countries France, Germany, and Italy, as ￿rst candidates for measures of
the monetary policy stance we consider money market rates as the target rates steered by their
respective central banks. Before 1999, unlike the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada
14See, for example, Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
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that sent signals mainly through announcements of target rates, these European countries￿
central banks used various strategies to signal their monetary policy stance, including tender
rates in open market operations, quantity signals, and standing facilities. The Bank of France
used repurchases of government and private claims as its major operation; important signals
were sent via various repurchase rates. Even among the tender rates, no single rate seems to
have adequately captured the complete monetary policy stance of the Bank of France, though.
The Deutsche Bundesbank￿ s lombard rate, constituting an upper bound for German money
market rates, was an important signal for German monetary policy for many years. The
lombard rate and the overnight call rate are identi￿ed as useful measures of the Bundesbank￿ s
monetary policy stance in Bernanke and Mihov (1997) using data before 1990. From the
1990s on, standing facilities have accounted for less and less of the re-￿nancing, and the
day-to-day call money market rate seems to be a more appropriate measure of the Deutsche
Bundesbank￿ s monetary policy stance (Brueggemann, 2003). For Italy, in addition to the
repurchase rates, the discount window has been conveying the long-term monetary policy
stance of the Bank of Italy. De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1999) argue that the repurchase
agreement rate and the overnight rate have been strong substitutes, and that the Bank of Italy
has been targeting the overnight interbank loan rate. Given these considerations, instead of
using for France, Germany, and Italy variables that likely re￿ ect only a limited amount of
information about monetary policy operations, we prefer to use for the time period prior to
the establishment of the European Central Bank country-speci￿c overnight money market
rates. For the time period following the introduction of a common monetary policy for the
Euro area in January 1999, we use the European Overnight Index Average (EONIA) as the
monetary policy indicator for France, Germany, and Italy, as the European Central Bank
appears to have a strong interest in steering it.
For the United Kingdom, our choice is the ￿o¢ cial bank rate￿ . The ￿o¢ cial bank rate￿
includes all the rates that the Bank of England has sequentially used since 1978.15
For Japan, we consider the overnight call rate as our primary candidate for the monetary
policy indicator for the Bank of Japan, as it was the operating target before 2001 and then
again after 2006. Between 2001 and 2006, the Bank of Japan primarily targeted the quantity
of bank reserves (for example, McCallum, 2003). Using the overnight call rate as the monetary
15The precise measurement of the o¢ cial bank rate has changed several times. For further details, see
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb/notesiadb/Wholesale_discount.htm#BANK%20
RATE
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policy indicator, Miyao (2002) ￿nds plausible e⁄ects for apparent changes in the Bank of
Japan￿ s monetary policy stance.
For Australia, we use the o¢ cial cash rate; the target for the o¢ cial cash rate appears to
be a reasonable measure of the Reserve Bank of Australia￿ s monetary policy intentions.16 The
Reserve Bank of New Zealand targeted settlement cash balances until 1999, and there were
no o¢ cially set or targeted interest rates during that time period. In March 1999, the o¢ cial
cash rate was introduced to help meet the in￿ ation target.17 We therefore use a combination
of the discount rate prior to 1999 and the o¢ cial cash rate thereafter as our monetary policy
indicator for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
1.5.2 Identi￿cation of Monetary Policy Shocks in the Global Vector Error
Correction Model
The structural form of the Global Vector Error Correction Model (GVECM) for country i
from Equation (1.27) can be represented as
Axx;i￿xit = Axx;iai0 + Axx;iai1t + Axx;i￿izi;t￿1 + Axx;i
p￿1 X
s=1
￿is￿zi;t￿s
+Axx;i￿i￿e zit + "xit; "xit
iid: (for t)
￿ (0; ￿"xi); (1.41)
with the reduced form shocks in uit are related to the structural shocks in "xit as uit =
A￿1
xx;i"xit. Let us suppose that the processes for the foreign variables in x￿
it and the common
factors in dt are given by
￿e zit = bi0 +
p￿1 X
s=1
￿is￿e zi;t￿s + "e zit; "e zit
i:i:d: (for t)
￿ (0; ￿"e zi): (1.42)
with, as before, e zit =
￿
x￿0
it d0
t
￿0
. We need to identify the m2 elements in Axx;i. As is
standard in the literature, we normalize E("xit"0
xit) = Im, that is E
￿
Axx;iuitu
0
itA0
xx;i
￿
=
Im, implying that
P
ui = A￿1
xx;iA￿10
xx;i. This orthogonality condition provides m(m + 1)=2
restrictions for identi￿cation. We thus still need an additional m(m ￿ 1)=2 restrictions to
just-identify A0;xx;i.
Typical restrictions considered in the VAR literature are to impose m(m￿1)=2 short-run
16http://www.rba.gov.au/MonetaryPolicy/about_monetary_policy.html
17http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/about/0047041.html
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(contemporaneous) restrictions, such as by restricting the Axx;i matrix to be lower triangular,
as in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). In this case, a strong causal ordering assumption for
the model variables is made, rendering the contemporaneous variable interaction structure
recursive. Such a recursive structure from the perspective of macroeconomic theory seems
unlikely to hold. Impulse responses from such a recursive structure based identi￿cation
scheme, known as orthogonalized impulse responses, also often are sensitive to the ordering
of the variables.
In our GVECM, the cointegrating relationships provide us with useful information for the
identi￿cation of the structural shocks, enabling us to work with identifying assumptions that
from the perspective of macroeconomic theory are considerably weaker than those underlying
orthogonalized impulse responses.18 We stack Equations (1.41) and (1.42) to obtain
Ai￿zit = ci0 + ci1t + e ￿izi;t￿1 +
p￿1 X
s=1
￿is￿zi;t￿s + "it; (1.43)
where
Ai =
0
@ Axx;i ￿Axx;i￿i
0(m￿+q)￿m Im￿+q
1
A; ci0 =
0
@ Axx;iai0
bi0
1
A; ci1 =
0
@ Axx;iai1
0(m￿+q)￿1
1
A; (1.44)
e ￿i =
0
@ Axx;i￿i
0(m￿+q)￿n
1
A; ￿is =
0
@ Axx;i￿is
￿is
1
A; "it =
0
@ "xit
"e zit
1
A; (1.45)
and k = m + m￿ + q. Suppose that we have r cointegrating relationships among the total of
k variables in zit. We can then represent fzitg as
zit = zi0 + Ci
t X
s=1
uis +
1 X
s=1
C￿
isui;t￿s; (1.46)
where Ci = ￿i?[e ￿
0
i?(I ￿
Pp￿1
s=1 ￿is)￿i?]￿1e ￿
0
i?, with e ￿
0
i?e ￿i = 0 and ￿
0
i￿i? = 0, so that
18Faust and Leeper (1997) in the context of a bivariate VAR argue against a long-run identi￿cation scheme
with one transitory and one permanent shock, as such a scheme may lead to misidenti￿cation when the true
empirical model features a larger number of shocks than the estimated model. In line with the arguments in
Pagan and Pesaran (2008), we view long-run identifying restrictions not just as weaker than corresponding
short-run restrictions from the perspective of macroeconomic theory, but also as recognizing existing properties
of a dynamic model with cointegrating relations. Furthermore, there is a wealth of econometric evidence (much
of it reviewed, for example, in Luetkepohl, 2007), that for the type of data sample we are working with in this
paper, such models can be estimated with a satisfactory degree of reliability.
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Cie ￿i = 0k￿r and ￿
0
iCi = 0r￿k; zi0 is an initialization of fzitg. It is well known (for a review,
see, for example, Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 2000) that
Pt
s=1 uis is a vector of random walks,
and that C￿
is is absolutely summable, with C￿
is converging to the zero matrix as s ! 1.
Therefore, the long-run e⁄ects of innovations to uit are fully captured through common
trend component Ci
Pt
s=1 uis. As Ci has rank k ￿ r, there are k ￿ r stochastic trends that
are driving the system in zit. Moving from a representation involving the reduced form
disturbances in uit to one involving the structural disturbances in "it, Equation (1.46) can
be re-written as
zit = zi0 + CiA￿1
i
t X
s=1
"is +
1 X
s=1
C￿
isA￿1
i "i;t￿s; (1.47)
with
CiA￿1
i =
0
@ Cxx;i Cxe z;i
Ce zx;i Ce ze z;i
1
A
0
@ A￿1
xx;i ￿(Axx;i￿i)
￿1
0(m￿+q)￿m Im￿+q
1
A
=
0
@ Cxx;iA￿1
xx;i ￿Cxx;i (Axx;i￿i)
￿1 + Cxe z;i
Ce zx;iA￿1
xx;i ￿Ce zx;i (Axx;i￿i)
￿1 + Ce ze z;i
1
A: (1.48)
Clearly, Ai is non-singular, and thus CiA￿1
i is of rank k ￿ r, that is, only k ￿ r structural
shocks have long-run e⁄ects on the total of k variables in zit. If the foreign variables in
x￿
it and the common factors in dt are weakly exogenous I(1) processes, and there are no
cointegrating relations among these, then the shocks to these variables will be among those
having long-run e⁄ects.
For most of the empirical analysis of this paper, we will focus on the e⁄ects of U.S.
monetary policy shocks. For the U.S., we ￿nd that there are three cointegrating relations.
Let us thus discuss the case of r = 3 in more detail. It would seem a strong restriction
to impose that the structural shocks to industrial production and to prices have no long-
run e⁄ects. It seems very reasonable, however, to impose that the structural shocks to
the monetary policy indicator, to the short-term interest rate, and to the e⁄ective nominal
exchange rate have no long-run e⁄ects. This assumption renders the columns of Cxx;iA￿1
xx;i
that measure the long-run e⁄ects of these shocks equal to zero vectors, re￿ ecting that these
shocks only have transitory e⁄ects. Placing the structural shocks to the monetary policy
indicator, the short-term interest rate, and the e⁄ective nominal exchange rate last in the
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disturbance vector "xit, we have:
Cxx;iA￿1
xx;i =
0
B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B
@
"y "P "Rm "R "Q
y ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
P ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
Rm ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
R ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
Q ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
1
C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C
A
: (1.49)
The zeros in the last three columns of Cxx;iA￿1
xx;i re￿ ect that we have six (in general r(m￿r))
linearly independent long-run restrictions for structural shock identi￿cation. Therefore, we
now only need four (in general m(m ￿ 1)=2 ￿ r(m ￿ r)) additional restrictions for a just-
identi￿ed Axx;i matrix. As the ￿rst additional restriction, we assume that the shocks to
consumer prices do not have long-run e⁄ects on real industrial production, so that now
Cxx;iA￿1
xx;i =
0
B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B
@
"y "P "Rm "R "Q
y ￿ 0 0 0 0
P ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
Rm ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
R ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
Q ￿ ￿ 0 0 0
1
C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C
A
: (1.50)
Observing the local uniqueness condition when solving for Axx;i,19 we are left with having
to impose three short-run restrictions to complete just-identi￿cation of Axx;i. It appears
reasonable to impose that (i) real industrial production does not contemporaneously respond
to monetary policy indicator and short-term interest rate shocks, and that (ii) consumer
19See, for example, Luetkepohl (2007) for a discussion of the local uniqueness condition.
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prices do not contemporaneously respond to short-term interest rate shocks:
Axx;i =
0
B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B
@
"y "P "Rm "R "Q
y ￿ ￿ 0 0 ￿
P ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿
Rm ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
R ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Q ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1
C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C
A
: (1.51)
Having identi￿ed the U.S. structural monetary policy shock, we can move to the global
solution and the impulse response functions. Recalling the global solution given by Equation
(1.38), we ￿rst stack it in companion form,
Xt = e a0 + e a1t + f HXt￿1 + Dt + Ut; (1.52)
where
Xt =
0
B
B B
B B
B B
B B
@
xt
xt￿1
xt￿2
. . .
xt￿p+1
1
C
C C
C C
C C
C C
A
; e a0 =
0
B
B B
B B
B B
B B
@
G￿1a0
0(N+1)m￿1
0(N+1)m￿1
. . .
0(N+1)m￿1
1
C
C C
C C
C C
C C
A
; e a1 =
0
B
B B
B B
B B
B B
@
G￿1a1
0(N+1)m￿1
0(N+1)m￿1
. . .
0(N+1)m￿1
1
C C
C
C C
C C
C C
A
; (1.53)
f H =
0
B
B B
B B
B B
B B
@
G￿1H1 G￿1H2 ￿￿￿ G￿1Hp￿1 G￿1Hp
I(N+1)m 0(N+1)m ￿￿￿ 0(N+1)m 0(N+1)m
0(N+1)m I(N+1)m ￿￿￿ 0(N+1)m 0(N+1)m
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
0(N+1)m 0(N+1)m ￿￿￿ I(N+1)m 0(N+1)m
1
C
C
C C
C C
C C
C
A
(1.54)
;Dt =
0
B B
B B
B B
B B
B
@
G￿1 Pr
s=0 ￿sdt￿s
0(N+1)m￿1
0(N+1)m￿1
. . .
0(N+1)m￿1
1
C C
C C
C C
C C
C
A
; (1.55)
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and
Ut =
0
B B
B B
B B
B B
B
@
G￿1A0"t
0(N+1)m￿1
0(N+1)m￿1
. . .
0(N+1)m￿1
1
C C
C C
C C
C C
C
A
; (1.56)
where we take the shock vector "t to be composed of the U.S. structural shocks and reduced
form shocks for all other countries:
"t =
￿
"0
USA;t; u0
1t; u0
2t; :::; u0
Nt
￿0
; (1.57)
and
A0 =
0
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
@
A￿1
xx;i 0m 0m ￿￿￿ 0m
0m Im 0m ￿￿￿ 0m
0m 0m Im
... 0m
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
0m 0m 0m ￿￿￿ Im
1
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
A
: (1.58)
We should note that identifying the complete set of structural shocks across all countries
would result in us having to impose more than 2,000 parameter restrictions on the global
solution. We therefore choose to restrict structural identi￿cation to the U.S. component of
the GVECM, including in particular the U.S. monetary policy shock. Doing so, we actually
can also allow for the U.S. structural monetary policy shock to be correlated with any of
the reduced form shocks in any of the other countries, and do not need to impose zero
contemporaneous impact restrictions for any of the U.S. structural shocks on other countries￿
variables. On this count, we let the data speak freely.20 The s-period ahead global impulse
response for a U.S. structural monetary policy shock can now be computed as
IR(Xt+s) = e HsE
￿
Ut
￿
￿ ￿"Rm
USA;t = ￿
￿
; (1.59)
20In Section 7, we will nevertheless also document the robustness of our main empirical ￿ndings to imposing
orthogonality on the monetary policy shocks across all countries.
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where
E(Ut
￿
￿ ￿"Rm
USA;t = ￿) =
0
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
@
G￿1A0
V ar("t) ei
V ar("Rm
US;t)￿
0(N+1)m￿1
0(N+1)m￿1
. . .
0(N+1)m￿1
1
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
A
; (1.60)
with ei being the selection vector detailing the location of the U.S. monetary policy shock in
the vector "t.
1.6 Empirical Results
We consider the e⁄ects of a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock, de￿ned in this Section
as a one-standard deviation positive innovation of the federal funds rate, and identi￿ed as
discussed in Section 1.5. All results in this Section are based on allowing for three cointe-
grating relations among the domestic and foreign variables for the United States block of the
GVECM, as is empirically supported by unit root and cointegration rank tests.21
A one-standard deviation positive shock to the federal funds rate represents an almost
immediate increase of the federal funds rate of about 30 basis points, before the federal funds
rate falls gradually back to its steady state level within about two years (see Figure 1.3). The
other countries￿monetary policy indicators do barely respond to the U.S. shock, except for
Canada, which features a positive increase in the overnight rate for the ￿rst 18 months. This
is in contrast to previous empirical studies using bilateral settings, which have found positive
and signi￿cant responses for foreign countries￿monetary policy indicators in response to U.S.
monetary policy shocks.
21The unit root and cointegration test results (as well as test results for weak exogeneity) are documented
in an appendix available from the authors upon request.
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The e⁄ects for a consistent cross-country measure of short-term interest rates, three-
month bond returns, are by and large similar to those for the monetary policy indicator,
with the exception of Canada: The response of Canadian short-term interest rates to a U.S.
monetary policy shock is insigni￿cant. Therefore, the U.S. monetary policy shock for the
majority of countries in our panel leads to a signi￿cant and relatively persistent increase in
the spread between U.S. and foreign interest rates. (Figure 1.4.)
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Turning to the nominal and real e⁄ective exchange rates, we ￿nd that the contractionary
U.S. monetary policy shock leads to immediate overshooting of the U.S. Dollar nominal and
real e⁄ective exchange rates (Figures 1.5,1.6 and 1.7,1.8). Namely, the peak of the exchange
rate appreciation occurs in the second month after the federal funds rate shock, before the U.S.
Dollar gradually depreciates back to its long-run PPP level within about two and half years.
This is in line with standard overshooting theory and in contrast to most of the previous
empirical ￿ndings. There is no delayed overshooting puzzle for the U.S. Dollar e⁄ective
exchange rate after a domestic contractionary monetary policy shock. The appreciation at
the peak is about 0:9 percent for both the nominal and real U.S. Dollar e⁄ective exchange
rates. The majority of the other countries￿nominal e⁄ective exchange rates respond to the
contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock with a small, often insigni￿cant depreciation (the
depreciation is statistically signi￿cant for the Canadian Dollar for about six months, the
Japanese Yen for about 18 months, and for the Pound Sterling for about three months. The
real e⁄ective exchange rates behave very similar to the nominal ones.
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With regards to the forward premium￿ s response to a contractionary U.S. monetary policy
shock, Figure 1.9 provides these impulse responses. For the U.S. forward premium, except
for the ￿rst two months, we do not observe a signi￿cant conditional short-run deviation from
uncovered interest parity. Our ￿nding that there is no signi￿cant conditional deviation from
uncovered interest parity again is in contrast to most of the previous empirical work. For the
other countries in our panel, these do not feature persistently signi￿cant short-run forward
premia either. Only for the ￿rst three to six months there are small but signi￿cant forward
premia (of the opposite sign as for the United States) for France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.
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Figure 1.11 graphs the impulse responses for the consumer price indices. After a con-
tractionary U.S. monetary policy shock, the consumer price index in the U.S. responds with
an increase of about 0:025 percent, which is followed by a gradual fall, until it reaches the
long-run response of about ￿0:1 percent. Only the long-run response is signi￿cant. For the
other countries, we do not ￿nd signi￿cant short-run increases of the consumer price indices,
though over longer horizons the impulse responses for these price indices fall as well, typically
by rather small magnitudes.
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Figure 1.12 summarizes the main ￿ndings conveyed by the impulse responses presented so
far: For our GVECM, unlike the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) results as an example of the
typical previous empirical ￿ndings, there is no delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle (but
rather an almost immediate peak appreciation in response to a U.S. contractionary monetary
policy shock that is in line with sticky price macroeconomic models), and there is (except
for the ￿rst two months after the shock) no signi￿cant conditional deviation from uncovered
interest parity, again consistent with sticky price macroeconomic models.
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It is important to note that our ￿ndings of exchange rate and forward premium adjust-
ment paths consistent with conditional uncovered interest parity and a long-run return to
purchasing power parity equilibrium in response to a contractionary U.S. monetary policy
shock are not implied by ￿ndings in favor of uncovered interest parity and/or purchasing
power parity as unconditional long-run relationships. Table 1 provides the three U.S. cointe-
gration relations. Table 2 provides tests for uncovered interest parity and purchasing power
parity as long-run relationships within our GVECM. Note that the joint validity of the uncov-
ered interest parity and purchasing power parity hypotheses is rejected for all nine countries
in our sample, and that uncovered interest parity and purchasing power parity individually
also are rejected for almost all countries. It is therefore critical to distinguish between di⁄er-
ent sources of shocks, a ￿nding that again is consistent with the predictions of the new open
economy macroeconomics literature, for example Bergin (2006).
While for space reasons we do not document so in elaborate detail, these results are robust
to considerations such as modi￿cation of our lag length selection criteria (our default results
are based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion based lag orders) as well as the addition of dummy
variables to account for the monetary policy change for some of the European countries in
1999, and to account for German re-uni￿cation in 1990. The results are furthermore robust
to using a broader commodity price index (rather than spot oil prices) as a common factor
in the GVECM.
Finally, as can be seen from Figure 1.13, the GVAR/GVECM based results indicate that
in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the countries other than the United
States,22 in virtually all cases either the bilateral and e⁄ective real U.S. Dollar exchange
rates either depreciate signi￿cantly for a period of between three and 18 months (Canada,
Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom), or exhibit no signi￿cant reaction.
22A note describing our identi￿cation procedure for monetary policy shocks in countries for which the
number of cointegrating relations is, unlike for the U.S., not equal to three, is available from the authors upon
request.
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1.7 Model Comparisons and Counterfactual Analysis
Clearly, the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) speci￿cation and our GVECM speci￿cation di⁄er
beyond considering bilateral (two-country) versus multilateral (multi-country) settings in
several other aspects also:
(i) data sets: relative to Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), we have an extended data set avail-
able;
(ii) variable speci￿cation: our GVECM includes a larger number of foreign variables than
accounted for by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995);
(iii) cointegrating relations: Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) use a level VAR, while our
GVECM imposes restrictions implied by empirically supported cointegrating relations;
(iv) monetary policy shock identi￿cation: our GVECM exploits a combination of long- and
short-run restrictions for identi￿cation purposes, whereas Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) iden-
tify monetary policy shocks based on short-run restrictions imposing a recursive ordering of
the model variables (the Cholesky decomposition).
Therefore, in order to explore the reasons underlying the remarkable di⁄erences between
our empirical ￿ndings of Section 6 and those of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), we conduct
a step-by-step ￿counterfactual analysis￿ .
In the ￿rst step of this counterfactual analysis, we use our sample from January 1978 to De-
cember 2006 to replicate Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), namely, we estimate a bilateral VAR
for the U.S. versus Germany, containing seven variables,
￿
yt Pt y￿
t R￿
t FFRt nbrxt qt
￿
,
where yt denotes U.S. real industrial production, Pt the U.S. consumer price index, y￿
t German
real industrial production, R￿
t German short-term interest rates, FFRt the federal funds rate
as the U.S. monetary policy indicator, nbrxt the ratio between U.S. non-borrowed reserves
and U.S. total reserves, and qt the bilateral real exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and
the Deutsche Mark. The lag order is chosen to be six in order to be consistent with Eichen-
baum and Evans (1995). The U.S. monetary policy shock is identi￿ed using the Cholesky
decomposition of the variables (ordered as above), which implies that the Federal Reserve
sets the federal funds rate taking into account the lagged values of all variables as well as the
current value of U.S. industrial production, the U.S. consumer prices, German industrial pro-
duction, and German short-term interest rates. To facilitate comparison with Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995), the U.S. monetary policy shock throughout our counterfactual analysis in
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this Section is set to 50 basis points, rather than to one standard deviation, as it was for
Figures 1.3 to 1.11, Figure 1.12 (iii) and Figure 1.13. Figure 1.14 shows that when incor-
porating more recent data than Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) could, the peak of the real
U.S. Dollar/Deutsche Mark exchange rate impulse response occurs about 10 months after the
shock, and thus the delay of overshooting is shorter than found by Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995). The federal funds rate and German short-term interest rates behave similarly as in
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), and a signi￿cant instantaneous deviation of about 0:8 percent
from uncovered interest parity is observed, with signi￿cance of this conditional uncovered in-
terest parity deviation holding for up to nine months. Overall, therefore, while the results
in the extended sample suggest a less pronounced delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle
than in the original Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) sample, both the delayed exchange rate
overshooting puzzle and the forward premium puzzle are not addressed by updating of the
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) sample.
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Our next step is to investigate how the key empirical results would change if rather than
using German variables we used weighted foreign variables for the U.S. (as well as the full
sample of data), within the VAR framework of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). Therefore,
we adapt the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) VAR speci￿cation to contain the same domestic
and foreign variables as we use in the U.S. portion of our GVAR: We consider a VAR with
the endogenous variables vector
￿
yt Pt y￿
t P￿
t FFRt Rt R￿
t Q￿
t
￿
: (1.61)
(Note that the starred variables now again denote the weighted sums of the corresponding
U.S. variables across all eight countries in our panel foreign to the U.S., instead of referring to
one speci￿c foreign country (Germany in the previous step of our counterfactual analysis).)
Compared to Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), we add the foreign consumer price index and
the U.S. short-term interest rate Rt, replace the real bilateral U.S. Dollar versus Deutsche
Mark exchange rate with the nominal e⁄ective U.S. Dollar exchange rate (Q￿
t rather than qt),
and drop the ratio between U.S. non-borrowed reserves and U.S. total reserves, nbrxt. We
continue to keep the Cholesky decomposition based identi￿cation scheme of Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995), with the variable ordering as noted in Equation (1.61)). While this is not a
truly multilateral speci￿cation yet, it captures a larger number of foreign variables than the
original Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) speci￿cation, and may address issues of potentially
peculiar results for speci￿c country pairs. Figure 1.15 provides the impulse responses. The
nominal and real e⁄ective U.S. Dollar exchange rates still display delayed overshooting, with
the peak of the appreciation of the U.S. Dollar occurring approximately 24 to 30 months after
the federal funds rate shock. The forward premium exhibits an approximately 0:4 percent
deviation from uncovered interest parity right after the U.S. monetary policy shock, before
the forward premium returns to zero within about 12 months. Augmenting the bilateral
VAR of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) to capture all variables entering the United States
component of our GVECM thus still resolves neither the delayed exchange rate overshooting
puzzle nor the forward premium puzzle.
51Section 1.7 Chapter 1
F
i
g
u
r
e
1
.
1
5
:
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
o
f
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
"
C
o
u
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
t
u
a
l
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
"
S
t
e
p
2
:
A
u
g
m
e
n
t
i
n
g
E
i
c
h
e
n
b
a
u
m
a
n
d
E
v
a
n
s
(
1
9
9
5
)
S
p
e
c
i
￿
c
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
C
a
p
t
u
r
e
t
h
i
s
P
a
p
e
r
￿
s
S
p
e
c
i
￿
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
a
n
d
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
52Section 1.7 Chapter 1
The third step of our counterfactual analysis is to move from the VAR setting to the truly
multilateral GVAR setting, specifying separate models for all nine countries in our panel. For
each country we consider the ￿ve domestic variables (yit Pit Rm
it Rit Qit), and the four weighted
foreign variables (y￿
it P￿
it R￿
it Q￿
it). The U.S. monetary policy shock is identi￿ed in the United
States portion of the GVAR using a Wold ordering, and is then incorporated into the global
solution. In this analysis, only the order of the domestic variables matters, and we order these
as yit, Pit, Rm
it, Rit, and Qit. A major di⁄erence in empirical results that we obtain for the
Cholesky decomposition-based GVAR as compared to the models considered in the ￿rst two
steps of our counterfactual analysis is that after a U.S. monetary policy shock, the German
short-term interest rate displays no signi￿cant response (see Figure 1.16). The non-GVAR
setting appears to overstate the response of German interest rates to U.S. monetary policy
shocks. In addition, the federal funds rate falls back to its original levels within 14 months, a
shorter adjustment phase than in the bilateral models. The peak responses of the U.S. Dollar
nominal and real e⁄ective exchange rates occur in the second month after the U.S. monetary
policy shock, but except for the ￿rst two months these responses are insigni￿cant, and for all
months of very small magnitude. The contemporaneous e⁄ective forward premium￿ s response
is about ￿0:3 percent, the deviations from uncovered interest parity now being smaller and
less persistent than for the bilateral models, with signi￿cant responses occurring only for
the ￿rst four or so months. Figure 1.17 reports results for the impulse responses implied
by this set-up for bilateral U.S. Dollar versus Deutsche Mark nominal and real exchange
rates, as well as bilateral forward premia between the United States and Germany. The
peak of the overshooting for the bilateral rates occurs with a signi￿cant delay of about 12
months only. The forward premium is signi￿cant in favor of U.S. bonds for about nine
months. Overall, therefore, working with a multilateral GVAR model without considering
long-run cointegration based monetary policy shock identi￿cation, there still is evidence for
the delayed exchange rate overshooting and forward premium puzzles. The lack of signi￿cance
of the U.S. Dollar nominal and real e⁄ective exchange rate impulse responses cast, however,
doubt on the set-up of a GVAR with the U.S. monetary policy shock being identi￿ed on the
basis of a Cholesky decomposition.
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In the fourth step of our counterfactual analysis, we capture the long-run cointegrating
relations of our GVECM set-up, but still use the Cholesky decomposition based monetary
policy shock identi￿cation of the previous steps of our counterfactual analysis. The results are
displayed in Figures 1.18 and 1.19. As for the GVAR results, the German short-term interest
rate does not display a signi￿cant reaction to the U.S. monetary policy shock. The U.S.
Dollar e⁄ective nominal and real exchange rates show small short-term appreciation, and then
depreciate. For the U.S. Dollar versus Deutsche Mark bilateral nominal and real exchange
rates implied by this set-up, we observe a similar small short-run appreciation. The forward
premium impulse responses, both measured as e⁄ective forward premia for the United States
and as bilateral forward premia for the United States relative to Germany, indicate forward
premia in favor of U.S. bonds for about four months. The mostly insigni￿cant nominal and
real depreciation of the U.S. Dollar in response to a contractionary U.S. monetary policy
shock obtained in the GVECM setting of this step suggests that the Cholesky decomposition
based shock identi￿cation is rather problematic when applied to a model containing long-run
restrictions.
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For the ￿fth step of our counterfactual analysis, we then move to our GVECM set-up with
identi￿cation restrictions similar to those in Sections 5 and 6, namely cointegration-based
long-run restrictions augmented by as few short-run identi￿cation restrictions as necessary,
but now - unlike in Sections 5 and 6 - we impose cross-country orthogonality of the monetary
policy shocks. As Figure 1.20 shows, for the impulse responses for the nominal and real
e⁄ective U.S. Dollar exchange rates this yields very similar results as we had obtained in
Section 6. (The impulse responses in Figures 1.22 and 1.23 are obtained using our method-
ology of Sections 5 and 6, except that they are plotted for a U.S. contractionary monetary
policy shock of 50 basis points, as in the previous steps of the counterfactual analysis in this
Section.) Also, the impulse response for the e⁄ective U.S. forward premium is very simi-
lar to the one we had obtained in Section 6. While there are quantitative di⁄erences for
the bilateral exchange rate and forward premium responses across the two settings of cross-
country orthogonality of the monetary policy shocks being imposed/not imposed, and the
results are stronger when cross-country orthogonality of the monetary policy shocks is not
imposed (which also is our preferred speci￿cation), for the analysis involving e⁄ective rates
assumptions regarding the presence of cross-country correlation of shocks abroad with U.S.
monetary policy shocks clearly are not a factor for the results.
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Overall, the ￿ndings of our counterfactual analysis strongly suggest that both (i) our
accounting for multilateral (rather than just bilateral) cross-country adjustment in response
to monetary policy shocks, and (ii) our taking advantage of the identifying restrictions for
monetary policy shocks implied by long-run relations between the macroeconomic variables
under consideration, are of critical relevance in us being able to provide evidence that there
is neither a delayed exchange rate overshooting puzzle nor a forward premium puzzle in the
adjustment of U.S. Dollar nominal and real exchange rates and forward premia in response
to U.S. monetary policy shocks.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper we have re-considered the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates
and forward premia. In the recent empirical literature these e⁄ects have been described
as puzzling, in that they would include delayed overshooting of the exchange rate as well
as persistent deviations from uncovered interest parity. We have constructed an empirical
model that in particular (i) allows for simultaneous multi-country adjustments in response to
monetary policy shocks, and (ii) takes advantage of the identifying restrictions for monetary
policy shocks implied by long-run relations between the macroeconomic variables under con-
sideration. Using monthly data from 1978 to 2006 for a panel of nine industrial economies
(Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the
United States), we have found that U.S. Dollar e⁄ective and bilateral real exchange rates
appreciate almost on impact after a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock, and that
there is no delay in the overshooting of the U.S. Dollar. Furthermore, there is no persistent
signi￿cant forward premium and the price puzzle is at most weakly present. These results
are consistent with the real exchange rate e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks in sticky price
open economy macroeconomic models, though the results of this paper also suggest that the
latter models should be speci￿ed so as to capture simultaneous multi-country adjustments to
shocks.
1.9 Appendix 1.1 : Data De￿nitions and Sources
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1.10 Appendix 1.2: Cointegrating Relations for the United
States, and Tests for Long-Run Uncovered Interest and
Purchasing Power Parity for All Countries
Cointegration #1
0:01t + 1:00yt￿1 + 0:00Pt￿1 + 0:00Rm
t￿1 ￿ 2:79Rt￿1 ￿ 1:89Qt￿1 + 0:53y￿
t￿1
￿ 3:92P￿
t￿1 + 9:18Rs￿
t￿1 ￿ 1:13Q￿
t￿1 + 0:45Po
t￿1 + 0:18Po
t￿1 v I(0) (1.62)
Cointegration #2
￿0:01t + 0:00yt￿1 + 1:00Pt￿1 + 0:00Rm
t￿1 ￿ 0:56Rt￿1 + 0:81Qt￿1 ￿ 0:22y￿
t￿1
+ 0:76P￿
t￿1 ￿ 3:12Rs￿
t￿1 + 0:41Q￿
t￿1 ￿ 0:12Po
t￿1 ￿ 0:05Po
t￿1 v I(0) (1.63)
Cointegration #3
0:00t + 0:00yt￿1 + 0:00Pt￿1 + 1:00Rm
t￿1 ￿ 1:20Rt￿1 + 0:21Qt￿1 ￿ 0:11y￿
t￿1
+ 0:40P￿
t￿1 ￿ 0:73Rs￿
t￿1 + 0:11Q￿
t￿1 ￿ 0:02Po
t￿1 ￿ 0:01Po
t￿1 v I(0) (1.64)
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Tests for Long-Run Uncovered Interest and Purchasing Power Parity
Australia Canada France
Uncovered In-
terest Parity
0.20 0.00 0.00
Purchasing
Power Parity
0.00 0.00 0.00
Uncovered In-
terest and Pur-
chasing Power
Parity
0.00 0.00 0.00
Germany Italy Japan
Uncovered In-
terest Parity
0.00 0.00 0.00
Purchasing
Power Parity
0.00 0.00 0.07
Uncovered In-
terest and Pur-
chasing Power
Parity
0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand United Kingdom United States
Uncovered In-
terest Parity
0.00 0.00 0.00
Purchasing
Power Parity
1.00 0.00 0.00
Uncovered In-
terest and Pur-
chasing Power
Parity
0.00 0.00 0.00
The reported p-values are for likelihood ratio tests of the overidentifying
restrictions on the cointegrating relations implied by Uncovered Interest and
Purchasing Power Parity.
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Exchange Rate Dynamics,
Expectations, and Monetary Policy
Fundamentals
2.1 Introduction
Since the study by Meese and Rogo⁄(1983), the literature has favored the view that exchange
rate dynamics are unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals. Macroeconomic models with
an exogenous money supply and rational expectations cannot outperform the random walk
model in terms of exchange rate return forecasts over a short to medium horizon, although
they gain empirical support in the case of long-horizon forecasts.1 Recent studies, such as
those by Taylor (1993) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) have found that central banks
set interest rates in reaction to macroeconomic fundamental changes. The implication is
that macroeconomic fundamentals could in￿ uence the exchange rates by inducing changes in
monetary policy expectations. Furthermore, fundamentals to which the central banks react
(monetary policy fundamentals) should be considered as one set of determinants of exchange
rate movements.
Recent studies such as Andersen et al. (2003), Faust et al. (2007), and Clarida and
Waldman (2007) show that exchange rates react to macroeconomic news, suggesting that
market participants expect future monetary policy to change in reaction to macroeconomic
1See Mark (1995), Mark and Sul (2001).
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conditions. Furthermore, subsequent changes in anticipation of the interest rate di⁄erential
in￿ uence their demand for currencies and thus in￿ uence the exchange rates. These ￿nd-
ings highlight the importance of the channel of monetary policy expectation through which
macroeconomic variables in￿ uence exchange rate dynamics.
Recent papers on exchange rates model monetary policy as a function of macroeconomic
fundamentals and evaluate the explanatory and predictive power of the fundamentals of
monetary policy, with mixed results. Molodtsova and Papell (2009) ￿nd that econometric
models with Taylor rule fundamentals beat the random walk for some currency pairs in terms
of one-month exchange rate return forecasts. Chen and Tsang (2010) ￿nd that models with
Taylor rule fundamentals and yield curve factors embedding ￿nancial market expectations
outperform the random walk model for forecasting the price of the yen and pound relative to
the U.S. dollar. Engel and West (2006) and Mark (2009) ￿nd that the price of the deutsche
mark and euro relative to the U.S. dollar generated from a UIP model with Taylor rule
fundamentals is moderately correlated with the actual exchange rate. However, the same
correlations for the exchange rate returns are rather mild over the short to medium horizon.
Binici and Cheung (2010) ￿nd the explanatory power of monetary policy rule fundamentals
varies across di⁄erent assumptions of policy rules. Therefore, it is di¢ cult to conclude whether
the monetary policy expectation channel can improve the explanatory and predictive power
of macroeconomic fundamentals.
The importance of modeling the market expectations of macroeconomic fundamentals are
highlighted in the above models. However, their treatments of market expectations regarding
future monetary policy are relatively simple. Typically, the expectations are assumed to be
based on a constant-parameter Taylor rule (Engel and West 2006 and Engel, Mark and West
2007) or an adaptive learning mechanism (Mark 2009), which is not guaranteed to be consis-
tent with market expectations. Because the movement of current and future monetary policy
fundamentals in￿ uence the exchange rate through an induced change in market expectations
of monetary policy, a correct model of these expectations is crucial to reach a conclusion on
this question. In addition, the ￿ndings of Binici and Cheung (2010) suggest the need for a
systematic way to model monetary policy expectations.
This paper investigates the linkage between monetary policy fundamentals and exchange
rate returns through the channel of monetary policy expectations. In particular, we decom-
pose the exchange return into three components: market expectations of short-term interest
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rates, market expectations of currency risk premia and the exchange rate forecast error. We
focus on the determination of monetary policy fundamentals on the exchange rate through
the ￿rst component. We ￿rst examine whether the monetary policy fundamentals are part
of the process by which market participants form expectations of future interest rates and
how they determine these expectations. We then explore whether the expected future inter-
est rates determine the exchange rate dynamics. In particular, we model this expectation
formation process based on consensus forecasts, which come from forecasts collected from
surveyed market participants. Speci￿cally, we generate interest rate forecasts from a large
number of VAR models that represent the alternatives of learning processes of the agents.
We use the model that generates the interest rate forecast closest to the consensus forecast
based on a set of criteria and we consider this the formation process for market expectations.
We therefore obtain the expected interest rates from this model. This avoids misspeci￿cation
from arbitrary assumptions about expectations.
Our analysis of the deutsche mark and euro price of U.S. dollar from 1979 to 2008 con￿rms
that the fundamentals of monetary policy in￿ uence exchange rate returns through the mone-
tary policy expectation channel. Modeling market expectations of monetary policy based on
consensus forecasts considerably improves the explanatory and predictive power of the mon-
etary policy fundamentals over the existing literature. Speci￿cally, we present the following
￿ndings and contributions.
First, Taylor rule fundamentals play a central role in the process of forming monetary
policy expectations among German and U.S. market participants. However, the functional
forms of the formation processes change over time and di⁄er across countries; the evidence
for the former property is stronger for the U.S. than it is for Germany and the euro area.
This implies that market expectations of short-term interest rates in Germany and the U.S.
cannot be represented by a single learning mechanism. This provides a reference for future
research that considers market expectations of monetary policy.
Second, in the pre-euro era, the expected short-term interest rate di⁄erentials are mod-
erately correlated with exchange rate returns over short horizons of up to one year and
strongly correlated over medium to longer horizons of up to four years. In the euro era, they
are strongly correlated with the exchange rate returns, even for the short to medium horizon.
These correlations are much larger than those found in previous studies. The volatility of
expected interest rates accounts for a large part of exchange rate return volatility over longer
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horizons. These ￿ndings imply that Taylor rule fundamentals have considerable explana-
tory power for exchange rate returns once the monetary policy expectation is modeled to be
consistent with the market￿ s expectation.
Third, the correlation between the expected interest rate and the exchange rate return
changes its sign from positive in the pre-euro era to negative in the euro era. The negative
sign implies that the UIP does not hold in the euro era and that the higher expected future
interest rate is associated with stronger currency, which is in line with the "interest parity
puzzle" in the international ￿nance literature.
Furthermore, the expected sum of future interest rate di⁄erentials is a good candidate
for the out-of-sample forecasting of exchange rate return, which outperforms the random
walk model for most of the forecast horizons in all sample periods in our exercise. This may
imply that macroeconomic fundamentals such as the output gap and in￿ ation rate have high
predictive power. Previous papers￿failure to beat the random walk model may result from
using the incorrect functional form instead of the wrong set of fundamentals. This is worth
considering before seeking other factors for forecasting exchange rates.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2.2 presents the conventional model
linking the monetary policy and the exchange rate, and the exchange rate return decom-
position derived from it. We also present the treatment in the previous literature and the
motivation of this paper. Section 2.3 discusses the modeling of the process of forming market
expectations of monetary policy. Section 2.4 evaluates the explanatory power of the monetary
policy expectations. Section 2.5 further evaluates the predictive power of monetary policy
expectations and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Exchange Rate Model
2.2.1 Decomposition
In this section, we use a model to demonstrate how macroeconomic fundamentals in￿ uence
exchange rate movements by inducing changes in monetary policy expectations. Following
the model, a summary of treatment for this problem in the existing literature is discussed.
We start from an uncovered interest parity (UIP) model with deviation from UIP, which is
the major link between exchange rate movement and macroeconomic variables in the existing
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literature:
Et￿st;t+h = Etst+h ￿ st =
￿
ih
t ￿ ih￿
t
￿
+ ￿t;t+h (2.1)
where st is the logarithm of the nominal bilateral exchange rate at period t, de￿ned as the
domestic price of the foreign currency. Furthermore, ih
t is the interest rate at t with maturity
h, ih￿
t is the corresponding foreign interest rate, and ￿t;t+h indicates the currency risk premium
between t and t+h. Since the exchange rate return over k maturity horizons can be written
as the sum exchange rate changes over each maturity horizon of h periods:
Et￿st;t+kh = Etst+kh ￿ st = Et￿st;t+h + Et￿st+h;t+2h + ::: + Etst+(k￿1)h;t+kh (2.2)
by combining equation 2.1 and 2.2, the kh-period ahead exchange rate change is expressed
as
Etst+kh ￿ st = Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
+ Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿t+ih;t+(i+1)h: (2.3)
If ￿t;t+kh represents the forecast error, that is st+kh = Etst+kh + ￿t;t+kh, the actual exchange
rate over kh-period horizon becomes:
￿st;t+kh = Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
+ Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿t+ih;t+(i+1)h + ￿t;t+kh: (2.4)
Therefore, the exchange rate change is decomposed into three parts: the expected sum of
current and future interest rate di⁄erentials between the domestic and foreign country (which
are indicators for monetary policies in many advanced economies), the expected sum of
current and future currency risk premia, and the forecast error.2
An example of this relationship is as follows: if we have monthly data and the interest
rate maturity is 3 months (k = 3), then the 5-year (60-month) ahead change of exchange rate
is written
st+60 ￿ st = Et
19 X
i=0
￿
i3
t+3i ￿ i3￿
t+3i
￿
+ Et
19 X
i=0
￿t+3i;t+3(i+1) + ￿t;t+60: (2.5)
2I do not decompose the level of exchange rate here because, since as the in￿nite forward interation requires
a stationarity assumption for the exchange rate. See Engel and West (2010). I do not impose this assumption
in the model.
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The actual change in exchange rates over the horizon of ￿ve years equals the expected
sum of current and future 3-month interest rates spanning 19 maturity periods, the expected
sum of corresponding future risk premium, and the forecast error.
Based on this decomposition, any impact of the macroeconomic fundamentals on exchange
rate return must go through these three channels:
(i) (i) Changing the expectations of domestic and foreign monetary policies, that is,
the ￿rst term on the right-hand side of Equation 2.4 can be written as a function of the
fundamentals:
Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
= f (Xt;X￿
t ); (2.6)
with Xt =
￿
x
0
t; x
0
t￿1; ::: x
0
t￿p
￿0
and X￿
t =
￿
x￿0
t; x￿0
t￿1; ::: x￿0
t￿q
￿0
. xt denotes the
vector of macroeconomic fundamentals at period t in the home and foreign country and
x￿
tdenotes the foreign counterpart.3 p and q are the lags chosen by market participants.
These fundamentals are the ones to which the market participants perceive that the central
banks will react by adjusting the short-term interest rates. Therefore, f indicates how the
monetary policy fundamentals determine the expected sum of future interest rates.
(ii) Changing the expectation of risk premium, that is,
Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿t+ih;t+(i+1)h = g (Xt;X￿
t ) + e g (nt): (2.7)
Here nt represents a vector containing variables other than the monetary policy fundamentals
that determine the expected future currency risk premia. g and e g are the functions mapping
fundamentals and other factors to expected premia respectively.
(iii) Changing the forecast error:
￿t;t+3k = l(Xt;X￿
t ) +e l(mt); (2.8)
where, analogously, mt is a vector of variables determining the forecast error in addition to
these fundamentals, l and e l are corresponding functions.
The research question that asks whether and how monetary policy fundamentals deter-
mine exchange rate change by inducing changes in monetary policy expectations requires
3Xt and X
￿
t include lag interest rates.
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a focus on channel (i). Speci￿cally, we need to identify f and to evaluate the explanatory
power of f for st+kh ￿ st. Only if there is evidence that f is determined by monetary policy
fundamentals and f (Xt;X￿
t ) can explain st+kh ￿ st; can the above question be answered
positively.
2.2.2 Treatment in the Existing Literature
The treatment of the relationship between exchange rate dynamics and the fundamentals of
monetary policy rule can be categorized into two types:
The ￿rst type includes econometric models focusing on the forecasting ability of the
monetary policy fundamentals for change in the exchange rate. Typically, they regress the
exchange rate change on fundamentals using the following form:
￿st;t+kh = ￿f Xt + ￿￿ f X￿
t + ￿￿t + "t (2.9)
where f Xt and f X￿
t are the monetary policy fundamentals in the home and foreign countries
used in these models,4 and ￿ and ￿￿ are their corresponding parameters. ￿t and coe¢ cient ￿
represent the part explained by factors other than the observed monetary policy fundamen-
tals.5 Papers using this type of model include Engel, West and Mark (2007),6 Molodtsova
and Papell (2009), and Chen and Tsang (2010).7 In this model setting, the coe¢ cient ￿
and ￿￿ represent the total e⁄ect of the monetary policy fundamentals on the exchange rate
return through all three channels. There is no distinction between e⁄ects through di⁄erent
channels. Therefore, one cannot determine whether the fundamentals in￿ uence exchange rate
movement by changing monetary policy expectation. In addition, the parameters are subject
to bias due to the potential missing variable problem if other determinants of the currency
risk premia and those of forecast error are not captured in ￿t:
The second type of treatment simulates a model￿ s implied exchange rate, based on the
￿rst term on the right-hand side of equation 2.4. This literature was pioneered by Engel and
West (2006) (EW06, hereafter) and followed by recent papers like Mark (2009) and Binici
4 f Xt and f X￿
t also include lag variables.
5Some papers use panel regressions, for simplicity, I use the time series representation here.
6Engel, West and Mark (2007) estimate a panel regression.
7Chen and Tsang (2010) emphasize combining the yield curve factors, which embed the expectations of the
￿nancial market participants, and the Taylor rule fundamentals, which represent the macroeconomic factors,
to forecast exchange rate. Their primary focus is not the predictive power of monetary policy fundamentals.
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and Cheung (2010) (BC 10, hereafter). In general, they assume certain monetary policy
rule-that is, an exogenously determined interest rate reaction function to replace Etih
t+ih
and Etih￿
t+ih whenever they appear. This replacement suggests the authors￿assumption that
the agent perceives the central banks￿adherence to these rules. With this assumption, the
expected sum of the future interest rate di⁄erential is written as a function of monetary policy
rule fundamentals Xt and X￿
t : The following shows the general form of this model-implied
exchange rate:
￿e s = f Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
= e ￿t
￿
f Xt
￿
+ e ￿￿
t
￿
f X￿
t
￿
= ￿
￿
f Xt; f X￿
t
￿
(2.10)
where e ￿t and e ￿￿
t are functions that map the domestic and foreign monetary policy fun-
damentals in these models, respectively, to f Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
. ￿ varies across models due
to di⁄erent assumptions of the expected monetary policy rules. These assumptions di⁄er in
the following features:
1. The macroeconomic variables to which the monetary policy responds. EW 06 and
Mark (2009) assume that the agents believe the central bank follows the Taylor rule, and
the fundamentals are output gap and in￿ ation (and the real exchange rate, in EW06). BC
10 try di⁄erent optimal monetary policy rules including the Taylor rule, in￿ ation targeting,
and constant money growth, among others. Therefore, the fundamentals include output,
in￿ ation, money growth and their variations.
2. Parameters of these fundamentals. Some papers take the monetary policy rule para-
meters from existing literature and others estimate them using the sample data. Parameters
can either be homogeneous or heterogeneous in domestic and foreign countries.
3. The expectation formation process (EFP) of future macroeconomic fundamentals, if
it exists in the policy rule. A typical example is the processes for output gap and in￿ ation,
which appear most often in the model with policy rules. The treatment in the existing
papers uses di⁄erent kinds of assumed EFPs. A constant parameter VAR assumes that
agents incorporate future realized variables to form a forecast (EW 06, Engel and West 2010)
or engage in constant least squares learning (Mark 09) or a ￿xed-year window VAR learning
(BC 10).
Therefore, ￿ is computed using di⁄erent combinations of the above three features. The
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correlation between ￿ and the actual exchange rate change ￿st;t+kh is computed,8 and the
subsequent conclusions about the linkage between monetary policy fundamentals and ex-
change rate is made.
Note that there is no guarantee that
￿
￿
f Xt; f X￿
t
￿
= f (Xt;X￿
t ) = Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
(2.11)
if there is no evidence that the arbitrary assumptions of the expected future monetary policies
in domestic and foreign countries match the actual expectations of the market participants.
The conclusion that policy fundamentals in￿ uence exchange rate changes by inducing changes
in expectations of future policy is therefore not found using the existing model. To do so,
the correct modeling of market participants￿EFP of future monetary policy￿ that is, the
modeling of f (Xt;X￿
t )￿ is necessary. Therefore, in the next section, we discuss the modeling
of the EFP of monetary policy stance.
As discussed in the above section, two sub-questions must be answered before reaching
the conclusion. Therefore, the following exercise is divided into two steps. The ￿rst step is
to investigate whether and how the expected sum of interest rate di⁄erentials depends on
policy rule fundamentals. The answer depends on modeling the market participants￿EFP
for future monetary policy. If we obtain a positive answer for the ￿rst step, the second step
is to evaluate whether the expected sum of interest rate di⁄erentials explains the exchange
rate change in terms of co-movement and volatility. These two steps are discussed in the
following sections.
2.3 Expectation Formation Process (EFP) of Monetary Policy
Stance
To discern whether the monetary policy fundamentals determine the expected future mone-
tary policy stance, it is necessary to know the market participants￿EFP of short-term interest
rates. It is then necessary to analyze whether the factors in this process are the monetary
policy fundamentals. To unfold the EFP requires obtaining the market expected interest
8Note that this formula is not explicitly used in the above-mentioned papers. Some of these papers focus
on the level exchange rate and write the expression in terms of levels. It is shown here that if they compute
the exchange rate change/return, the model￿ s implied exchange rate can be expressed in this formula.
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rates, identifying the variables determining them, and the functional form matching these
variables to the expected interest rates.
Concerning the market expected future monetary policy stance, survey forecasts of in-
terest rates from professionals are believed to represent subjective market expectations. We
therefore use the survey data and further study the underlying EFPs that generate them.
For countries where central banks follow a rule to set short-term interest rates and the public
is well informed about this, it is natural to assume that the public incorporates the monetary
policy rule fundamentals in their EFPs. However, we have to further identify the functional
form of EFP, which is determined by forms of the variables, such as variables in levels or
growth rate form, the length of the historical data incorporated for forecasting at each pe-
riod, and additional variables not included in the general interest rate reaction functions but
believed to be monitored by the central banks.
One way to determine the EFP is to generate interest rate forecasts from various models.
If the number of models is large enough, a model can be found that produces an interest rate
close enough to the consensus forecast, and this model can represent the EFP of the market
participants. A natural starting point to mimic this learning process is to use a reduced-form
VAR with time-varying parameters, which allows agents to learn new information and make
a new forecast each period.9
Using the above strategy to identify EFP based on the consensus forecast is the main
deviation of our paper from the previous literature in terms of treating expectations. This
treatment assures that the EFPs in the model are not arbitrarily assumed and represent the
perception of the market participants.
In this paper, we focus on the price of deutsche mark and euro relative to the U.S. dollar;
therefore, the expected monetary policies of Germany, the euro area and the U.S. are inves-
tigated. The primary reason for choosing these two economies is that central banks in these
economies are generally found to follow a Taylor-type rule when conducting monetary policy
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1998). This helps to reduce the set of possible fundamentals that
the agents incorporate in their expectation formation. In addition, because these economies
are the focus of a large body of existing papers, analyzing the exchange rate between the
deutsche mark and euro and the U.S. dollar allows a direct comparison with the previous
literature.
9These are special cases of adaptive learning, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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In the next section, we discuss the consensus interest rate forecasts and the VAR learning
models in further detail.
2.3.1 Consensus Interest Rate Forecasts
We use the survey forecast of short-term interest rates in Germany and the U.S. from consen-
sus economics. Consensus economics surveys over 240 ￿nancial and economic institutes for
their forecasts for their forecast for interest rate values with 3-month maturities in one quar-
ter and one year ahead. The professional forecasters include all kinds of ￿nancial institutions
and a small number of economic research institutes.
Our monthly observation of the consensus interest rate forecast starts in October 1989 and
ends in February 2008. For each country, we take the mean of the interest rate forecasts from
each institute as the representative value from the market participants in that country. Due
to the euro launch, from January 1999 onward, we study the dynamics of the euro-U.S. dollar
exchange rate. Therefore, the relevant economy for this exchange rate shifts from Germany
to the entire euro area. The mean value for euro-area interest rates forecast is composed of
forecasts in ￿ve euro-area economies: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the 3-month and 12-month consensus forecast and the actual
interest rates in the U.S..10 The consensus forecast is systematically above or below the
federal funds rate before the mid-1990s, which may suggest that there was room for the
Federal Reserve to work on anchoring interest rate expectation during that period compared
to the late 1990s. At the same time, this also implies that perfect foresight does not apply to
these market participants. Therefore, using realized interest rates to represent their expected
rates is potentially misleading and justi￿es the use of market expectations. Therefore, the
next section examines the EFP by VAR learning.
2.3.2 VAR Learning
As discussed above, we start with VARs to study the interest rate EFPs of the agents in
Germany/the euro area and U.S. The general form of VAR for each country is represented
by the following equation:
xt = ￿ +
p X
j=1
￿j;txt￿j + ut: (2.12)
10The months at the x-axis indicates the value of the interest rates the forecast is made for and the actual
interest rate at that month.
79Section 2.3 Chapter 2
Figure 2.1: U.S. Short-term Interest Rate Forecast (Forecast Horizon=3
Months)-pre Euro Era
Figure 2.2: U.S. Short-term Interest Rate Forecast (Forecast Horizon=12
Months)-pre Euro Era
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Equation 2.12 is an unrestricted VAR with time-varying parameters in xt with lag p. xt is
a vector of short-term interest rate it and other domestic variables determining it￿ s law of
motion. ￿ denotes a vector of constant, and ut is the vector of residuals. Note that the
time-varying coe¢ cients ￿j;t allow the agents to update their beliefs about interest rates￿law
of motion each period. The VAR represents a learning mechanism for the agents about the
central bank￿ s monetary policy stance. We estimate this VAR using di⁄erent speci￿cations;
the resulting models are the alternatives for the representative EFP . The speci￿cations di⁄er
in the following respects.
1. The variables determine the interest rate dynamics in market participants￿perceptions,
which are included in . We start with Taylor-rule fundamentals as implied by Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1998). Because the Taylor rule is widely known, it is not too strong to
assume that the agents in Germany or the euro area and the United States believe that
relevant variables they incorporate in EFP are output gap (de￿ned as deviation of industrial
production from its HP ￿ltered level) and in￿ ation. In fact, both the level and growth rate
of these two variables are alternatives for VAR learning speci￿cations. In addition, given
that the information set considered by central banks when taking their monetary policy is
huge (literally hundreds of data series)11 and this is likely to be known by the public, we do
not exclude the possibility that agents incorporate information from a large number of other
macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables. Therefore, we also adopt the factor-augmented VAR
(FAVAR) based on Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) (BBE 05, hereafter) to generate the
U.S. EFP alternatives. The following form of FAVAR is considered:
2
4 Ft
xt
3
5 =
q X
j=1
￿j;t
2
4 Ft￿j
xt￿j
3
5 + ￿t (2.13)
where Ft denotes the vector of the unobserved factor, ￿j;t is the time-varying coe¢ cient
vector, ￿t is the residual and q is the lag length. The factor is extracted from more than 70
macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables, as listed in Appendix 2.1.
2. Length of rolling windows. The length of rolling windows indicates the length of
historical data the agents incorporate for their forecasts. Windows selected here are either
￿xed with length from 4 to 10 years, meaning the agents use the past 4 to 10 years￿information
up to the current period, or expanding, implying that the agents do not discard any historical
11Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005), p.388.
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data when they obtain the new one each period.
3. Lag length. Lag length ranges from 1 to 6. Lag length is either set by optimal lag
selection criteria or set exogenously.
VARs with di⁄erent combinations of the above features are estimated, and the forecasts
of interest rates one quarter ahead Evar
t (it+3) and one year ahead Evar
t (it+12) are made each
month. We thus obtain two time series of VAR generated forecasts of 3-month and 12-month
interest rates. We pick the VAR that generates forecasts with the highest correlations with the
consensus interest rates forecasts E
cf
t (it+3) and E
cf
t (it+12) and produce a standard deviation
and autocorrelation close to those of the consensus forecasts12. This VAR is considered to
represent the EFP of the market participants.
Our sample data span 1979:1 to 2008:2; details are available in Appendix 2.1. The es-
tablishment of the European central bank and the launch of the euro indicates that it is
appropriate to assume that market participants form their euro-wide interest rate expecta-
tions incorporating euro-wide variables rather than German variables. Therefore, we split
the sample into two periods. The ￿rst period spans 1979:1 to 1998:12, which is called the
pre-euro era in the following sections, and the second spans 1999:1 to 2008: 2, which is the
euro era.
2.3.3 Properties of the Market EFP
In this section, we discuss the properties of the VAR that represents the EFPs of market
participants. The market EFP reveals whether the policy fundamentals is in the process of
interest rate forecasts and, if so, how the information on fundamentals is processed.
We report the best-￿t VARs for two countries in the pre- and post-euro eras, respectively;
that is, there are four best-￿t VARs. We ￿rst analyze the results for the former period.
EFP for Pre-euro Monetary Policy
Our consensus forecast data are available from 1989:10 onwards, so the 3-month interest rate
forecasts being compared for the pre-euro era are for 1990:1 to 1998:12, and the 12-month
forecasts are for 1990:10 to 1998:12.
The best VAR for the United States is a six-year ￿xed-rolling window VAR with four lags,
12We use lexicographic preference, the matches with the 3-month forecast is ordered ￿rst and the one for
12-month forecast is placed to the second order.
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Table 2.1: Comparison between the U.S. Interest Rate Forecast from Best-￿t
VAR and Consensus in Pre-euro Era
U.S. Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation Auto Correlation (of Lag One)
(Consensus, VAR) Consensus VAR Consensus VAR
3m ahead 0.98 1.33 1.45 0.97 0.96
12m ahead 0.95 1.13 1.38 0.97 0.92
including federal funds rate ius
t , output (industrial production) gap, b yus
t and in￿ ation ￿us
t .
The industrial production (IP) gap is constructed as the IP deviation of the HP ￿ltered IP.
Table 2.1 shows the properties of this VAR model.
Concerning the 3-month forecast, the forecast generated from VAR has a correlation of
0.98 with the consensus forecast. Its volatility also matches the volatility of the consensus
forecast well. Because we ￿nd that the consensus interest rate forecast is quite persistent with
a lag one auto-correlation of 0.97, we also attempt to determine whether the VAR forecast
reproduces this property. The auto correlation of lag one reaches 0.96, which con￿rms that
the VAR-generated forecast also does a good job. Figure 2.1 shows that the VAR forecast
tracks the consensus forecast very closely, especially from 1992 on. For the ￿rst two years in
the 1990s, we observe that some deviations in the VAR forecast from consensus forecast are
relatively larger. This may be because there were structural changes in the mid- to late-1980s,
leading agents to use more recent information to form their forecasts. Therefore, forecasts
based on the average relationship for the last six years are less accurate for reproducing the
agents￿beliefs regarding these changes.
For the 12-month forecasts, the correlation between the forecast generated from VAR and
the one from consensus is lower than the 3-month forecast but still higher than 0.9. The
persistency property of the consensus forecast is matched well. However, the VAR forecast
has a higher volatility than the consensus forecast, which can be shown in table 2.1 and
￿gure 2.2. Furthermore, the relative volatility of the VAR forecast to the consensus forecast
is higher for the 12-month case than for the 3-month case.13
One fact worth mentioning is that the FAVAR, which incorporates a large amount of
information on macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables, does not generate a higher correlation
than the parsimonious VAR does. Table 2.2 comparison between the best-￿t FAVAR forecast
and the consensus interest rate forecast.
13This may imply that the EFP generating 3-month forecasts is di⁄erent from the one generating 12-month
forecasts. There is room for future research on this issue. For this paper, we assume the forecast for all
horizons is generated by the same EFP.
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Table 2.2: Comparison between the U.S. Interest Rate Forecast from Best-￿t
FAVAR and Consensus in Pre-euro Era
U.S. Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation Auto Correlation (of Lag One)
(Consensus, FAVAR) Consensus FAVAR Consensus FAVAR
3m ahead 0.98 1.33 1.48 0.97 0.95
12m ahead 0.84 1.33 1.45 0.97 0.89
Note: The FAVAR that generates an interest rate forecast with the highest
correlation with the consensus forecast is in three observed variables b y ;￿;i and
two common factors.
Table 2.3: Comparison between the U.S. Interest Rate Forecast from VARs
and Consensus in Pre-euro Era
Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation
Rolling (Consensus,VAR) (VAR)
Window Variables Lag 3-month 12-month 3-month 12-month
Expanding b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i
us
t 4 0.9208 0.8994 1.5572 1.8378
window (1.334) (1.326)
Expanding b y
us
t ;￿￿
us
t ;￿i
us
t 3 0.9333 0.8849 1.5449 1.7588
window* (1.334) (1.326)
Expanding b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i
us
t 4 0.9208 0.8994 1.5572 1.8378
window** (1.6901) (1.3195)
5-year b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i
us
t 4 0.9800 0.8108 1.5052 1.7198
window (1.6901) (1.3195)
6-year b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i
us
t 2 0.9745 0.8965 1.4403 1.3891
window (1.334) (1.326)
6-year b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i
us
t 3 0.9783 0.9259 1.4644 1.4772
window (1.334) (1.326)
4-year b y
us
t ;￿￿
us
t ;￿i
us
t 2 0.9889 0.8850 1.9071 2.2711
window (1.6901) (1.3195)
Note: The number in () denote the value for consensus forecast. b y is the output gap ￿
is the in￿ ation rate, and i is the short-term interest rate. * for ￿rst forecast is based on
a VAR of the ￿rst 6-year data. ** for ￿rst forecast is based on a VAR of the ￿rst 5-year
data.
In summary, in the 1990s, U.S. market participants tended to use the information on
output gap and in￿ ation to form their expectations of future monetary policy. They per-
ceived frequent structural changes in policy and incorporated only recent data to form their
expectations. The relatively low correlation generated from the expanding window VAR in
table 2.3 con￿rms this conjecture.
The best-￿t VAR for Germany comes from the expanding window model with four lags,
where the ￿rst forecast is made from the ￿rst six-year data. Variables included are output
(industrial production) gap, b yde
t ; in￿ ation growth rate, ￿ ￿us
t ; and short-term interest rate
changes, ￿ ius
t . Interest rate forecasts are made by transforming the forecast from ￿rst
di⁄erence to levels. Table 2.4 shows that the correlation between VAR and consensus forecast
reaches 0.99 for the 3-month forecast and 0.95 for the 12-month forecast. A visual comparison
84Section 2.3 Chapter 2
Table 2.4: Comparison between the German Interest Rate Forecast from
Best-￿t VAR and Consensus in Pre-euro Era
Germany Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation Auto Correlation (of Lag One)
(Consensus, VAR) Consensus VAR Consensus VAR
3m ahead 0.99 2.42 2.45 0.99 0.98
12m ahead 0.95 2.03 2.59 0.99 0.98
Figure 2.3: German Short-term Interest Rate Forecast (Forecast Horizon=3
Months)-pre Euro Era
is provided by ￿gures 2.3 and 2.4. From table 2.5, we know that the same VAR with three lags
or with a six-year rolling window perform similarly. This indicates that forecasts based on
the average relationship across all historical periods are similar to those using the most recent
periods. This further indicates that agents do not perceive frequent structural changes to
monetary policy and that the Bundesbank conducts a stable monetary policy and maintains
good credibility. Volatility matches for 3-month forecasts perform well, and the volatility of
the VAR 12-month forecast is a bit higher than the consensus forecast. We can see from
￿gure 2.4 that the VAR forecast is more volatile before 1995, but it catches the trend and the
turning points. The high persistency of the consensus forecast is well captured by the VAR
forecasts.Note that in addition to the expanding window, the best-￿t model for Germany
di⁄ers from the one for the U.S. in the form of variables entering the VAR. The best-￿t
variables for Germany are interest rate di⁄erences, output gaps, and in￿ ation growth, which
means that interest rate forecasts are made by converting the interest rate di⁄erence to level.
The likely reason for this is that the German consensus forecast and the actual interest rate
are highly persistent processes, with a lag one autocorrelation equal to 0.99 (Table 2.6).
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Figure 2.4: German Short-term Interest Rate Forecast (Forecast Horizon=12
Months)-pre Euro Era
Table 2.5: Comparison between the German Interest Rate Forecast from
VAR and Consensus in Pre-euro Era
Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation
Rolling (Consensus,VAR) (VAR)
Window Variables Lag 3-month 12-month 3-month 12-month
Expanding b y
de
t ;￿￿
de
t ;￿i
de
t 2 0.9847 0.9108 1.0261 1.2339
window** (0.9261) (0.8398)
Expanding b y
de
t ;￿￿
de
t ;￿i
de
t 3 0.9909 0.9562 2.4054 2.4636
window (2.4200) (2.0254)
4-year b y
de
t ;￿￿
de
t ;￿i
de
t 4 0.9734 0.8990 1.0552 1.4416
window (0.9261) (0.8398)
4-year b y
de
t ;￿
de
t ;i
de
t 4 0.9516 0.6498 0.9909 1.5787
window (0.9261) (0.8398)
6-year b y
de
t ;￿￿
de
t ;￿i
de
t 4 0.9896 0.9518 2.4504 2.5900
window (2.4200) (2.0254)
Note: b y is the output gap ￿ is the in￿ ation rate, and i is the short-term interest rate. *
for ￿rst forecast is based on a VAR of the ￿rst 6-year data. ** for ￿rst forecast is based
on a VAR of the ￿rst 5-year data.
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Making an interest rate forecast from a VAR in the di⁄erence of these variables means that
the level interest rate is an I(1) process; therefore, the time series of VAR forecast produced
in each month is also an I(1) process so that they can match the high persistency. In contrast,
the U.S. federal funds rate and its consensus forecast are less persistent than the German
short-term rate, so a forecast generated from stationary-level VARs matches the consensus
forecasts well.
Table 2.6: Statstical Properties of Short-term Interest Rates in Pre-euro Era
Countries Mean Standard Deviation Auto Correlation of lag
1 2 4 10
U.S. 5.16 1.46 0.97 0.93 0.84 0.46
Germany 5.93 2.41 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.83
Summarizing the learning mechanism for the EFP for U.S. and German interest rates
from 1990 to 1998, we ￿nd that core variables incorporated into the market participants￿
EFP are the output gap, in￿ ation, and lag interest rate. VAR in the level of these variables
generates the closest interest rate forecasts to the consensus forecast for the U.S., while VAR
in the di⁄erence of these variables generates the best-matching interest rate forecasts. U.S.
agents tend to perceive frequent structural changes of monetary policy, and the German
agents believe the Bundesbank follows a stable policy rule.
EFP for Euro Era Monetary Policy
The interest rate forecasts for comparison in the euro era cover the horizon from 1999:4 to
2008:2. We avoid the crisis period from 2008 onward because it is publicly known that during
the crisis period, central banks used non-standard measures that deviated from previous rules.
Therefore, it is di¢ cult to use a VAR that implies the rule-based expectation formation
process to match the consensus forecast in this period.
For the U.S., the best VAR is a ￿ve-year expanding window VAR with four lags, including
domestic output (industrial production) gap, b yus
t , in￿ ation growth ￿ ￿us
t and the federal funds
rate di⁄erence, ￿ ius
t . The expanding window implies that the market participants perceive
a stable monetary policy rule from the Federal Reserve in the late 1990s and the ￿rst eight
years in the twenty-￿rst century, which represents a signi￿cant di⁄erence compared to the
previous ten years. In the euro era, the volatility and persistency of U.S. consensus interest
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Figure 2.5: U.S. Short-term Interest Rate Forecast (Forecast Horizon=3
Months)-Euro Era
rate forecasts and actual interest rates are larger than the pre-euro era (Table 2.7 and 2.8),
so the VARs in di⁄erences of variables capture the consensus forecast best. However, the
VAR forecasts have a larger standard deviation than the consensus forecasts. Figures 2.5 and
2.6 show comparisons with 3- and 12-month forecasts. The trend of consensus forecasts are
mostly matched by the VAR forecast, but the volatility that this model generates is higher
than the consensus forecast.
Table 2.7: Statstical Properties of Short-term Interest Rates in Pre-euro Era
Countries Mean Standard Deviation Auto Correlation of lag
1 2 4 10
U.S. 3.57 1.85 0.99 0.98 0.93 0.65
Germany 3.23 0.96 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.52
Table 2.8: Comparison between the U.S. Interest Rate Forecast from Best-￿t
VAR and Consensus in Euro Era
U.S. Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation Auto Correlation (of Lag One)
(Consensus, VAR) Consensus FAVAR Consensus FAVAR
3m ahead 0.99 1.69 1.89 0.99 0.99
12m ahead 0.95 1.31 2.24 0.98 0.97
VAR interest rate forecasts from the same speci￿cations also match the German consensus
forecast very well. Although the VAR forecasts generate a higher standard deviation than
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Figure 2.6: U.S. Short-term Interest Rate Forecast (Forecast Horizon=12
Months)-Euro Era
Table 2.9: Comparison between the U.S. Interest Rate Forecast from VARs
and Consensus in the Euro Era
Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation
Rolling (Consensus,VAR) (VAR)
Window Variables Lag 3-month 12-month 3-month 12-month
Expanding b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i 4 0.9893 0.8835 1.7999 1.6919
window** (1.690) (1.3194)
5-year b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i
us
t 4 0.9867 0.6766 1.8220 2.2222
window (1.690) (1.3194)
5-year b y
us
t ;￿￿
us
t ;￿i
us
t 4 0.9890 0.8850 1.9071 2.2711
window (1.6900) (1.3194)
5-year b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i
us
t 3 0.6207 0.5141 1.897 2.242
window (1.690) (1.3194)
5-year b y
us
t ;￿￿
us
t ;￿i
us
t 2 0.9890 0.8850 1.907 2.271
window (1.690) (1.3194)
4-year b y
us
t ;￿
us
t ;i
us
t 4 0.9736 0.9340 0.9973 1.0862
window (1.690) (1.3194)
4-year b y
us
t ;￿￿
us
t ;￿i
us
t 4 0.9871 0.8841 1.958 2.883
window (1.690) (1.3194)
Note: b y is the output gap ￿ is the in￿ ation rate, and i is the short-term interest rate. *
for ￿rst forecast is based on a VAR of the ￿rst 6-year data. ** for ￿rst forecast is based
on a VAR of the ￿rst 5-year data.
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Table 2.10: Comparison between the German Interest Rate Forecast from
Best-￿t VAR and Consensus in the Euro Era
Germany Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation Auto Correlation (of Lag One)
(Consensus, FAVAR) Consensus VAR Consensus VAR
3m ahead 0.97 0.92 0.99 0.98 0.96
12m ahead 0.93 0.84 1.09 0.98 0.95
Figure 2.7: German Short-term Interest Rate Forecast (Forecast Horizon=3
Months)-Euro Era
the consensus forecasts (Table 2.10), they shows that both the 3- and 12-month forecasts
are less volatile than in the pre-euro era, which is consistent with the same changes to the
consensus forecasts. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show that 3-month forecasts track the consensus
tightly and that the 12-month forecasts track the consensus forecasts closely (although they
are a bit volatile) in the ￿rst half of the 2000s and mostly catch the trend for the recent-year
movements.
To summarize the ￿ndings, the expectation formation process of future monetary policy is
a function of the s, namely, output gap, in￿ ation and interest rates. Other information seems
to be less crucial for interest rate forecasts from the perspective of the market participants.
However, the functional forms vary by time, country and other factors. In the perception of
the market participants, the monetary policy regime is changing over time, and this evidence is
stronger in the U.S. than it is in Germany. Therefore, exercises assuming that agents perceive
constant-parameter Taylor rules or impose arbitrarily assumed VAR learning processes on the
agents are less likely to re￿ ect the actual EFP of the market participants.
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Figure 2.8: German Short-term Interest Rate Forecast (Forecast Horizon=12
Months)-Euro Era
Table 2.11: Comparison between the German Interest Rate Forecast from
VARs and Consensus in the Euro Era)
Correlation Coe¢ cient Standard Deviation
Rolling (Consensus,VAR) (VAR)
Window Variables Lag 3-month 12-month 3-month 12-month
Expanding b y
de
t ;￿
de
t ;i
de
t 4 0.9710 0.9310 0.9609 0.9460
window (0.9260) (0.9398)
Expanding b y
de
t ;￿￿
de
t ;￿i
de
t 4 0.9260 0.8397 0.9973 1.086
window (0.9260) (0.9398)
5-year b y
de
t ;￿
de
t ;i
de
t 4 0.9531 0.6361 0.974 1.268
window (0.9260) (0.9398)
5-year b y
de
t ;￿￿
de
t ;￿i
de
t 4 0.9771 0.8912 0.043 1.350
window (0.9260) (0.9398)
5-year b y
de
t ;￿
de
t ;i
de
t 3 0.9546 0.6431 0.9809 1.2934
window (0.9260) (0.9398)
4-year b y
de
t ;￿
de
t ;i
de
t 4 0.9734 0.8990 1.0552 1.4416
window (0.9260) (0.9398)
4-year b y
de
t ;￿
de
t ;￿i
de
t 4 0.9515 0.6498 0.9909 1.5787
window (0.9260) (0.9398)
Note: b y is the output gap ￿ is the in￿ ation rate, and i is the short-term interest rate. *
for ￿rst forecast is based on a VAR of the ￿rst 6-year data. ** for ￿rst forecast is based
on a VAR of the ￿rst 5-year data.
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2.4 Explanatory Power of the Monetary Policy Expectations
After obtaining the expected future interest rates for di⁄erent horizons, the expected sum of
interest rate di⁄erentials between Germany and the U.S can be constructed and the explana-
tory power can be further evaluated. Because the representative EFP allows us to compute
the expected interest rates in all horizons, we can go beyond the forecast horizons provided
in the survey data. Therefore, we compute Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
for the horizons of three
months, six months, one year, two years and four years at each point in time. Let
￿b st;t+kh = Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
: (2.14)
We call ￿b st;t+kh the (market expectation) model-implied exchange rate return. Follow-
ing Engel and West (2006) and Mark (2009), one of the measurements we use to evaluate
the model￿ s explanatory power is the correlation between the model-implied exchange rate
return and the actual exchange rate return. Therefore, for each horizon, we compute the
corresponding correlation, which is de￿ned as
corrkh = cor(￿b st;t+kh;￿st;t+kh): (2.15)
The correlation reveals the extent to which the model-implied exchange rate return co-moves
with the actual exchange rate return. If the monetary policy fundamentals in￿ uence the
exchange rate change through expectations of monetary policy, the correlation of the expected
interest rate di⁄erential and the actual exchange rate return should not be low.
In addition to the co-movement, we would like to know how much volatility in the actual
exchange rate return can be explained by the expected interest rate di⁄erential. Therefore,
we compute the relative volatility of the model-implied exchange rate return to the actual
exchange rate return, as follows
relvolkh =
var(￿b st;t+kh)
var(￿st;t+kh)
: (2.16)
The rest of the return volatility should attribute to the volatility of currency risk pre-
mium, which is the third term of equation 2.4. Note that modeling interest rate forecast can
clean up the interest rate expectation measurement errors in this term, so the currency risk
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Table 2.12: Model Comparison to Mark (2009) and Engel and West (2006)
-Pre-euro Era
1979-1998 Market Constant Gain Learning Rational Expectation
Expectation Mark (2009) EW (2006)
1-quarter return corr 0.10 0.08 -0.12
rel vol 0.015 0.749 0.712
half year return corr 0.13 - 0.03
rel vol 0.028 - 0.59
one-year return corr 0.21 -0.14 0.16
rel vol 0.056 0.614 0.47
two-year return corr 0.27 -0.074 0.09
rel vol 0.134 0.576 0.57
four-year return corr 0.58 0.350 0.03
rel vol 0.912 0.534 1.17
Note: corr is the correlation of the model implied exchange rate and actual exchange rate change.
rel vol is the part of exchange rate return volatility that is explained by the model.
premium only include liquidity premium, portfolio adjustments14 and so on, and excludes
this measurement errors.
Explanatory Power in the Pre-euro Era
The correlations for pre-euro era data are shown in the ￿rst column of table 2.12. The
model-implied exchange rate return is moderately correlated with the actual return for the
short horizon and strongly correlated for the medium horizon. In particular, the correlation
between 3-month exchange rate returns is 0.1. This correlation increases along with the
return horizon; it reaches 0.21 for the one-year return and reaches a value of nearly 0.6 for
the four-year return.
The volatility ratio of the model-implied return relative to the actual return is quite small
for the horizon up to two years. However, it starts to increase for returns over a 3-year horizon
and reaches 0.9 for the 4-year horizon return. This result suggests that most of the volatility
of the short-horizon exchange rate return comes from the volatility of currency risk premium
and the exchange rate forecast error. However, the volatility of returns over medium horizon
of three to four years is driven by the volatility of expected future monetary policies.
Figure 2.9 and 2.10 plot the comparison between the exchange rate return implied by the
market expectation model and the actual exchange rate return over di⁄erent horizons15. The
short-term returns over three to six months are dominated by noises, and the model-implied
14See Engel and West (2010) for details.
15To compare the co-movements, the exchange rate returns are standardized to have zero means and standard
deviations of one.
93Section 2.4 Chapter 2
Figure 2.9: Exchange Rate Return Comparison_1 (DMark per U.S. dollar)
return is less capable of capturing the ￿ uctuations. For the longer horizons, noises add up,
and the model-implied exchange rate returns catch the main trend of the actual movements.
For instance, the model-implied return over four-year horizons tracks the actual return very
well during the period from late 1989 to late 1999 and from 1992 to 1994.
This result indicates that we observe an impact of monetary policy fundamental on ex-
change rate change through the channel of monetary policy expectations. It also sheds light
on the problem in the literature that the policy fundamentals have little in￿ uence on exchange
rate change through this channel despite in￿ uencing the exchange rate level.16 The fact that
16The literature includes Engel and West (2006) and Mark (2009), where a moderate correlation is found
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Figure 2.10: Exchange Rate Return Comparison_2 (DMark per U.S. dollar)
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the correlation increases with the return horizon also suggests that the UIP is more likely to
hold for assets with longer maturity.
What do we gain from the consensus based expectation measurement compared to the
existing literature, in addition to cleaning up the expectation measurement errors in the cur-
rency risk premium we mentioned above? We discuss this in the following by comparing with
EW06 and Mark (2009) in table 2.12.17 Recall that EW06 assumes constant Taylor rules for
both countries and rational expectation while Mark (2009) assumes a constant gain learning
environment for the market participants. The comparison shows that for each horizon, the
correlation from the market expectation model is much higher than what have been found in
EW06 and Mark (2009). These two papers ￿nd that the model generated exchange return
barely correlates with the actual return over short horizon and only moderately correlates
with it over longer horizon (with a correlation of 0.35). This result indicates that with mar-
ket based expectations of monetary policy, , the policy fundamentals are moderately able to
explain the movement of exchange rate over the short horizons and are very in￿ uential over
longer horizons.
Explanatory Power in the Euro Era
The euro-era correlations between the model-implied return and the actual return di⁄er from
the pre-euro era in two respects: larger magnitude and negative signs. The results are shown
in table 2.13. In particular, the magnitude of the correlation is 0.38 for 3-month return and
increases to 0.66 for the 2-year return before decreasing to 0.4 for the 4-year return. The larger
magnitude means that the expected future monetary policy stance has more co-movements
with the actual exchange rate return, thus leading the fundamental e⁄ects of monetary policy
on the exchange rate through the expectation of monetary policy to be stronger. The negative
correlations imply that a higher expected sum of future euro-area interest rates than the U.S.
counterpart is associated with an appreciation of the euro relative to the U.S. dollar. The
same holds true for the expected sum of future U.S. interest rates. This implies that the UIP
does not hold. It also suggests that the sum of the expected risk premium (the second term of
equation 2.4) and the exchange rate forecast errors (the third term of equation 2.4) is positive.
This ￿nding is in contrast to the uncovered interest parity prediction but consistent with
for the exchange rate level while very low correlations are found for exchange rate changes.
17Since EW06 and Mark (2009) cover the same sample period, we replicate EW06 and take the quarterly
estimate directly from Mark (2009) for comparison.
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Table 2.13: Properties of Model Implied Exchange Rate Return with Market
Participants￿Expectation-Euro Era
1-quarter return corr -0.38
rel vol 0.006
half year return corr -0.52
rel vol 0.013
one-year return corr -0.60
rel vol 0.025
two-year return corr -0.66
rel vol 0.061
four-year return corr -0.40
rel vol 0.81
Note: corr is the correlation of the model implied
exchange rate and actual exchange rate change.
rel vol is the part of exchange rate return volatility
that is explained by the model.
the large body of empirical evidence documenting this interest-parity puzzle.18 It is worth
exploring the change from the UIP￿ s likelihood of holding for assets with longer maturity
in the pre-euro era to the UIP not holding at all. This may also indicate that the excess
return for high interest rate currency changes from possibly negative to positive after the
euro launch.
The volatility of the return explained by the market expectation model has a pattern
similar to the one in the Pre-euro Era but is smaller. We plot the actual exchange rate
return and the negative model-implied return over di⁄erent horizons in ￿gure 2.11 and 2.12.
We ￿ ip the sign of for the sake of visualizing the co-movements. For this sample period,
the negative model-implied changes track the trend of the actual changes quite well, even
for short horizons. The co-movement of the two time series is strongest over the two-year
horizon, when they have the highest correlation. Taking the two-year return as an example,
the model-implied return tracks the actual return very closely over the entire sample period;
in particular, it matches the turning points in April and August 2003 and December 2006
very well.
Therefore, we can conclude that in the pre-euro era, the market expectation model-implied
exchange rate moderately explain the short-term euro-dollar exchange rate return. In the euro
era, in terms of correlation, the model-implied return has moderate explanatory power for the
short term and high explanatory power for medium- to long-term returns. The correlation
changes from being positive in the pre-euro era to negative in the euro era. However, this
18Papers include Fama (1984), Flood and Rose (1996) etc. Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) propose explanation
of the positive excess return in terms of consumption growth and risk hedging.
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Figure 2.11: Exchange Rate Return Comparison_3 (euro per U.S. dollar)
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Figure 2.12: Exchange Rate Return Comparison_4 (euro per U.S. dollar)
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model-implied return explains only a small fraction of the actual return volatility for short-
term returns, whereas it explains most of the volatility for the medium-run return of about
four years. From the above analysis, we know that the macroeconomic fundamentals to
which monetary policy reacts in￿ uence the exchange rate change/return by inducing changes
in future monetary policy and that this channel was more important following the launch of
the euro.
2.5 Predictive Power of the Monetary Policy Expectations
Because the expected sum of interest rates co-moves with the exchange rate returns, we go a
step further to use this expected sum of interest rate di⁄erential (market expectation model)
to predict exchange rate changes and examine its predictive power.
At each month t, we make a forecast for the kh-month ahead exchange rate change using
the expected future interest rate di⁄erential, which is based on information up to t:
￿sF79￿98
t;t+kh = Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
(2.17)
Note that the euro era, we obtain a negative correlation between the expectation-implied
return and the actual return, so we use a negative expected interest rate to make forecasts:
￿sF99￿08
t;t+kh = ￿Et
k￿1 X
i=0
￿
ih
t+ih ￿ ih￿
t+ih
￿
(2.18)
Statistics for the forecast error for each forecast horizon can be found by computing the
root-mean-square-error (RMSE).19 In particular, It is customary to use the random walk
model as a benchmark for forecasting exchange rate change, we thus evaluate the predictive
power of this model by analyzing the RMSE ratio of ￿sF
t;t+kh relative to a driftless random
walk, indicating no change in the exchange rate. If the ratio is less than one, it means that the
forecast error of this model is smaller than the forecast error from a random walk model; that
is, in conventional terms, the model beats the random walk model. The ratios for di⁄erent
horizons are shown in table 2.14.
The ￿rst ￿nding from this table is that all ratios are smaller than one. We further test
19The RMSE is the square root of the mean of the same horizon forecast made at each month.
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Table 2.14: RMSE Ratio Relative to Driftless Random Walk
1979-1998 1998-2008
1-quarter return 0.89 0.87
half year return 0.89 0.87
one-year return 0.88 0.87
two-year return 0.87 0.95
four-year return 0.90 0.96
six-year return 0.73 1.30
Note: The number in italics denotes being signi￿cant
under CW test at 10% signi￿cance level, numbers in
bold are signi￿cant at 5% signi￿cance level.
the signi￿cance using the CW test. The results show that for a one-quarter exchange rate
return in the ￿rst sample period, the test rejects the random walk hypothesis at the 10% level.
For the same return in the second sample period and returns of horizons up to two years,
the market expectation model beats the random walk signi￿cantly at the 5% level. This is
also true for the four-year return in the ￿rst period. This is in contrast to a large number
of papers that use only macroeconomic fundamentals to make their forecasts and ￿nd that
models beat the random walk only over a four-year horizon. The model does slightly better
for the mark-dollar exchange rate in the pre-euro era, and the forecasting ability increases
with the horizons of exchange rate returns.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper explores the linkage between monetary policy fundamentals and exchange rate
return through the channel of monetary policy expectations. We decompose the exchange
return into three components: market expectations of future short-term interest rates, market
expectations of future currency risk premia and the exchange rate forecast error. We then
examine whether and how the monetary policy fundamentals determine the interest rate
expectations and, in turn, how the expected interest rates determine exchange rate dynamics.
In particular, we model the market expectations of monetary policy based on consensus
forecasts from market participants. This avoids mismeasurement from arbitrary assumptions
about expectations.
Our analysis of the deutsche mark and euro prices relative to the U.S. dollar from 1979 to
2008 shows that the monetary policy fundamentals in￿ uence the exchange rate return through
the monetary policy expectation channel. Modeling market expectations of monetary policy
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Variable Source Sample Period Remark
Exchange Rate IFS 1979: 1-1998:12 Deutsche Mark price per U.S. dollar.
CEIC 1995:1-2008:2 Euro price per U.S. dollar.
Note: The above are all original data used in Engel and West (2006).
based on consensus forecasts considerably improves the explanatory and predictive power of
the monetary policy fundamentals over the existing literature.
The ￿ndings also suggest that expectation formation processes of monetary policy change
over time and di⁄er across countries and that a single learning mechanism is not able to
represent these processes. Moreover, Taylor rule fundamentals have considerable explanatory
power for exchange rate returns once monetary policy expectations are modeled to be con-
sistent with market expectations. The expected sum of future interest rate di⁄erentials is a
good candidate for an out-of-sample forecast of exchange rate returns. It outperforms the
random walk model for most of the forecast horizons and sample periods in our exercise.
Results also indicate that macroeconomic fundamentals such as the output gap and in-
￿ ation rate have good explanatory and predictive power and that unsatisfactory results in
previous papers may be attributable to the mismeasurement of the monetary policy expec-
tation and, in turn, an incorrect functional form of the monetary policy fundamentals in the
exchange rate model. This should be considered before analyzing currency risk premia or
searching for other factors to forecast exchange rate returns.
2.7 Appendix 2.1: Data Description
Consensus interest rate forecast: forecast for interest rate with 3 month maturity 3-
month and 12-month ahead. Source: consensus economics, 1989:10-2008:2.
Exchange Rate:
Data for VAR learning:
Data for U.S. FAVAR learning: all data are from are from CEIC and IFS database with
the sample period from 1978:1 to 1998:12, variables are listed as following:
Industrial Production
1. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted
2. Industrial Production Index: Crude Oil
102Section 2.7 Chapter 2
Germany 1979: 1-1998:12
Variables Source Remark
Industrial Pro-
duction
IFS 66.c and Bundesbank Logarithm is taken. Data are combined from
Consumer Price
Index
IFS 64. and Bundesbank West German data for 1979-1990 and
German data from 1990-1998. Adjustment
to smooth the data according to
Engel and West (2006) is involved.
Money Market
Rate
IFS 60b
Note: The above are all original data used in Engel and West (2006).
United States 1979: 1-1998:12
Variables Source Remark
Industrial Production Index IFS 66.c Logarithm is taken.
Consumer Price Index IFS 64.
Federal Funds Rate IFS 60b
Note: The above are all original data used in Engel and West (2006).
Euro Area 1995:1-2008:2
Variables Source Remark
Industrial Pro-
duction Index
CEIC (Eurostat EUB-
GADGA)
Logarithm is taken.
Harmonized Con-
sumer Price Index
CEIC (ECB EUICB) Seasonally adjusted.
Money Market
Rate
CEIC (ECB EUMCAC) Euro interbank market 3-month rate.
United States 1995:1-2008:2
Variables Source Remark
Industrial Pro-
duction
CEIC (IMF 217893801) Logarithm is taken. Seasonally adjusted.
Consumer Price
Index
CEIC (IMF 217892101) Logarithm is taken. Seasonally adjusted by
the author.
Federal Funds
Rate
IFS
Note: The above are all original data used in Engel and West (2006).
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3. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Final Product
4. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Consumer Goods
5. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Consumer Goods: Durable
(DU)
6. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Consumer Goods: Non-
Durable(ND)
7. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Equipment: Business
8. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Intermediate Product: NI: BS:
General
9. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Materials
10. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Materials: Non-Energy:
Durable
11. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Materials: Non-Energy: Non-
Durable
12. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Manufacturing: SIC
13. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Manufacturing: Durable
14. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted Manufacturing: Non-Durable
15. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Mining
16. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Electric & Gas Utilities
Personal Income
18. Personal Income (PI): Seasonally Adjusted
19. Personal Income: Seasonally Adjusted: Disposable: Personal Income
Employment & Labour
21. Unemployment: By Duration: 15 Weeks & Over: 15 to 26 Weeks
22. Unemployment: By Duration: 15 Weeks & Over: 27 Weeks & Over
25. Employment: NF: Seasonally Adjusted: Goods Producing
26. Employment: NF: Seasonally Adjusted: NR: Mining
27. Employment: NF: Seasonally Adjusted Construction (CO)
28. Employment: NF: Seasonally Adjusted: Manufacturing: Durable
29. Employment: NF: Seasonally Adjusted: Manufacturing: Non-Durable
31. Employment: NF: Seasonally Adjusted: Trade, Transportation & Utilities
33. Employment: NF: Seasonally Adjusted: Utilites
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35. Employment: NF: Seasonally Adjusted: Government
Housing
38. Private Housing Units Started: Midwest
Manufacturing
42. Manufacturing Index: Seasonally Adjusted: New Orders
43. Manufacturing Index: Seasonally Adjusted: New Orders: Excluding Defense
44. Manufacturing Index: Seasonally Adjusted: New Orders: Durable Goods
45. Manufacturing Index: Seasonally Adjusted: New Orders: Non Durable Goods
Consumer Price Index
46. Consumer Price Index: Urban
48. Consumer Price Index: Urban: Transport
49. Consumer Price Index: Urban: Medical Care
50. Consumer Price Index Urban: All Commodities
51. Consumer Price Index Urban: Durables
52. Consumer Price Index Urban: Services
53. Consumer Price Index Urban: All Items Less Food
54. Consumer Price Index Urban: All Items Less Shelter
55. Consumer Price Index Urban: All Items Less Medical Care
Produce Price Index
56. Producer Price Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Intermediate Materials (IM)
57. Producer Price Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Finished Goods
58. Producer Price Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Finished Goods: Finished Consumer
Goods
59. Producer Price Index: Seasonally Adjusted: Crude Materials (CM)
60. Producer Price Index: Industrial Commodities
Stocks & Equity
61. Equity Market Index: Month End: NYSE Composite
62. Index: Standard & Poors: 500
Reserves & Money Supply
63. Depository Institution Reserve: Seasonally Adjusted
64. Depository Institution Reserve: Seasonally Adjusted: Non-Borrowed
65. Money Supply M1: Seasonally Adjusted
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66. Money Supply M2: Seasonally Adjusted
67. Money Supply M3: Institution al. Money Market Funds
68. Reserve Assets.
69. Consumer Credit Outstanding: Seasonally Adjusted: Non-revolving
70. Commercial Banks: Credit: Loans and Lease (LL)
Consumption
71. Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE): Seasonally Adjusted
72. Personal Consumption Expenditure: Seasonally Adjusted: GD: Durable Goods
(DG)
73. Personal Consumption Expenditure: Seasonally Adjusted: GD: Nondurable
Goods (NG)
74. Personal Consumption Expenditure: Seasonally Adjusted: Services (SE)
75. Personal Consumption Expenditure: Seasonally Adjusted: Durable Goods: MV:
New Autos
Personal Income
76. Personal Income (PI): Seasonally Adjusted
77. Personal Income: Seasonally Adjusted: Disposable Personal Income
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International Transmission of Bank
and Corporate Distress
3.1 Introduction
The recent crisis demonstrated how rapidly ￿nancial distress can be transmitted to the do-
mestic economy and across borders. The U.S. subprime crisis weakened balance sheets of
banks, households and corporates put major ￿nancial institutions in that economy and other
advanced economies on the brink of bankruptcy, were it not for large government bailouts.
The subsequent tightening of global ￿nancial conditions, together with the seizure of capital
markets, reduced the availability of funding for non￿nancial corporations around the world,
hampering their capacity to produce, export and invest. Households (and consumption) in
advanced economies were also hit: many individuals lost their jobs and experienced large
declines in net worth. Con￿dence fell around the world, and with it, activity.
Indeed, studies by Gilchrist et al (2009), Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008), Jacobson et
al, 2005, and Carlson et al (2008 show that the credit channel is the main channel of transmis-
sion of ￿nancial distress, the strength of which hinges on that of the ￿nancial accelerator￿ the
extent to which borrowing costs depend on the external ￿nance premium that re￿ ects bor-
rowers￿net worth (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999; and
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
The evidence on the transmission of ￿nancial distress has mostly been limited to advanced
economies and seldom uses a framework that integrates macroeconomic, ￿nancial and (non-
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￿nancial) corporate sector variables. For example, recent papers on credit risk (Cartensen
et al, 2008; and Pesaran et al, 2006) examined the spillover e⁄ects of credit risk shocks in a
multi-country context, using a global vector autoregression model (Dees et al, 2007), but with
the credit risk modeled separately from macroeconomic variables. Financial distress in these
papers is measured as bank capital or borrowers￿default risk, proxied by corporate bond
spreads, credit default swap spreads or data on actual defaults. These data are available only
for a limited number of (mostly advanced) economies, which limits the scope of analysis.
This paper attempts to ￿ll the void in the literature by providing an integrated analysis
of the linkages between bank and (non￿nancial) corporate sectors in the global economy. It
does so by introducing forward-looking measures of default risk for banks and corporates
into a Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) model proposed by Pesaran, Schuermann and
Weiner (2004). Bank and corporate default risk is proxied by the respective Expected Default
Frequencies (EDFs) from Moody￿ s cartensen Credit Edge. The EDF uses information on a
bank￿ s or corporate￿ s balance sheet and equity market data, and is often referred to as the
equity market-implied default risk (Vassalou and Xing, 2004). The limited data requirements
for calculating the EDFs mean that such measures can be created for a large number of
￿nancial and non-￿nancial corporate ￿rms across the world, including those from emerging
markets, which is a great advantage for the analysis of international spillovers. In addition to
the EDFs, the GVAR model includes macroeconomic variables, such as industrial production,
real short-term interest rates, real e⁄ective exchange rates and real stock prices; oil prices are
treated as a global factor).
Like the earlier studies, the study ￿nds linkages between the ￿nancial sector and the real
economy, with distress in the banking or corporate sector having signi￿cant e⁄ects on activity
in domestic economies. In particular, the results show that bank distress ampli￿es corpo-
rate distress, reduces industrial production and stock prices, and tends to be accompanied
by a depreciation of real e⁄ective exchange rates and lower real short-term interest rates.
Corporate distress has broadly similar macroeconomic e⁄ects.
Bank and corporate distress are also found to have signi￿cant global repercussions, al-
beit with striking di⁄erences for advanced and emerging economies. International spillovers
are stronger when ￿nancial distress originates in large advanced economies, particularly the
United States. The impact of corporate distress originating in advanced economies on growth
in emerging economies tends to be larger than the impact of advanced economies￿bank dis-
108Section 3.2 Chapter 3
tress, consistent with a more prominent role of trade channels in the transmission of advanced
economies￿shocks to emerging economies. In contrast, advanced economies tend to be more
vulnerable to bank distress than corporate distress, re￿ ecting the greater role of the ￿nancial
sector in these economies.
These conclusions are qualitatively robust to a variety of changes in model speci￿cation,
including alternative weights and ordering of variables. When bank and corporate default
measures are excluded from the model, the e⁄ects of shocks are similar in direction but
smaller in magnitude. Thus, bank and corporate balance sheet channels appear to be an
important ampli￿er of the international transmission of shocks, consistent with the ￿nancial
accelerator mechanism and ￿ndings by Dees et al (2007). The ￿ndings also appear broadly
consistent with experiences during the recent ￿nancial crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the GVAR framework
and describes the data, particularly Moody￿ s KMV EDFs. Section III discusses the results
of selected shocks. Section IV concludes.
3.2 Methodology and Data
The GVAR model of Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004) provides a multilateral dynamic
framework for the analysis of interdependence and international transmission of country-
speci￿c shocks among a large number of economies.
3.2.1 Structure of the GVAR Model
The structure of the GVAR model can be summarized as the follows. Consider N + 1
economies, indexed by i = 0;1;2;:::;N, and a vector xit of ki domestic variables for each
economy. Stacking the vectors of country-speci￿c variables,
xt =
￿
x0
0t; x0
1t; ￿￿￿ ; x0
Nt
￿
; (3.1)
a VAR in xt would contain too many parameters to be estimated if the time dimension T of
the data is not much larger than the number of economy N. Instead of regressing xi;t on
x￿i;t =
￿
x
0
0t; x
0
1t; ￿￿￿ ; x
0
i￿1;t; x
0
i+1;t; ;:::; x
0
N;t
￿
; (3.2)
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without any restriction, GVAR links xi;t to a k￿
i ￿ 1 vector x￿
i;t, where
x￿
lit =
N X
j=0
!lijxljt; l = 1;2;:::;k￿
i : (3.3)
The weight !lij captures the spillover e⁄ect of variable l of foreign economy j on variable l of
domestic economy i. Since !lijmeasures the relative importance of economy j to economy i,
the spillover e⁄ect of variable l is in proportion to the weight chosen to measure the relative
importance. Therefore, each economy￿ s component of GVAR is given as a VARX* (pi;qi):
xit = aio + ai1 ￿ t +
pi X
s=1
￿isxi;t￿s +
qi X
s=0
￿isx￿
i;t￿s +
ri X
s=0
￿isdt￿s + uit (3.4)
with uit
iid ￿ (0;
P
i), where dt￿s is the observed common factor of q ￿ 1 dimension and "it
is iid across time. Country-speci￿c vector x￿
i;t￿s re￿ ects interdependence among economies
and serves as a proxy for the unobserved common e⁄ects across economies. The country-
speci￿c foreign variables and common factors are treated as weakly exogenous (if con￿rmed
by statistical tests), i.e., they are "long-run forcing" country-speci￿c domestic variables. The
term "long-run forcing" means that in the equations for foreign variables, the coe¢ cients on
the error-correction terms are set to zero. The dynamics of foreign variables are not in￿ uenced
by deviations from the long-run equilibrium path, in contrast to the dynamics of domestic
variables.
The VARX* can be estimated economy by economy using the ordinary least squares
(OLS) method or rank-reduced approach if the cross-dependence of the idiosyncratic shock
is su¢ ciently small, that is:
N X
j=0
Cov ("lit;"sjt)=N ! 0 (3.5)
all i 6= j, l and s.
From equation (3.3), it can be seen that
zit = Wixti = 1; 2;￿￿￿ ;N (3.6)
where zit =
￿
x
0
it x￿
0
it
￿
and Wi is an appropriately de￿ned weighting scheme. Thus, stacking
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(3.4) across i, the endogenous variables can be solved for in a global system:
Gxt = ai0 + ai1 ￿ t +
p X
s=1
￿sxt￿s +
r X
s=0
￿sdt￿s + ut (3.7)
thus
xt = G￿1ai0 + G￿1ai1 ￿ t + G￿1
p X
s=1
￿sxt￿s + G￿1
r X
s=0
￿sdt￿s + G￿1ut (3.8)
where p = maxfpi;qig, r = maxfrig, and
G =
0
B
B B
B B
B
@
A0W0
A1W1
. . .
ANWN
1
C
C C
C C
C
A
;Hs =
0
B
B B
B B
B
@
Bs;0W0
Bs;1W1
. . .
Bs;NWN
1
C
C C
C C
C
A
;ut =
0
B
B B
B B
B
@
u0;t
u1;t
. . .
uN;t
1
C
C C
C C
C
A
: (3.9)
Equation (3.8) is a VAR for the complete set of domestic variables for all economies.
The advantage of the GVAR model is that it makes the estimation of (3.8) feasible by
accounting for interdependence among economies and then estimating the partial system on a
economy-by-economy basis, which implies allowing for modeling a large number of economies.
The impulse response is computed based on (3.8).
The vector for domestic variables is given by:
xit =
￿
edfbit edfnit rit yit ps
it qit
￿0
(3.10)
where edfbit denotes the logarithm of asset-weighted average expected default frequency
(EDF) of banks and edfnit for (non￿nancial) corporates, rit is the real money market rate,
yit is the logarithm of industrial production, ps
it the logarithm of real share price index, and
qit is the logarithm of the real e⁄ective exchange rate.
The vector for foreign variables for each economy except the United States is given by:
x￿
it =
￿
edfb￿
it edfn￿
it r￿
it y￿
it ps￿
it
￿0
: (3.11)
We do not construct foreign e⁄ective exchange rates to minimize the number of parameters to
be estimated, since information about foreign economies￿currency is captured in the (trade-
weighted) real e⁄ective exchange rate qit.
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The foreign variable for the United States is constructed as:
x￿
us;t = y￿
us;t (3.12)
Given the large in￿ uence of the U.S. ￿nancial variables on global markets, the U.S. foreign
￿nancial variables are less likely to be weakly exogenous for the U.S. domestic variables. That
is the main reason we do not include the U.S. foreign ￿nancial variables in the equations for
the United States.
The spot oil price is included as a common factor dt￿s to remove the common component
in the reduced form residuals. Another candidate for inclusion as a common factor could
be the index of global stock price volatility VIX, to ensure that the EDF shocks are purely
idiosyncratic. However, because the VIX is driven by volatility in U.S. share prices, it is not
weakly exogenous to the U.S. variables. Adding it separately will not augment the information
content of the model.
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) show that the spillover e⁄ect of a foreign variable on a domestic
variable is proportional to the weight!lij, which measures the relative importance of economy
i to economy j in transmission. Since the transmission channels for ￿nancial variables are
likely to be di⁄erent from the transmission channels for the variables measuring real activity,
we use ￿nancial weights to construct foreign ￿nancial variables ￿ EDFs, real money market
rate, share price index and real e⁄ective exchange rate ￿ and trade weights for industrial
production.
3.2.2 Sample, Variables and Weights
The GVAR model covers 30 economies, including 21 advanced￿ Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong S.A.R., Ireland, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States￿ and 9 emerging economies￿ Brazil, China, India, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, and Turkey.
Macroeconomic and ￿nancial data are of monthly frequency and cover the period from
January 1996 to December 2008. All data, except the EDFs, are obtained from the IMF￿ s
International Financial Statistics, CEIC and GDS. The sample period is constrained by the
availability of data for emerging economies. See Appendix 3.1 for detailed information about
112Section 3.2 Chapter 3
data sources and transformations as well as descriptive statistics. In particular, note that
the standard deviations of bank and corporate EDFs are similar, implying that the e⁄ects of
shocks to these variables are comparable.
Measures of ￿nancial distress, EDFs, are from Moody￿ s KMV (MKMV). MKMV is a
commercial product that uses a modi￿ed version of the Merton model (1974) to calculate
the expected default frequency (EDFs) for 35,000 ￿nancial institutions and non￿nancial cor-
porates in 55 economies (see Gray and Malone, 2008; and Gray, Merton and Bodie, 2008,
for details). A ￿rm is in default when the market value of its assets falls short of its debt
obligations. The likelihood of default depends on the current value and risk (volatility) of its
assets relative to the promised payments on the debt (de￿ned as the default barrier). The
implied asset value and volatility are estimated by applying a modi￿ed version of the Merton
model to equity market data and balance sheet information. For more details on the Merton
model and contingent claims analysis, see Appendix 3.2.
The EDFs combine equity price data with data on ￿rms￿balance sheet data and often
exhibit nonlinear characteristics, re￿ ecting the impact of a broad range of factors, such as
the structure of a ￿rm￿ s balance sheet and investors￿risk appetite, on the probability of
the ￿rm￿ s default. For example, correlations between EDFs for U.S. banks and corporates
and U.S. stock prices, in level terms, are 0.3 and 0.6 respectively, while correlations between
changes in the respective variables (which are used in the GVAR model) are close to zero. To
create country-speci￿c measures of EDFs, we use the time-varying asset-weighted averages
of one year-ahead EDFs for all banks and (non￿nancial) corporates. The average number
of banks and corporates in emerging and advanced economies does not vary signi￿cantly,
suggesting that the coverage of ￿rms should not bias the results. See Appendix 3.1 for the
number of ￿rms in each country.
In GVAR, the bilateral dependence of domestic variable on a foreign variable is propor-
tional to the country-speci￿c weight used to form foreign variables. We use broad ￿nancial
and trade weights to form foreign values of ￿nancial and macroeconomic variables, respec-
tively. This is in contrast to the previous GVAR literature which uses trade weights or narrow
￿nancial weights (covering only bank lending relationship) to form foreign values of ￿nancial
variables (Dees and others, 2007; Galesi and Sgherri, 2009, respectively). Using the above
mentioned ￿nancial weights advances the GVAR literature in the direction of improving the
model￿ s ability to capture the ￿nancial channels of shock transmission.
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Financial weights are constructed using currency exposure measures of Lane and Sham-
baugh (2009), which summarize bilateral ￿nancial asset positions in ￿ve instruments: portfo-
lio equity, direct investment, portfolio debt, other general bank-related debt, and reserves. We
take the average weight from 1999 to 2004 (the latest data for which Lane and Shambaugh￿ s
data are available) as a ￿xed weight for the four ￿nancial variables in the model (Table 3.9
to Table 3.11). To construct measures of foreign industrial production, we use trade weights.
These weights are constructed based on the IMF￿ s Direction of Trade Statistics as the share
of bilateral goods trade in total trade, averaged over the period from 1996 to 2008 (Table
3.12 to Table 3.14).
Data limitations, especially for data on ￿nancial asset positions, prevent us from using
time-varying weights. However, this may not be a major issue as the bilateral patterns of
assets and liabilities for most countries in the sample have remained broadly stable during
1999￿ 2004. Also, as shown in Pesaran et al (2006), the GVAR results are robust to using
time-varying (trade) weights. We explore alternative ways to form foreign ￿nancial and real
sector variables as part of robustness checks.
3.2.3 Impulse Responses
Given the short sample period, the study focuses on short-run dynamics. The model is esti-
mated in ￿rst di⁄erences as the macroeconomic and ￿nancial data are found to be integrated
of order 1. Identifying the complete set of shocks in equation (3.8) and computing the im-
pulse response functions in a GVAR model is not straightforward. It requires imposing an
enormous amount of identi￿cation restrictions due to the large number of economies covered
in the study. Therefore, we identify shocks following the approach in Dees and others (2007)
and Binder, Chen and Zhang (2010).
To identify shocks to EDFs of U.S. banks and corporates, for example, we ￿rst identify
structural shocks in the VARX* for the United States, using Cholesky decomposition and
assuming a Wold ordering of
h
yit rit ps
it qit edfnit edfbit
i
. Ordering industrial pro-
duction ￿rst means that it does not respond contemporaneously to the ￿nancial shocks. The
real short-term interest rate is assumed to react contemporaneously to industrial production
shocks, consistent with a Taylor rule. Share prices are allowed to respond to industrial produc-
tion and the real interest rate, as they re￿ ect expected future macroeconomic fundamentals.
The exchange rate is assumed to react to all variables except the EDFs.
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The EDFs are assumed to react to all four variables on the grounds that the industrial
production shock a⁄ects future pro￿ts of banks and corporates and hence their default prob-
abilities, while the real interest rate, share price index and the exchange rate also enter into
the calculation of the EDFs through the maturity and composition structure of institutions￿
balance sheets. We assume that bank EDFs respond to shocks to corporate EDFs, and not
the other way around, because loans to corporates constitute a signi￿cant portion of banks￿
assets. An increased likelihood of corporate default is likely to a⁄ect bank default proba-
bilities as the quality of banks loan portfolio deteriorate. Of course, one may argue that
an unexpected change of bank default probability due to, say, the shortage of liquidity can
raise corporate default probabilities because of the tightening of lending conditions. Placing
banks￿EDFs before corporates￿EDFs in the GVAR does not alter the main ￿ndings.
The U.S. domestic variables are assumed not to react to shocks to other economies￿
variables, which amounts to ordering the U.S. economy ￿rst. As part of robustness checks,
we con￿rm that an alternative ordering of the remaining economies does not change the
impulse response function for the U.S. shocks.
After identifying the EDF shocks, we compute impulse responses of the other variables in
the global solution in equation (3.8) based on correlations between the reduced form shock of
each variable and the identi￿ed structural shock of the EDF. Such an identi￿cation scheme
means that zero correlation between the structural EDF shocks and other domestic variables
in each economy need not be imposed and the transmission of the shock is determined with-
out any additional restrictions. The impulse response of variables in other economies are
computed similarly to the generalized impulse response, which leaves the contemporaneous
correlations of the U.S. EDF shocks and structural shocks in other countries unrestricted.
We consider temporary shocks to U.S. bank and corporate distress. Each shock is assumed
to last for one month and amount to a one percentage point increase in the default probability
of banks and corporates. Since we have controlled for changes in the macroeconomic funda-
mentals and stock prices that may a⁄ect the EDFs, the innovation to the residual should be
interpreted as an unexpected shock that worsens the balance sheets of ￿rms and augments
the EDF. The correlations of the U.S. EDF shocks and the contemporaneous macroeconomic
and ￿nancial variables are close to zero.
These shocks usefully illustrate the channels through which bank and corporate distress
can be transmitted across the world. However, they are not necessarily suggestive of patterns
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of contagion during ￿nancial crises because bank and corporate distress is likely to be more
persistent and greater in magnitude than what is assumed in the paper. Distress during
crises may also be associated with nonlinear e⁄ects, for example, owing to changes in market
liquidity. Such nonlinear e⁄ects are not captured in the GVAR.
3.3 Transmission of Bank and Corporate Distress
The results show that ￿nancial distress has signi￿cant e⁄ects on domestic economies activity,
with bank and corporate default, equity prices and real activity being a⁄ected in tandem. The
strength of international spillovers from bank and corporate distress depends on the impor-
tance of the economy where the shock originates from. Although the macroeconomic e⁄ects
of bank and corporate distress are in many ways similar, there are also notable di⁄erences. In
particular, corporate distress in advanced economies has a larger impact on economic growth
in emerging economies than bank distress in advanced economies. On the other hand, ad-
vanced economies are more vulnerable to bank distress than to corporate distress. These
results are robust to various changes in speci￿cation. In addition, we ￿nd that controlling
for the strength of bank and corporate balance sheets in GVAR ampli￿es the e⁄ects of real
and ￿nancial sector shocks.
3.3.1 Domestic Impact of Bank and Corporate Distress
The impulse response functions associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the proba-
bility of default of U.S. banks show that the expected probability of corporate defaults im-
mediately starts to rise, with the impact peaking at about 0.3 percentage points one month
after the initial shock (Figure 3.1). The co-movement between bank and corporate default
risk (albeit with a lag) re￿ ects the transmission of the shock through the banks￿balance
sheets, whereby weaker banks tighten lending conditions, hurting borrowers￿balance sheets
and pushing up their default risk. Higher bank and corporate default risks lead to declines
in stock prices (with a maximum impact of 10 percentage points one month after the initial
shock) as investors anticipate weaker earnings. The e⁄ects on corporate default risk and
stock prices are statistically signi￿cant at the 90 percent signi￿cance level, underscoring the
importance of ￿nancial and balance sheet channels in the transmission of ￿nancial distress.
Other macroeconomic variables move in the expected direction. Industrial production
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falls, with the maximum impact of 0.3 percentage points two months after the initial shock.
The real short-term interest rate rises during the ￿rst month after the shock, consistent
with the tightening of lending conditions, but over the subsequent months, it declines, likely
re￿ ecting an easing of monetary policy. The e⁄ects on industrial production and the real
interest rate are statistically signi￿cant, albeit only two-three months after the initial shock.
Prior to this, responses are typically statistically insigni￿cant. The real e⁄ective exchange
rate depreciates in the ￿rst two months after the initial bank distress shock, consistent with
slowing economic activity, rising corporate default risk and declining stock prices. These
e⁄ects are statistically insigni￿cant during the full one year after the shock.
The e⁄ects of a 1 percentage point increase in the default probability of U.S. corporates on
￿nancial variables are broadly similar to those of an increase in banks distress risk, con￿rming
close linkages between the health of the corporate and banking sector (Figure 3.2). Bank
default risk rises (with the maximum impact of about 0.3 percentage points) within a month
after the increase in corporate default risk, as the deterioration in corporate balance sheets
worsens the quality of banks￿loan portfolio. Stock prices fall (with the maximum impact of
about 13 percentage points). These e⁄ects are statistically signi￿cant, as before, pointing to
the strength of linkages between distress in bank and corporate balance sheets and ￿nancial
markets.
Other macroeconomic variables behave as expected. Industrial production declines, al-
though this e⁄ect is statistically insigni￿cant. The real e⁄ective exchange rate appreciates by
about 2 percentage points, and this e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant. One possible explanation
is that a shock to corporate default risk may be akin to a negative supply-side shock and be
associated with a pickup in in￿ ation. The real interest rate declines as in the case of a bank
distress risk shock, although the decline is statistically insigni￿cant.
Shocks to the default probabilities of banks and corporates in other economies have sim-
ilar e⁄ects. The degree of co-movement in the default risk of banks and corporates varies,
possibly re￿ ecting di⁄erent degree of ￿nancial development, the importance of the corporate
sector exposures for banks, and availability of alternative ￿nancing sources for (non￿nancial)
corporates.
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3.3.2 International Propagation of Bank and Corporate Distress
Bank and corporate distress in systemically important economies have signi￿cant interna-
tional implications. For example, a 1 percentage point increase in the default probability of
U.S. banks immediately raises the probability of German banks￿default by about 0.2 percent-
age points, possibly re￿ ecting an expectation of a tightening of funding conditions and losses
on holdings of U.S. assets as well as weaker demand for German export products (Figure 3.3).
The default probability of German corporates rises by approximately the same magnitude as
the default probability of German banks immediately after the shock. Industrial production
in Germany declines by a larger magnitude than that in the United States, possibly because
the real e⁄ective exchange rate for the euro appreciates in contrast to that for the dollar.
Bank distress may also have a larger impact on real activity in Germany than in the United
States, because bank credit is a more important source of funding for German corporates
than for their U.S. counterparts.
The impact of an increase in the default probability of U.S. banks on emerging economies
is also signi￿cant. For example, as shown in Figure 3.4, a 1 percentage point increase in the
default probability for the U.S. banks raises the default probability of Brazilian corporates
(with the maximum impact close to 1 percentage point). This is a larger e⁄ect than that
on German corporates, albeit with a one month lag in contrast to the immediate impact on
the default risk of German corporates. The larger impact on the corporate default risk in
Brazil is consistent with a larger decline in industrial production (by close to 5 percentage
points on impact), more than double the impact on Germany￿ s industrial production. It may
re￿ ect the fact that Brazil experiences a dual shock of lower demand from the United States
and other advanced economy partners, namely Europe and Japan. Although the immediate
impact on industrial production is signi￿cant, a large depreciation of the exchange rate, helps
mitigate the impact on real economic activity and the initial decline in industrial production
quickly unwinds. Share prices fall by as much as 15 percent.
Surprisingly at the ￿rst glance, the default risk of Brazilian (and Mexican) banks declines
in response to the increase in the default risk of U.S. banks. One possible explanation is that
the quality of banks￿loan books improves as high-quality domestic borrowers substitute away
from foreign bank borrowing toward domestic banks. Another explanation, put forward by
Kamil and Rai (forthcoming), is that foreign banks￿involvement in Latin America tends to
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di⁄er from that in other regions: it is mostly conducted through local subsidiaries, with loans
denominated in domestic currency and funded through domestic deposits. These di⁄erences
may help explain why global deleveraging has not a⁄ected Latin America as much as other
emerging markets during the recent ￿nancial crisis.
In contrast to Brazil, an increase in the default probability of U.S. banks has an adverse
impact on the default probability for both Chinese banks and corporates. These probabilities
rise by about 0.5 percentage points in the ￿rst month after the shock (Figure 3.5). The
impact on stock prices and real e⁄ective exchange rate is smaller than those in Brazil. The
e⁄ects on the real interest rate and industrial production are statistically insigni￿cant over
the entire horizon of one year.
The direction of the e⁄ects of shocks to the default probability of U.S. corporates on
Germany, Brazil and China is broadly similar to those of shocks to the default risk of U.S.
banks (Figures 3.6 ￿ 3.8). The e⁄ects on the default probability of Chinese banks and
corporates are larger in magnitude, suggesting that production chain linkages between China
and the United States tend to be larger than those through the ￿nancial channels, which is
consistent with China￿ s capital account being closed.
The e⁄ects of the U.S. bank and corporate distress on other advanced and emerging
economies are summarized in Figures 3.9 ￿3.10. Distress in U.S. banks and corporates has a
signi￿cant adverse impact throughout the world, with the magnitude of the impact depending
on the strength of ￿nancial and trade linkages of the economy in question to the United States,
where the shock originates, as well as various structural features of the economy and its policy
framework. A 1 percentage point increase in the default probability of U.S. banks is estimated
to result in a 0.3￿ 0.5 percentage point increase in the default probability of banks in China,
India, Japan and other advanced Europe. The impact on the euro area, Paci￿c (including
Australia and New Zealand) is smaller, around 0.1￿ 0.2 percentage points, while the default
probability of the Latin American banks tends to improve, as discussed above.
Distress in the U.S. banking sector tends to be transmitted to the non￿nancial corporate
sector, particularly in Latin America and emerging Asia. The apparently close relation
between U.S. bank distress and corporate distress in emerging economies may re￿ ect the
price sensitivity and reliance of emerging economies￿corporates on overseas borrowing from
advanced economies￿ banks, particularly from the United States. The magnitude of the
shock transmission to Japan, Paci￿c (Australia and New Zealand), the euro area and other
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advanced economies in Europe is weaker, possibly because of their greater reliance on the
domestic sources of funding in contrast to the role of overseas ￿nancing in emerging economies.
Industrial production falls in all advanced and emerging economies in response to distress
in the U.S. corporate sector. Japan and Latin America are most a⁄ected, re￿ ecting their close
production and trade linkages with the United States and the composition of their trading
partner groups more generally. Consistent with the decline in real activity and a rise in default
risk of banks and corporates, stock markets fall across the world. India, Latin America, Newly
Industrialized Economies in Asia, and the euro area experience the largest declines in real
stock prices (around 15 percentage points). Like in response to U.S. bank distress, a decline
in stock prices in China is much smaller than in India, re￿ ecting, among other things, its
less open capital account and less developed capital markets. E⁄ects on the real e⁄ective
exchange rate are mixed, ranging from a 6 percentage point appreciation in Japan to close to
5 percentage point depreciation in Latin America, Australia and New Zealand. The e⁄ects of
a 1 percentage point increase in the default probability of U.S. corporates are broadly similar
to those of the shock to the default probability of U.S. banks.
The aggregation of the impact on emerging and advanced economies shows the similari-
ties and di⁄erences in the e⁄ects of the U.S. bank and corporate distress on these economies￿
￿nancial distress (Figure 3.11). U.S. bank distress has a larger impact on the default prob-
ability of banks in advanced economies than those in emerging economies, consistent with
the former￿ s greater ￿nancial openness and integration. The impact of U.S. bank distress on
advanced economies￿(and global) industrial production is also greater than in response to the
U.S. corporate distress, possibly re￿ ecting larger ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ects associated with
the shocks originating in the banking sector as well as greater ￿nancial openness of advanced
economies than emerging economies. The impact of U.S. bank distress on corporate distress
is larger for emerging economies than advanced economies possibly owing to the greater re-
liance of emerging economies￿corporates (especially larger ￿rms) on overseas ￿nancing or
their greater price sensitivity to ￿nancial conditions proxied by U.S. bank distress.
The e⁄ects of bank and corporate distress on other macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables
in advanced and emerging economies are also quite di⁄erent (Figures 3.11￿ 3.12). First, the
impact of U.S. corporate distress on industrial production in emerging economies is consid-
erably larger than that in advanced economies (about 3.5 percentage points compared to less
than 1 percentage point), consistent with greater trade openness of these economies than that
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of advanced economies. Other possible reasons are a larger impact on emerging economies￿
banks and appreciating exchange rates under the U.S. corporate distress shock. Second, the
impact of the U.S. corporate distress shock on industrial production in emerging economies
also exceeds that of the U.S. bank distress shock, possibly owing to greater importance of
trade channels than ￿nancial channels in the transmission of shocks to emerging economies.
Third, emerging economies￿central banks tend to respond more aggressively to shocks em-
anating from the U.S. corporate sector than from the U.S. banking sector, as re￿ ected in a
decline in real interest rates under the former shock and an increase under the latter. This
could re￿ ect stronger concerns about the impact of U.S. corporate distress on real activity
than direct impact from U.S. bank distress on its own, given strong production linkages.
All in all, the ￿ndings are broadly consistent with recent crisis experiences, including the
larger impact on banking sectors and economic growth in advanced economies than emerging
economies.
Shocks to the default probability of banks and corporates in other economies have similar,
albeit weaker e⁄ects than those of the U.S. shocks, consistent with other economies￿smaller
role in the global economy and ￿nance than that of the United States.
3.3.3 Robustness Analysis
The results are qualitatively robust to a variety of changes in model speci￿cations, including
applying the average of trade and ￿nancial weights to foreign variables instead of using
￿nancial weights for ￿nancial variables and trade weights for the real activity variables.
The averages take into account the possibility that shocks to all variables are transmitted
through both trade and ￿nancial channels equally. The results remain very similar to those
based on the original speci￿cation, including the e⁄ects on domestic and spillovers to other
economies. However, the magnitude of the e⁄ects on the real interest rate vary for some
economies, suggesting that the nature of transmission channels has signi￿cant bearing on the
macroeconomic e⁄ects of shocks, particularly on in￿ ation, and hence the monetary policy
response.
The results are also robust to using an alternative Wold ordering, particularly, switching
the order of bank and corporate default probabilities to allow for the corporate EDF to
respond to the bank EDF shock contemporaneously. The rationale for this modi￿cation
is to allow for the possibility that bank and corporate balance sheets to worsen following a
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tightening of monetary policy and lending conditions. The results are qualitatively consistent
with those based on the original speci￿cation, although the ordering of economies by the
maximum impact of shocks changes slightly.
Similarly, replacing the real e⁄ective exchange rates with bilateral real exchange rates also
does not a⁄ect the results signi￿cantly. The number of observations is insu¢ cient to test the
robustness of the results to changes in the sample time period. However, we con￿rmed that
the exclusion of a limited number of economies from the sample does not a⁄ect the results
signi￿cantly.
In addition to the above robustness tests, we examined how the inclusion of bank and
corporate default probabilities in the GVAR model a⁄ects the direction and magnitude of
the macroeconomic e⁄ects of shocks and their transmission. We ￿nd that the inclusion of
these credit risk measures tends to amplify the transmission of shocks (Figure 3.13). This
￿nding suggests that incorporating additional measures of bank and corporate credit risk
in a macroeconomic VAR model helps better account for the various ￿nancial accelerator
mechanisms and bank capital channels.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper examined how distress in banks and corporates a⁄ects domestic economies and
gets transmitted to other economies. The analysis is based on a parsimonious GVAR model
covering 30 advanced and emerging economies and including not only macroeconomic and
￿nancial variables such as stock prices and interest rates but also forward-looking measures
of default probabilities for banks and corporates. The model controls for common global
shocks, such as oil prices, and uses broad measures of ￿nancial exposures to account for
various ￿nancial channels through which shocks are transmitted across the world.
The analysis con￿rms strong macro-￿nancial linkages within domestic economies and
globally. Bank and corporate distress, especially when originating in systemically important
economies, can have adverse implications for global real activity, with stark di⁄erences be-
tween advanced and emerging economies. Growth in emerging economies is more sensitive
to corporate than bank distress, while the opposite is true for advanced economies. This
￿nding may re￿ ect a lower level of ￿nancial development of emerging economies compared
to advanced economies. Lower ￿nancial openness and greater trade openness of emerging
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economies may also play a role as it implies greater importance of trade and production
linkages as channels through which emerging economies are integrated in the global economy.
These conclusions are qualitatively robust to a variety of changes in model speci￿cation and
broadly consistent with experiences during the recent ￿nancial crisis.
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Figure 3.9: Maximum Impact of One Percentage Point Increase in the U.S.
Bank Default Probability (In percentage points)
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Figure 3.10: Maximum Impact of One Percentage Point Increase in the U.S.
Corporate Default Probability (In percentage points)
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Figure 3.11: Average Impact on Advanced and Emerging Economies (In
percentage points)
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Figure 3.12: Global Transmission of U.S. Bank and Corporate Distress
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Figure 3.13: Impact of One Percentage Point Decline in the U.S. Industrial
Production (In percentage points)
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3.5 Appendix 3.1: Data Description
This appendix describes the sources and construction of data series that are used in the main
text.
Table 3.1: De￿nitions and Sources of Variables
Variable Description Source Notes
edfb Asset weighted one
year ahead expected
default probability of
￿nancial ￿rms
Moody￿ s KMV Data for China from
March 1996 to April
1997 are not available,
and are interpolated in
a linear manner.
edfn Asset weighted one
year ahead expected
default probability of
non￿nancial ￿rms
Moody￿ s KMV Missing data for Octo-
ber 1996 are interpo-
lated.
Table 3.1 continues on Next Page
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Variable Description Source Notes
y Logarithm of indus-
trial production in-
dex
GDS for Australia
and New Zealand;
CEIC for Brazil,
China, Hong Kong
SAR, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philip-
pines, Singapore and
South Africa; IFS for
all other economies.
Data for China is the
value added of in-
dustry, which to our
knowledge the closest
available measure of
the industrial produc-
tion. The series is
spliced with the im-
plied value from the
year on year growth
value from 1995 Janu-
ary onwards. All data
from CEIC and for
India are available in
seasonally unadjusted
form and adjusted us-
ing Census X12 in
EViews.
Table 3.1 continues on Next Page
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Variable Description Source Notes
r Money market rate
de￿ ated by consumer
price index (CPI)
Money market rates
are from IFS and
CEIC. Consumer
price indices for
Australia and New
Zealand are from
GDS, while the rest
economies are from
IFS. The 7 day
weighted average
CHIBOR is used for
China.
Data for Sweden from
December 2004 on-
wards are not available
in the IFS, and the
policy-related interest
rate from the GDS is
taken instead. Missing
data for September
1992 is interpolated.
ps Logarithm of share
price index de￿ ated
by CPI
IFS
q Logarithm of real ef-
fective exchange rate
Data for Hong Kong
SAR, Indonesia,
Mexico and Turkey
are from CEIC, while
the rest are from
IFS.
po Logarithm of world
spot petroleum price
IFS
End of Table 3.1
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Table 3.2: Number of Firms
Country Corporates Banks
Australia 1542 8
Austria 65 6
Belgium 105 2
Brazil 257 26
Canada 1218 9
China 1913 14
Denmark 118 37
Finland 113 3
France 605 22
Germany 631 14
Hong Kong 793 9
India 1980 39
Indonesia 269 26
Ireland 57 2
Italy 229 23
Japan 3436 95
Malaysia 816 9
Mexico 90 3
Netherlands 123 3
New Zealand 110 n.a.
Norway 168 22
Philippines 137 16
Singapore 548 3
South Africa 268 9
Spain 106 8
Sweden 366 6
Switzerland 185 26
Turkey 186 16
United Kingdom 1333 10
United States 4367 443
Average 738 31
Advanced 858 36
Emerging 458 20
Total 22134 909
Advanced 18013 728
Emerging 4121 181
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Table 3.9 to Table 3.11 report currency exposure measures constructed by Lane and
Shambaugh (2009) for bilateral ￿nancial asset positions in ￿ve instruments: portfolio equity,
direct investment, portfolio debt, other general bank-related debt, and reserves. We take the
average weight from 1999 to 2004 (the latest data for which Lane and Shambaugh￿ s data
are available) as a ￿xed weight for the four ￿nancial variables in the model. The ￿nancial
weights for Euro zone countries after 1999 are computed using the weight of the Euro zone,
multiplying which with the share of the country weight in the Euro zone based on the 1998
weight.
Table 3.12 to Table 3.14 report average trade weights for 1996-2008, which are used for
constructing measures of foreign industrial production. The estimates are based on the IMF￿ s
Direction of Trade Statistics (2009).
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3.6 Appendix 3.2. Contingent Claims Analysis and Estimat-
ing Default Probabilities for Corporates and Banks
The contingent claims analysis (CCA) is based on the Merton Model and it provides a method-
ology to combine balance sheet information with widely used ￿nance and risk management
tools to construct marked-to-market balance sheets that better re￿ ect underlying risk (see
Merton 1973, 1974 and Gray, Merton, and Bodie 2008). It can be used to derive a set of
risk indicators for individual ￿rms, ￿nancial institutions that can serve as risk indicators and
barometers of vulnerability and calculate default probabilities. An estimate of the market
value of assets and asset volatility is needed, but market value of assets is not directly observ-
able because many of the assets on the balance sheet of a ￿nancial institution are not traded.
CCA imputes the value and volatility of assets indirectly using the market value of equity
from stock price data, equity volatility (from equity data and/or equity options), and the
book value of short- and long-term obligations. This is then used to calculate risk indicators
such as the probability of default, credit spreads, or other risk indicators.
The value of assets of a corporate or bank at time t is A(t). Assets are uncertain (sto-
chastic), and the evolution of the asset is given by dA=A = ￿Adt + ￿A"
p
t, where ￿A is the
drift rate or asset return, ￿Ais equal to the standard deviation of the asset return, and" is
normally distributed, with zero mean and unit variance. The probability distribution of the
asset at time T is shown below in (a)
Figure 3.14: The Probility Distribution of the Asset Value at time T
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Default occurs when assets fall to or below the promised payments on debt which de￿ne
the default barrier,Bt. The probability of default is the probability that At ￿ Bt which is:
Prob(At ￿ Bt) = Prob
￿
A0 exp
h￿
￿A ￿ ￿2
A=2
￿
t + ￿A"
p
t
i
￿ Bt
￿
=Prob(" ￿ ￿d2;￿) (3.13)
Since" ￿ N(0;1), the "actual" probability of default isN(￿d2;￿), where d2;￿ =
ln(A0=Bt)+(￿A￿￿2
A=2)t
￿A
p
t ,
this term is called the distance to default. N(￿)is the cumulative standard normal distribu-
tion.
Merton Model. We can use this basic idea to construct risk-adjusted balance sheets, i.e.
CCA balance sheets where the total market value of assets, A, at any time, t, is equal to the
sum of its equity market value, E, and its risky debt, D, maturing at time T. The asset value
is stochastic and may fall below the value of outstanding liabilities. Equity and debt derive
their value from the uncertain assets. As pointed out by Merton (1973) equity value is the
value of an implicit call option on the assets, with an exercise price equal to default barrier,
B. The value of risky debt is equal to default-free debt minus the present value of expected
loss due to default. The ￿rm￿ s outstanding liabilities constitute the bankruptcy level. The
expected potential loss due to default can be calculated as the value of a put option on the
assets, A, with an exercise price equal to B, t is the time horizon, r is the risk free rate, and
￿A, asset volatility.
Risky Debt = Default-free Debt - Potential Loss due to Default
D(t) = Be￿rT ￿ PE(t)
d1 =
ln(
A
B)+
￿
r+
￿2
A
2
￿
T
￿A
p
T and d2 =
ln(
A
B)+
 
r￿
￿2
A
2
!
T
￿A
p
T
The calibration of the model uses the value of equity, the volatility of equity, the distress
barrier as inputs into two equations in order to calculate the implied asset value and implied
asset volatility.1 Equity and equity volatility are consensus forecasts of market participants
and this provide forward-looking information. The value of assets is unobservable, but it can
be implied using CCA. In the Merton Model for ￿rms, banks and non-bank ￿nancials with
traded equity use equity, E, and equity volatility, ￿E, and the distress barrier in the following
1See Merton (1974,1977, and 1992), Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2008), and Gray and Malone (2008).
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two equations to solve for the two unknowns A, asset value, and ￿A, asset volatility.
E = A0N(d1) ￿ Be￿rTN(d2)
E￿E = A￿AN(d1)
Now we have all the parameters which can be used to estimate credit risk indicators. The
present value of expected losses associated with outstanding liabilities can be valued as an
implicit put option. This implicit put option is calculated with the default threshold as strike
price on the current asset value of each institution. Thus, the present value of expected loss
can be computed as
PE = Be￿rTN(￿d2) ￿ A0N(￿d1)
Once the asset value, asset volatility are known, together with the default barrier, time
horizon, and r, the values of the implicit put option, PE(t), can be calculated. Note that by
rearranging the formula for PE(t) we distinguish between default probability and loss given
default (LGD), such that
PE = N (￿d2)
￿
1 ￿
N (￿d1)
N (￿d2)
A
Be￿rT
￿
| {z }
LGD
Be￿rT
Shown in (b) below is the probability distribution (dashed line) with drift of the risk-free
interest rate, r. Risk adjusted (or risk-neutral) probability of default is N(￿d2), where
d2 =
ln(A0=Bt)+(r￿￿2
A=2)t
￿A
p
t . The actual probability of default from (a) is shown too.
Figure 3.15: The Actual Probility Distribution of Default at time T
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Moody￿ s KMV Model. In the 1990s a company called KMV adapted Merton￿ s ap-
proach for commercial applications. They used information from the equity market for ￿rms,
along with book value information of liabilities to get estimates of distance-to-distress, which
were used with a large database of actual defaults to estimate Expected Default Probabilities
(EDFTM). KMV was purchased by Moody￿ s in 2002 and is now Moody￿ s-KMV, or MKMV,
for short. The exact methodology is con￿dential, but general descriptions can be found on
the MKMV website (www.mkmv.com), and in KMV (2001) and MKMV (2003). MKMV￿ s
EDF credit measure is calculated using an iterative procedure to solve for the asset volatility.
It uses and initial guess of volatility to determine asset value and de-lever the equity returns
(according to MKMV 2003). The volatility of the asset returns are used as an input into the
next iteration of asset values and asset returns until a convergence is obtained. In essence,
the model used equity return volatility, equity values, distress barrier from book value of
liabilities, and time horizon to get a distance-to-distress. This distance-to-distress was then
mapped to actual default probabilities, called expected default probabilities (EDFs), using a
database of detailed real world default probabilities for many ￿rms. The distance-to-distress
and the CEDF are calculated as follows:
DDKMV = f
 
ln(A0=Bt) +
￿
￿A ￿ ￿2
A=2
￿
t
￿A
p
t
!
EDFt = f (DDKMV (t))
MKMV estimates the "actual" default probabilities. The EDF credit measure is calcu-
lated daily for 35,000 corporations and ￿nancial institutions in 55 countries (see MKMV 2001
and 2003). Robustness checks con￿rm that the model to be quite accurate and is a leading
indicator for default. MKMV lead actual defaults, for example high yield default forecasts,
according to MKMV EDFs, lead actual default rates by about a year.
Source: MKMV
For sectors (groups of ￿rms or banks) the time series of median (50th percentile) EDFs
for corporate sectors and banking sectors is one candidate for a sector credit risk measure,
but this would be biased by small ￿rms in the sample. To get a single aggregate measure
which is linked to the size of the ￿rms and size of default risk in the sector, the EDFs are
weighted by the market value of assets of the ￿rms and banks in the sector for the analysis
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Figure 3.16: MKMV estimated aveage EDF, US Speculate Default Rate and
Baseline Forecast
in this paper. Extensions and more details of CCA models can be found in Gray and Malone
(2008).
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Monetary Policy and the Interest
Rate Channel in China
4.1 Introduction
In ordinary times, when interest rates bounded away from zero, central banks in advanced
economies typically implement monetary policy by steering short-term interbank rates. While
the exact ways in which this is done di⁄ers between countries, the focus is squarely on the
price of liquidity. Thus, given the policy interest rate, other variables contain no information
about the stance of monetary policy. In the case of China, however, it is generally felt that
interbank rates are not good measures of the stance of monetary policy.1
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the interest rate channel of monetary policy
transmission is week or non-existent in China. Geiger (2006) shows that retail lending rates
and money market rates do not have a tight and predictable relationship with loan and money
growth, and Laurens and Maino (2007) ￿nd that GDP and price does not react to short-term
interest rates, although they react signi￿cantly to M2 growth. Green and Chang (2006) show
that the People￿ s Bank of China (PBoC) controls reserve money well but not M2, since there
is no close relationship between reserve money and M2. This evidence suggests that the
relationship between the monetary policy instruments, short-term interest rates, loan growth
and money growth di⁄ers from what we observe in advanced economies.
In thinking about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in China, it is useful to
1He and Pauwel (2006), Shu and Ng (2010) construct the indicator of the stance of monetary policy using
PBoC statements or data on the policy instruments instead.
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distinguish between the link, ￿rst, between the policy instruments and interbank rates, and,
second, that between interbank rates and the cost and availability of bank loans. Explanations
put forward in the literature of the ine⁄ectiveness of monetary policy in China has typically
focused on how structural impediments in ￿nancial markets have weakened the second link.2
In this paper, by contrast, we also study the ￿rst link since understanding it is a prerequisite
for understanding the overall transmission of monetary policy to the real economy.
The PBoC conducts monetary policy using an array of instruments. These include re-
quired reserve ratios (RR hereafter), the rate of remuneration on reserves, open market oper-
ations (that is, the issuance of central bank bills) and, crucially, regulated deposit and retail
lending rates.3 The two regulated rates are important for the implementation of monetary
policy in China in contrast to in advanced economies. This raises the question of what the
coexistence of such regulation and market forces implies for PBoC￿ s policy to in￿ uence.
To study this mechanism, we present a model of bank behavior in China, which is an
extension of the model of Porter and Xu (2009a), which in turn is an extension of Freixas
and Rochet (2008). The model illustrates how the interbank rate and the quantity and price
of retail loans are determined in an environment where banks compete, given regulations con-
cerning the interest rates they can pay on deposits and charge for loans. The model suggests
that the presence of regulated rates have a large impact on the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. In particular, the e⁄ect of monetary policy on interbank rates and retail
bank lending depends on how the regulated interest rates deviate from their equilibrium lev-
els, de￿ned as the rates we would observe in the absence of regulation. Two corollaries ￿ ow
from this conclusion.
First, in this regulated framework, the interbank rate is not a su¢ cient, and potentially
misleading, indicator of the central bank￿ s policy intentions. To characterize the stance of
monetary policy, all policy instruments, including the benchmark deposit rate, benchmark
lending rate, RR, open market operations and the rate of remunerations on reserves, must
be considered.
Second, to the extent that the central bank does not observe the equilibrium rates, it may
not know if a change of its policy instruments is expansionary or contractionary. Liberalizing
the regulated rates eliminates this uncertainty and improves the e⁄ectiveness of the monetary
2See Liu and Zhang (2007), Larence and Maino (2007) and Podpiera (2006).
3Window guidance, which pressures or impose rules on banks to follow PBC￿ s instructions about retail
lending, is also an important tool.
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policy transmission.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of the
implementation of monetary policy in China. Section 4.3 presents the model and some policy
implications. Section 4.4 considers a few recent monetary policy episodes in order to explore
the model￿ s empirical predictions. Section 4.5 concludes and provides suggestions for future
research.
4.2 Implementing Monetary Policy in China
Since the PBoC uses a large number of policy instruments in setting monetary policy, it is
useful to start by brie￿ y reviewing how these have evolved over time. Figure 4.1 contains
data on the interest rate on central bank bills, which are used in open market operations to
steer interest rates more broadly, and interbank rates as captured by the 7-day repo rate.
We also plot the rates paid on required and on excess reserves, and the regulated rates on
deposits and loans.
The regulation of deposit and lending rates has a long history in China. The deposit rates
and lending rates were historically set by the PBoC. From 1997 onwards, the PBoC gradually
relaxed these regulations. In October 2004, PBoC retained a regulated rate (the benchmark
lending rate) as a ceiling for the deposit rate and another (the benchmark deposit rate) as a
￿ oor for lending rates. The regulation of (the ceiling on) the deposit rate is generally seen as
binding; the regulated ￿ oors on lending rates is perhaps less closely adhered to.
Since ￿nancial markets in China have developed rapidly over time, as has the conduct
and implementation of monetary policy, the ￿gure focuses on the period starting in 2004.4
Several observations are warranted. First, the yield on central bank bills and the repo rate
are closely correlated, indicating the important role played by open market operations in the
PBoC￿ s conduct of policy. Second, the benchmark deposit rate evolves over time in much the
same way as the repo rate. This is compatible with the idea that when changing the stance
of policy, the PBoC seeks to raise banks￿ s costs of funds both in inter bank and deposit
markets. Third, changes in the benchmark lending rate tend to coincide with changes in the
repo rate and in the benchmark deposit rates. Overall, the ￿gure is compatible with a "belts
and suspenders" approach to monetary policy in which many, if not all, policy levers are used
4See Feyzioglu et al. (2009), Porter and Xu (2009a,b) and He and Pauwels (2008) for summaries of recent
changes in Chinese ￿nancial markets and their implication for monetary policy.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the Main Policy Instruments of PBoC and the
Interbank Rate
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simultaneously to achieve the desired change in monetary conditions. Again, this contrasts
with the approach in advanced economies in which typically only the interbank interest rate
is used to change policy.
One not always understood the consequence of this approach in that the change of an
instrument which would clearly have expansionary or contractionary e⁄ect in a liberalized
market might have perverse e⁄ects in a quasi-liberalized market system such as that in China.
It is therefore important to study the e⁄ects of changes in individual policy instruments in a
model in which market forces and regulations coexist.
Finally, the ￿gure also shows the RR, which was gradually increased in from 2006 onwards.
This may re￿ ect the desire of the PBoC to sterilize the e⁄ects of its foreign exchange markets
interventions on monetary conditions.
In terms of the stance of monetary policy, the ￿gure indicates that monetary policy
was progressively tightened from 2004 onwards in response to robust economic growth, in
particular to very strong investment spending, and a rise in in￿ ation in 2004 and from 2007
onwards, in both cases largely due to rapidly increasing food prices. In the fall of 2008,
monetary policy was relaxed sharply to mitigate the e⁄ects on the mainland economy of
the rapid worsening of global economic and ￿nancial conditions to limit their e⁄ects on the
Mainland economy.
4.3 The Theoretical Model
4.3.1 Model Framework
To study the e⁄ect of the monetary policy instruments on aggregate bank loans, we present a
stylized model that integrates regulation of banks￿deposit and lending rates with a competi-
tive interbank market. The model is based on that of Porter and Xu (2009a), which is in turn
an extended version of the model of Freixas and Rochet (2008). We assume that each bank
chooses the amount of the deposits, excess reserves, central bank bills, and loans in order to
maximize pro￿ts, given the RR, the reserve remuneration ratio, central bank bill yield and
the regulated interest rates for deposit and lending. Thus, each bank￿ s pro￿t maximization
problem is given as:
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￿i = max
Li;Ei;Di;Bi
frLLi + rEEi + rR￿Di + rBBi + rMi ￿ rDDi (4.1)
￿ c(Di;Li) ￿
￿
2
￿
Ei ￿ ET￿2
￿
￿
2
￿
Li ￿ LT
i
￿2
g
where Li denotes the level of loans, Ei is the level of excess reserves, ￿ Di is the amount
of required reserves (with ￿ being the RR and Di the deposit level), Bi is the quantity
of central bank bill holdings and changes as a consequence of open market operations,5 and
Mi, is the net position in interbank market. The relevant interest rates are denoted rL,
rE, rR, rD, and rB.
Equation 4.1 states that the pro￿ts of bank is the sum of revenues minus the costs.
Revenues come from retail lending, rL Li; holdings of excess reserves6, rE Ei;7 holdings of
required reserves, rR ￿D;revenues on holdings of central bank bills, rB Bi; and lending in
the interbank market, rMi:8 The costs arise from interest payments on deposits, rD Di;
the management of central bank bill holdings, deposits and loans, c(￿);9 and the cost of
deviations of reserves from their target level ET
i ,
￿
2
￿
Ei ￿ ET
i
￿2.10 The last term captures
window guidance, that is, the fact that the PBoC on occasion sets a target loan level LT
i for
banks. In this section we disregard this cost by setting ￿ = 0.
The net position on the interbank market is given by Mi:
Mi = Di ￿ Li ￿ Ei ￿ ￿Di ￿Bi (4.2)
5Corporate bonds and repo transaction is modelled as interbank lending.
6The main di⁄erence between our model and that of Porter and Xu (2009a) is that we make a distintion
between required and excess reserves. Since the PBoC sometimes changes the spread between the interest rate
it pays on these two types of reserves, this seems appropriate.
7The PBC pays interest for required and excess reserve.
8We assume there is only one interbank market and thus one interbank rate. Although there is segmentation
of the Chinese interbank, it does not a⁄ect our result qualitatively.
9Costs include implicit source costs to attract depositors, i.e.labor, physical capital, material cost to produce
service to depositors (Sealey and Lindley 1977, p. 1254); costs to attract lenders and costs to manage bond
investment portfolio.
10Reserve plays a role as liquidity, banks typically set a target level of reserve to ￿nance unexpected in￿ ow
or out￿ ow from banks￿reserve account (Campbell 1987 p. 61). "The target level is determined by banks￿
relationship with its non-bank customers, its role in teh payment system, and the need to secure positive
balances to avoid end-of-day overdraft penalties" (Bartolini et al 2001 p. 1295).
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The management costs are given by:
C (Di;Li) =
cDiD2
i + cLiL2
i
2
(4.3)
with cDi, cLi > 0.
Following Bartolini et al. (2001) and Campbell (1987), we assume that banks are con-
cerned about their access to liquidity. The cost is modelled as a quadratic function of the
deviation of actual excess reserve holding from the target level. Using equation (4.2), the
pro￿t maximization problem becomes:
￿i = max
Li;Ei;Di;Bi
f(rL ￿ r)Li + (rE ￿ r)Ei + [r ￿ rD + ￿(rR ￿ r)]Di
+ (rB ￿ r)Bi ￿
cDiD2
i + cLiL2
i
2
￿
￿
2
￿
Ei ￿ ET
i
￿2
g (4.4)
Rearranging the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to Li, we obtain:
rL = r + cLiLi: (4.5)
Equation (4.5) indicates that the optimal amount of loans is given by the point where
the marginal bene￿t of loans equals the marginal cost of loans. The marginal bene￿t is
the interest rate in retail lending and the marginal cost depends on two components: the
interbank rate and the cost of managing the loans.
Similarly, the ￿rst-order condition for excess reserves can be rearranged to yield:
rE = r + ￿
￿
Ei ￿ ET
i
￿
(4.6)
Thus, the optimal level of excess reserves is selected such that remuneration equals the cost
of holding them. These costs are given by the sum of the interbank rate and cost of deviation
from target reserve level.
Turning to deposits, we obtain:
￿rR + (1 ￿ ￿)r = rD + cDiDi (4.7)
The bank should thus attract deposits to the point where their marginal bene￿t and marginal
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cost are equal. The bene￿t of holding reserves is the sum of the interest earned on required
reserves, ￿rR, and the interbank lending return from the part of deposits that do not serve
as required reserves, (1 ￿ ￿)r. The cost composes of the interest rate on deposits, rD, and
management costs.
Finally, the optimal quantity of central bank bills to hold is given by the level that equates
the central bank bill yield with opportunity cost of holding central bank bills, r:
rB = r (4.8)
Holding central bank bills is therefore a perfect substitute for lending the same amount of
funds in interbank market.
Furthermore, the supply for loans can be written as a function of the spread between the
lending rate and the interbank rate:
Li =
rL ￿ r
cLi
(4.9)
and optimal excess reserve as:
Ei =
1
￿
(rE ￿ r) + ET
i (4.10)
The deposit demand function is:
Di =
1
cDi
(r ￿ rD + ￿(rR ￿ r)) (4.11)
Assuming there are N banks in the interbank market, the market clearing condition is:
N X
i=1
Mi = 0 (4.12)
The supply of central bank bills is exogenous and set through OMOs. rB and r are
jointly determined by the interbank market clearing condition (equation 4.12). In practice,
the PBoC announces the reference rate for the central bank bills in order to in￿ uence the
interbank rate.
So far we have assumed that banks maximize pro￿ts by choosing the amount of deposits,
loans, excess reserves and central bank bill holdings, given interest rates and their cost func-
178Section 4.3 Chapter 4
tions. The net position Mi of each ￿rm can be positive, zero, or negative, while the sum of
Mi equals zero, as shown in equation (4.12). Equations (4.12) have three unknowns we need
to determine: the interbank market rate, r; the deposit rate, rD, and the retail lending rate,
rL. In the next section, we study the model solution and the impact of changes in policy
instruments on interbank rate and lending.
4.3.2 The Impact on Interbank Rate and Loans
We ￿rst discuss the solution for the standard case in which the interest rates for lending and
deposits are market determined.
Case 1: rL and rD are market determined.
In the standard case, the retail lending rate, rL; and deposit rate, rD, are endogenously
determined in the loan and deposit markets. To capture the demand side of the loan market,
we simply assume that aggregate loan demand is negatively related to the lending rate and
positively related to real GDP and the price level:
Ld = Ld
￿
￿
rL;
+
Y ;
+
P
￿
(4.13)
Loan supply is the sum of banks￿loan supply so that the equilibrium lending rate, r￿
L, is
implicitly determined by:
Ld
￿
￿
rL;
+
Y ;
+
P
￿
= Ls =
N X
i=1
Li =
N X
i=1
rL ￿ r
cLi
(4.14)
which we can solve for r￿
L:
r￿
L = h
￿
+
r;
+
Y ;
+
P
￿
(4.15)
Thus, r￿
L positively related to the interbank rate, r; real GDP, Y , the price level, P, and loan
management costs, as captured by cLi. Furthermore, we assume that the supply of deposits
is a linear function of the deposit rate, real GDP and the price level:
Ds = Ds
￿
+
rD;
+
Y ;
+
P
￿
: (4.16)
179Section 4.3 Chapter 4
In equilibrium we have that:
Ds
￿
+
rD;
+
Y ;
+
P
￿
= Dd =
N X
i=1
Di =
N X
i=1
1
cDi
(r ￿ rD + ￿(rR ￿ r)) (4.17)
By solving equation (4.17), the equilibrium deposit rate, r￿
D, is obtained:
r￿
D = f
￿
+
r;
+
rR;
+
￿;
￿
Y ;
￿
P
￿
: (4.18)
Thus r￿
D is positively related to the interbank rate, r; the remuneration rate on required
reserves, rR; the required reserve ratio, ￿; the price level, P; and negatively related to real
GDP, Y . Substituting rL and rD in (4.9) and (4.11) with r￿
L and r￿
D respectively, and
substituting Mi with Di, Li, Ei, and B, the sum of aggregate net position, i.e. equation
(4.12) can be expressed as:
F (￿) =
N X
i=1
Mi =
N X
i=1
[(1 ￿ ￿)Di ￿ Li ￿ Ei] ￿B
=
N X
i=1
(1 ￿ ￿)Di ￿
N X
i=1
Li ￿
N X
i=1
Ei ￿ B (4.19)
The aggregate net position F (￿) depends on four factors: the fraction of aggregate deposits
that is not held as required reserves,
N X
i=1
(1 ￿ ￿)Di; aggregate loans,
N X
i=1
Li; aggregate excess
reserves,
N X
i=1
Ei; and the aggregate amount of central bank bills, B, which is determined by
the central bank￿ s open market operations and is exogenous. The equilibrium interbank rate,
r￿, clears the interbank market, and is given by:
r￿ = g ( ￿;rR;rE;B;Y;P): (4.20)
The solution of r￿ equations (4.13) or (4.14), implies that:
L = Ld = Ls =
N X
i=1
h
￿
+
r￿;
+
Y ;
+
P
￿
￿ r￿
cLi
(4.21)
The partial e⁄ects of adjusting monetary policy instruments on this equilibrium loan level is
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Table 4.1: Impact of Changes in Policy Instruments on Interbank Rate
Case 1 Case 2.1 case 2.2 case 2.3
Instrument No rB
L < r￿
L rB
L￿ r￿
L
Intervention rB
D< r￿
D rB
D< r￿
D rB
D￿ r￿
D
rB
L = 0 ￿ ￿
rB
D = ￿ ￿ 0
￿ ￿ + + ￿
rR ￿ 0 0 ￿
rE + + + +
B + + + +
given by Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. When the deposit rate, rD; and lending rate, rL; are market determined,
the impact of increasing the rate of remuneration on excess reserves and sales of central bank
bill on loans, i.e. @L
@rE and @L
@B; are both negative. The impact of increasing remuneration rate
on required reserve on loans, @L
@rR, is positive, and the impact of increasing RR on loans, @L
@￿;
is ambiguous.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix 4.1. The intuition is as follows: increasing the
remuneration on excess reserve leads banks to hold more excess reserves, which results in a
negative aggregate position in the interbank market, F (￿) < 0; given the original equilibrium
interbank rate. Hence the equilibrium rate must rise to clear the interbank market. In turn,
that results in a higher lending rate and a lower loan level.
Sales of bills by the central bank has the same e⁄ect on loans by making the aggregate net
position negative. By contrast, a higher remuneration rate on required reserves lead banks
to attract more deposits. The resulting rise in aggregate deposits causes the aggregate net
position in the interbank market to become positive, thus resulting in a lower interbank rate
and hence more lending.
The impact of a change in RR depends on two factors. First, higher RR reduces the
funds banks have available to lend, purchase central bank bills, and to hold excess reserves.
Moreover, a higher RR also increases the demand for deposits by banks. The overall impact
on the aggregate net position in the interbank market and on loans is ambiguous. Table 4.1
and 4.2 summarize the policy e⁄ects on interbank rate and loans respectively.
So far, we have discussed a model in which banks maximize pro￿ts, under the assumption
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Table 4.2: Impact of Changes in Policy Instruments on Loans
Case 1 Case 2.1 case 2.2 case 2.3
Instrument No rB
L < r￿
L rB
L￿ r￿
L
Intervention rB
D< r￿
D rB
D￿ r￿
D rB
D< r￿
D
rB
L = 0 ￿ ￿
rB
D = + 0 0
￿ ￿ ￿ 0 0
rR + 0 0 0
rE ￿ ￿ 0 0
B ￿ ￿ 0 0
that the interest rates on deposits and retail lending are market determined. This case
considered above is relevant for central banks that conduct monetary policy principally by
in￿ uencing interest rates in interbank markets. While this is the standard procedure in
advanced economies, the PBoC continues to rely on regulation of the interest rates that
banks pay on deposits and charge for loans.
We therefore next consider how the introduction of regulated interest rates modi￿es the
conclusions from the above analysis assuming market determined deposit and lending rates.
This complicates the analysis considerably because such regulation could apply to either or
both deposit and lending rates. Moreover, it can force the actual rate below or above the
equilibrium level. To limit the number of cases that we must consider, we therefore focus on
the sub-cases that we believe best capture the present situation in China.
Case 2 The ￿oor of rL and the cap of rD are set by the central bank
Figure 4.2 illustrates the determination of loan and deposit when the regulated rates
provide a ￿ oor for the lending rate and a ceiling for the deposit rate.11 The level of loans
and the lending rate are equilibrium outcomes, when the regulated lending rate is below the
equilibrium level. However, when the regulated lending rate is above the equilibrium rate, the
loan level is determined by the loan demand, which is exogenous to the banks. The opposite
holds true in the case of deposits. If the regulated deposit rate is above the equilibrium level,
the amount of deposits is determined as if there was no such regulation. In contrast, if the
regulated rate is below the equilibrium rate, deposits are determined by supply function.
Whether the regulated interest rates are above or below their equilibrium levels is crucial
11In practice, the lower bound of the lending rate is 90% of the regulated lending rate (also named benchmark
lending rate). We do not model this detail since it does not change our result qualitatively.
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Figure 4.2: Regulated Lending and Deposit Market
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because it determines whether the quantity of deposits and loans will rise, fall or remain the
same following a change in some instruments. Since it may be di¢ cult for policy makers to
determine the equilibrium rate, one consequence is that they may not know whether a change
in the regulated interest rate will be expansionary or contractionary.
In order to explore the consequences of changing monetary policy instruments when the
interest rates are regulated, below we discuss the sub-cases in which the regulated rates
deviate from the equilibrium rates in di⁄erent directions. Since the regulated rates only
a⁄ect the equilibrium when they are binding (that is, the lending rate is below equilibrium
and the regulated deposit rate is above equilibrium), we solely discuss cases in which either
or both regulated rates are binding.
Case 2.1 rB
L < r￿
L and rB
D < r￿
D
Here we examine the e⁄ect of policy changes when both regulated rates are below their
equilibrium levels. The fact that regulated lending rate is below the equilibrium level means
the volume of bank loans are market determined and not a⁄ected by the regulation. In this
case, we can solve for r￿
L using (4.15) and the loan level is then given by equation (4.21). In
contrast, as the regulated deposit rate is below the equilibrium level, deposits are determined
by supply factors. The aggregate net position in the interbank market is therefore given by:
F (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)Ds ￿
rB
D
￿
￿ Ld
0
@
￿
h
￿
+
r;
+
Y ;
+
P
￿
;
+
Y ;
+
P
1
A
￿
N X
i=1
￿
1
￿
(rE ￿ r) + ET
i
￿
￿ B (4.22)
The e⁄ect of policy instruments are presented in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. When rB
L provides a ￿oor for the retail lending rate and rB
D a ceiling for
deposit rate, and these two rates are both below their equilibrium rates respectively, increasing
the benchmark deposit rate is expansionary. Increasing the RR, remuneration rate on excess
reserve and sales of securities to banking system are contractionary. Changes in the regulated
lending rate and on remuneration on required reserve do not in￿uence the level of loans.
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix 4.1. In this case, the increase of the benchmark
deposit rate attracts more deposits from the public and thus attracts funds to the interbank
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market, which implies this is an expansionary policy. Higher RR, higher remuneration on
excess reserves and sales of central bank bills reduce liquidity in the interbank market, thus
are all contractionary. Thus these three policy actions are all contractionary. Since the
regulated lending rate is not binding, raising it does not change the level of loans and lending
rate. A change in the remuneration on required reserves also does not have e⁄ect on interbank
liquidity and loans. The reason is that it only in￿ uences interbank liquidity through banks￿
demand for deposit, while in this case, the interbank liquidity is not determined by this bank
demand.
Case 2.2 rB
L ￿ r￿
L and rB
D < r￿
D
When the regulated lending rate exceeds the equilibrium level, it is binding and the level
of loans is demand driven. As in Case 2.1, the deposit level is determined by supply function.
The aggregate net position in the interbank market is given by:
F (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)Ds ￿
rB
D
￿
￿ Ld ￿
rB
L
￿
￿
N X
i=1
￿
1
￿
(rE ￿ r) + ET
i
￿
￿ B (4.23)
The only instrument that matters for the determination of loans is the regulated lending
rate, a rise in which leads to a lower demand for loans, and thus lower level to loans. Moreover,
raising benchmark lending rate lowers interbank rates by leading the banks to demand less
liquidity from the interbank.
This partial e⁄ect of raising regulated lending rate on loans is given by:
@L
@ rB
L
=
@
@ rB
L
LD
 
￿
rB
L;
+
Y ;
+
P
!
< 0: (4.24)
And the e⁄ect on interbank rate is:
@r
@ rB
L
= ￿
@F=@ rB
L
@F=@r
= ￿
￿@Ld ￿
rB
L
￿
=@ rB
L
@F=@r
< 0 (4.25)
However, changes in other instruments in￿ uence the interbank market rate in the same
way as in Case 2:1. Thus, a rise in benchmark deposit lowers the interbank rate, while raising
RR, increasing remuneration on excess reserve and sales on central bank bills pushes up the
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interbank rate. There is no e⁄ect of a change in the remuneration on required reserves on
the interbank rate.
In this case the central bank can directly control the loan level by changing the regulated
lending rate, so that the interbank market plays no role for the transmission of monetary
policy. Furthermore, there exist a disconnect between the interbank rate and bank loans. In
particular, when the central bank raises RR, increase the remuneration on excess reserves,
and conduct sales of central bank bills, the interbank rate increases but bank loans does not
change.
Case 2.3 rB
L ￿ r￿
L and rB
D ￿ r￿
D
When both regulated rates are above the equilibrium rates, bank loans are determined
by demand while deposit is determined by the equilibrium rate. The aggregate net position
thus is:
F (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)Ds
￿
f
￿
+
r;
+
rR;
+
￿;
￿
Y ;
￿
P
￿￿
￿ Ld ￿
rB
L
￿
￿
N X
i=1
￿
1
￿
(rE ￿ r) + ET
i
￿
￿ B (4.26)
As in Case 2.2, raising benchmark lending rate lowers loans by reducing loan demand.
Changes of other instrument do not have any e⁄ect on it. Raising benchmark lending rate
lowers interbank rates by reducing the bank demand for funds from the interbank market.
However, other instruments in￿ uence the interbank liquidity either directly, or through chang-
ing the equilibrium level of deposits and excess reserves. Their e⁄ects on the interbank rate
are therefore the same as in Case 1. To be speci￿c, higher remuneration on required reserves
lowers the interbank rate, higher remuneration on excess reserves and sales of central bank
bills increase the interbank rate, and the e⁄ect of raising required reserve on interbank rate
is ambiguous.
The main implication from the theoretical model is thus that the e⁄ect of policy instru-
ments on the interbank rate and bank loans di⁄ers from the standard case if the interest
rates on deposit and lending are regulated. Furthermore, the e⁄ect depends on whether the
regulated interest rate is above or below the equilibrium rate. The disconnect between the
changes in interbank rate and loans can thus be explained by the presence of regulated rates
in the policy framework.
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Before proceeding, we emphasize that from the view point of the central bank, knowledge
about the relationship between the benchmark rates and equilibrium rates is crucial for
knowing the e⁄ect of changes in policy instruments.
This section provides a theoretical model to show the transmission of monetary policy to
bank loans in an monetary policy framework with regulations of deposit and retail lending
market. In the next section, we provide some empirical evidence showing that the e⁄ects of
some previous policy actions from PBoC are consistent with the predictions of the model.
4.4 Selected Monetary Policy Episodes
In lieu of undertaking a formal econometric study, in this section we interpret recent Chinese
monetary policy development from the perspective of the model. In doing so it should be
noted that the model traces out the responses of the banking system to monetary stimulus
under the assumption that output and prices are exogenously given. While this is, of course,
not a good characterization of the real world, the time spans that we consider below are short
and it seems not unreasonable to assume that they are approximately constant.
With that caveat in mind, we study three episodes from 2004 onwards in which intensive
policy actions were taken. The purpose of this analysis is to illustrate the potential for
perverse changes in interbank rates and lending to changes in policy. Within each period, we
list the dates and magnitudes of the changes in the PBoC￿ s policy instruments, the resulting
change in interbank market rate and the in bank lending. We focus on two episodes as shown
in Table 4.3 and 4.4 respectively.
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In all episodes, the PBoC appears to have taken policy actions to tighten monetary
conditions.12 In particular, they raised the regulated rates for both deposits and lending
simultaneously, raised RR, and withdrew liquidity. However, surprisingly, the resulting inter-
bank rate fell and new loans increased on all three occasions, suggesting that these measures
were expansionary. Indeed, this is suggested by the model.
To explain the di⁄erent episodes with the model, we ￿rst need to identify in which regime
or case the economy is. This is di¢ cult since it requires us to know whether the regulated
deposit and lending rates are above or below their underlying equilibrium levels. As already
noted, the equilibrium deposit rates are in general believed to be above the benchmark rate,
since there is little evidence that market deposit rates below the regulated rate. Thus we
assume this is the case in our analysis. For the lending rate, it is less clear whether the
regulated rate is binding. Table 4.5 shows the fraction of bank loans that are lent at rates
above the regulated rate. In particular, for some periods, the largest four state-owned banks
and joint-stock commercial banks had more than one third of their loans prices above the
regulated rate, while the city commercial banks had more than two thirds. We therefore
assume that either Case 2.1 or 2.2 best characterizes the economy.
Episode 1 shows the policy actions and the corresponding changes in interbank market
and new loans between September 15th and October 31st, 2006. On September 15th, the
PBoC raised RR by 0.5%, which the model suggests would push up the interbank rate. Four
days later, PBoC increased the regulated rates for both deposit and lending simultaneously by
27 basis points. The model suggests that the combination of these two actions would reduce
the interbank rate. At the same time, the withdrawal of 73 billion RMB of interbank liquidity
was ￿according to the model ￿also expected to raise the interbank rate. The overall e⁄ect
on the interbank rate thus depends on whether the increase in the regulated rates (which
attracts deposits and tends to reduce interbank rates) was greater than the contractionary
e⁄ects on interbank liquidity arising from the increase in the RR and the withdrawal of
liquidity. The data shows that the interbank rate fell by 19 basis points, indicating the e⁄ect
arising from the increase in the regulated rates, which attracts liquidity into the interbank
markets, dominates. The resulting increase of new loans suggests that the economy is in Case
2.1.
In the next month, PBoC withdrew liquidity by 97 billion RMB without altering its other
12This is consistent with what the monetary policy indicator imply in Shu and Ng (2010).
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Table 4.5: Proportions of Lending Rates Higher than the Regulated Lending
Rate
Period Big Four Commercial Banks
Joint-stock City
2004Q3 35.70 33.20 66.30
2004Q4 44.33 36.00 60.23
2005Q1 39.80 34.60 66.80
2005Q2 39.96 32.37 57.79
2005Q3 41.08 35.62 68.10
2005Q4 41.09 35.07 51.94
2006Q1 39.92 35.07 57.01
2006Q2 39.41 34.70 58.32
2006Q3 35.70 31.02 62.82
2006Q4 38.52 29.03 56.93
2007Q1 36.01 28.43 54.67
2007Q2 36.48 27.41 49.82
2007Q3 36.88 26.19 44.12
2007Q4 35.54 29.35 46.30
2008Q1 36.47 35.57 NA
Source: CEIC
policy instruments. In contrast to the previous month, this time the interbank rate increased
by 22 basis points and new loans fell by about 2.6%. The result is again consistent with the
predictions of the model Thus, the model suggests that increasing the two regulated rates is
probably the main reason leading to an opposite overall e⁄ect.
The second episode considers the policy actions from May 15th to June 5th, 2007. The
sequence of adjustments in the instruments is the same as the ￿rst case, except that the
PBoC increased the RR a second time after the adjustment of the regulated interest rates
rates. Furthermore, it injected, rather than withdrew, a large amount of interbank liquidity.
The impact on the interbank rate and new loans were similar to in the ￿rst episode. The
explanation of the model is that although the second rise of the RR reduced liquidity in the
interbank market, the large liquidity injection and the increase of the regulated deposit rate
were more important. Hence the interbank rate dropped by more, and new loans grew faster,
then in the earlier case.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the implementation of monetary policy and the interest-rate
transmission mechanism in China. This is an interesting area of inquiry because the coex-
istence of regulation regarding what interest rates banks can charge for loans and o⁄er on
deposits with a market determined interbank rate make the transmission mechanism much
more complicated than in a system in which all interest rates are fully ￿ exible. Perhaps
because of these complications and the resulting limited controllability of the degree to which
monetary conditions are expansionary, the PBoC uses an array of policy instruments ￿in-
cluding required reserve ratios, the rate of remuneration on reserves, open market operations
￿which further complicates the transmission mechanism.
To understand these issues better, we extend the model of bank behavior in China pro-
posed by Porter and Xu (2009a). The model illustrates how the interbank rate and the
quantity and price of retail loans are determined in an environment where banks compete,
given regulations concerning the interest rates they can pay on deposits and charge for loans.
The analysis suggests to several conclusions.
First, the presence of regulated rates has a large impact on the interest rate transmis-
sion mechanism. In particular, the net e⁄ect of changes in the policy instruments depends
on whether and how the regulated interest rates deviate from their equilibrium levels. For
instance, an increase in deposit rates will attract more deposits ￿and therefore depress inter-
bank rates and expand bank lending ￿if the deposit rate is below the equilibrium level, but
may do the opposite if the deposit rate is above the equilibrium level, given macroeconomic
conditions.
Second and as a consequence, the interbank rate does not fully re￿ ect the stance of
monetary policy. Indeed, it can even be a potentially misleading indicator of the central
bank￿ s policy intentions. For instance, an increase in the regulated lending rate above the
equilibrium level will tend to depress interbank rates ￿suggesting a more expansionary policy
￿ since banks may react to the resulting decline in bank lending rates by reducing their
demand for funds in the interbank market.
Third, to characterize properly the central bank￿ s policy stance, information from all
policy instruments ￿including the remuneration on required and excess reserves, RR and
open market operations ￿needs to be taken into account. Doing so is not an easy exercise,
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neither for outside analysts nor the PBoC￿ s sta⁄.
Fourth, since the PBoC does not observe the equilibrium rates, there is a risk that it may
not know at all times whether a change of its policy instruments would be expansionary or
contractionary. This raises the risk that policy changes do not always have their intended
e⁄ects, which may lead to policy errors.
Fifth, liberalizing the regulated rates would eliminate much of this uncertainty and is
therefore likely to improve the PBoC￿ s ability to control the degree to which monetary policy
is stimulatory. The system of regulated rates is also likely to lead banks and borrowers
to avoid the regulation by operating in grey markets. An additional bene￿t of lifting the
regulations is that it would transfer this activity to the regulated sector.
While the focus of this paper has been to better understand the transmission mechanism
by investigating theoretically how pro￿t maximizing banks are likely to behave in the presence
of regulation, a number of important empirical questions are readily apparent.
One set of questions concerns the behavior of interbank rates. For instance, to what
extent do they respond to the policy instruments reviewed above? Have the responses be-
come stronger over time, as one would expect given the gradual liberalization of the Chinese
￿nancial system over time? How do answers to these questions depend on the maturity of
the interbank rate considered? What is the role of macroeconomic conditions in determining
their evolution over time?
A second set of questions pertains to the behaviour of e⁄ective bank lending rates. How
do they respond to the di⁄erent policy instruments of the PBoC? Have these responses
varied over time? What is the role of ￿ uctuation in the demand for bank loans coming from
movements in real GDP?
Finally, questions regarding the interconnectedness of Chinese interest rates with interest
rates in the rest of the world arise. If the exchange rate is ￿xed or heavily managed, economic
forces will tend to equalize interest rates across currencies. Of course, regulation to thwart
these forces may be e⁄ective, at least for some time. Over time and as ￿nancial integration
proceeds, one would expect international interest rate linkages to become stronger. Is this
true for China?
While admittedly the available data set is limited, it would be fruitful to address these
issues in a future paper. We hope to do so.
192Section 4.6 Chapter 4
4.6 Appendix 4.1: Proof of Propositions
4.6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. :
The aggregate net position is given by:
F (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)Ds ￿ LD ￿
N X
i=1
Ei ￿ B (4.27)
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The partial e⁄ect of a change in interbank market rate on the aggregate net position is:
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which implies
@F (￿)=@r > 0 (4.29)
The partial e⁄ects of raising remuneration on excess reserves on aggregate position is
given by:
@F (￿)=@rE = ￿
@
@rE
N X
i=1
Ei = ￿
N
￿
< 0; (4.30)
Using the implicit function theorem, we therefore obtain the partial e⁄ect of remuneration
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on excess reserves on interbank rate is given as the following:
@ r
@rE
= ￿
@F (￿)=@rE
@F (￿)=@r
> 0 (4.31)
in turn, the impact on loans is:
@L
@rE
=
@LD
@ h
@ h
@ r
@ r
@rE
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@LD
@ h
@ h
@ r
@F (￿)=@rE
@F (￿)=@r
< 0 (4.32)
Similarly, the partial e⁄ect of changes in remuneration on required reserves on the interbank
rate and loans are:
@F (￿)=@rR = (1 ￿ ￿)
@
@rR
Ds > 0; (4.33)
@ r
@rR
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@F (￿)=@rR
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The same impact of RR is:
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|{z}
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+ (1 ￿ ￿)
@
@￿
Ds
| {z }
>0
? 0 (4.36)
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? 0 (4.38)
The impact of sales of central bank bills is thus:
@F (￿)=@B = ￿1 (4.39)
@ r
@B
= ￿
@F (￿)=@B
@F (￿)=@r
> 0
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Q.E.D
4.6.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof.
In this case, the aggregate net position is given by:
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N
￿
> 0 (4.42)
The impact of a change in regulated lending rates on aggregate net position is given by:
@F (￿)=@ rB
L = 0 (4.43)
Applying the implicit function theorem, this impact on interbank rate becomes:
@ r
@ rB
L
= ￿
@F (￿)=@ rB
L
@F (￿)=@r
= 0 (4.44)
and the impact on loans is therefore:
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Similarly, the impact of a change in regulated deposit rate on net aggregate position, interbank
rate, and loans are given by:
@F (￿)=@ rB
D = (1 ￿ ￿)
@
@ rB
D
Ds ￿
rB
D
￿
> 0 (4.46)
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The e⁄ects of raising remuneration on excess reserves is:
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and the e⁄ects of raising remuneration on required reserves is:
@F (￿)=@rR = 0 (4.52)
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and the impact of a higher RR is given by:
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The impact of sales of central bank bill is:
@F (￿)=@ B = ￿1 < 0 (4.57)
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Q.E.D.
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Hong Kong, den 23. October 2010 Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Einleitung Die vorliegende Dissertation umfasst vier Kapitel, von denen sich jedes mit einem
anderen Themengebiet aus der internationalen Makro￿konomik und Geldpolitik befasst. Das
erste Kapitel analysiert den Ein￿ uss unerwarteter geldpolitischer Schocks auf die Wech-
selkurse in einem empirischen Mehrl￿ndermodell. Das dritte Kapitel untersucht den inter-
nationalen Ein￿ uss ￿skalpolitischer Schocks. Das zweite Kapitel untersucht den Zusammen-
hang zwischen makro￿konomischen Faktoren und Wechselkursen ￿ber den Erwartungskanal
der Geldpolitik. Im vierten Kapitel wird die internationale Transmission wirtschaftlicher
Schie￿ agen im Unternehmens- und Bankensektor analysiert. Das letzte Kapitel untersucht
den Zinskanal der monet￿ren Transmission in einer aufstrebenden Volkswirtschaft, China, in
der sowohl Marktkr￿fte als auch Regulierung Ein￿ uss auf den Transmissionsprozess entfalten.
Kapitel 1 untersucht E⁄ekt unerwarteter gelpolitischer Schocks auf den Wechselkurs im
Rahmen eines ￿konometrischen Mehrl￿ndermodell.
Sowohl in der theoretischen wie auch in der empirischen Makro￿konomik hat die Frage, wie
eine ˜nderung in der Geldpolitik einer Volkswirtschaft den Au￿ enwert seiner W￿hrung bee-
in￿ usst, eine lange Tradition. R￿diger Dornbuschs (1978) Artikel ￿ber das ￿berschie￿ en des
Wechselkurses ist in diesem Zusammenhang als einer der wichtigsten Beitr￿ge zu betrachten.
In Dornbuschs Modell wertet der reale Wechselkurs nach einem kontraktion￿ren geldpolitis-
chen Schritt zun￿chst auf, und verliert erst graduell im weiteren Verlauf an Wert. Dieses
Ergebnis wird von mehreren neueren Beitr￿gen aus der Literatur, die sich mit dynamisch-
stochastischen Gleichgewichtsmodellen befasst, best￿tigt.
Im Gegensatz zu diesen theoretischen Arbeiten dokumentiert der ￿berwiegende Teil der
empirischen Literatur allerdings, dass der H￿hepunkt der Aufwertung des nominalen und
des realen Wechselkurses infolge eines kontraktion￿ren geldpolitischen Schritts erst nach
einer erheblichen Zeitverz￿gerung erreicht wird: dieses Ergebnis wird auch als das "de-
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layed exchange rate overshooting puzzle" bezeichnet. Des weiteren scheinen die Ergebnisse
in der empirischen Literatur darauf hinzudeuten, dass es nach einem kontraktion￿ren US-
amerikanischen geldpolitischen Schritt betr￿chtliche und langwierige Arbitragegelegenheiten
zugunsten US-amerikanischer Anleihen gibt, die gegen die G￿ltigkeit der bedingten ungedeck-
ten Zinsparit￿t sprechen: dieses Ergebnis wird auch als das "forward premium/discount puz-
zle" bezeichnet. Die empirische Evidenz wurde bislang in solch einem Ma￿ e als stichhaltig
angesehen, dass mehrere Mechanismen vorgeschlagen wurden, um die Puzzles mit fundierten
Erkl￿rungen zu unterlegen, so z.B. die lediglich eingeschr￿nkte Verarbeitung von Informatio-
nen, verzerrte Wahrnehmungen oder zustandsabh￿ngige Preisbestimmung.
Der ￿bliche Ansatz zur Analyse von Geldpolitik und Wechselkursen in der bestehenden
empirischen Literatur ist die (zwei-L￿nder) Vektorautoregression (VARs), in der die rele-
vanten makro￿konomischen Variablen sowohl f￿r die in- wie auch f￿r die ausl￿ndische Volk-
swirtschaft aufgenommen werden. Die Identi￿kation geldpolitischer Schocks erfolgt ￿ber-
wiegend auf Basis der Choleski-Zerlegung. J￿ngere Arbeiten nutzen weniger restriktive, auf
die kurzfristigen E⁄ekte zielende Identi￿kationsschemata wie z.B. Vorzeichenrestriktionen
(Scholl und Uhlig, 2008).
Im ersten Kapitel dieser Dissertation wird untersucht, ob die Erkl￿rung des oben beschriebe-
nen Puzzles in der empirischen Literatur durch die Wahl eines konzeptionell restriktiven, em-
pirischen Ansatzes begr￿ndet sein k￿nnte. Insbesondere werden zwei m￿gliche Ursachen f￿r
das Entstehen der Puzzles untersucht: (i) im Rahmen bilateraler VARs wird von den infolge
geldpolitischer Schocks zeitgleich in mehr als nur zwei L￿ndern statt￿ndenden mako￿konomis-
chen Anpassungsmechanismen abstrahiert; (ii) die Identi￿kation geldpolitischer Schocks durch
die Auferlegung von Kurzfristrestriktionen basierend auf der Choleski-Zerlegung ist zum
einen nicht durch eine makro￿konomische Theorie gest￿tzt, und l￿sst zum anderen empirisch
dokumentierte Langfristbeziehungen zwischen den makro￿konomischen Variablen im VAR
ungenutzt.
Im esten Kapitel dieser Dissertation wird daher zur Untersuchung der Wechselkursef-
fekte eines geldpolitischen Schocks unter besonderer Ber￿cksichtigung dieser zwei Aspekte
ein Mehrl￿nder-VAR Modell f￿r ein Panel von neun Industriel￿ndern aufgestellt. Die geld-
politischen Schocks werden unter Ausnutzung empirisch dokumentierter Langfristbeziehun-
gen zwischen den Variablen identi￿ziert. Die empirischen Ergebnisse implizieren, dass sowohl
der e⁄ektive wie auch der bilaterale US-amerikanische Wechselkurs zeitgleich mit dem kon-
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traktion￿ren US-amerikanischen geldpolitischen Schock aufwerten, und dass der Wechselkurs
nicht verz￿gert ￿berschie￿ t. Des Weiteren entsteht nach einem kontraktion￿ren geldpolitis-
chen Schock keine nennenswerte, persistente Abweichung von der ungedeckten Zinsparit￿t
und daher auch kein "forward premium". Die Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels sind konsistent mit
den Implikationen aus theoretischen Modellen der o⁄enen Volkswirtschaft mit unvollkommen
￿ exiblen Preisen. Zudem deuten die empirischen Ergebnisse in diesem Kapitel darauf hin,
dass es aufschlussreich sein k￿nnte, existierende Modelle der o⁄enen Volkswirtschaft - z.B.
das von Benigno (2004), Bergin (2006) oder Steinsson (2008) - zu erweitern, um simultane
Anpassungsdynamiken in einem Mehrl￿nderkontext mit abzubilden.
Kapitel 2 analysiert den E⁄ekt makro￿konomischer und f￿r die Zinsentscheidung von
Zentralbanken relevanter Variablen auf Wechselkursrenditen.
Seit der Studie von Meese und Rogo⁄ (1983) ist allgemein anerkannt, dass zwischen
makro￿konomischen Faktoren und der Wechselkursdynamik kein Zusammenhang besteht.
Neuere Studien belegen jedoch, dass Zinsentscheidungen von Zentralbanken ˜nderungen der
makro￿konomischen Faktoren ber￿cksichtigen. Dieses Ergebnis legt nahe, dass makro￿konomis-
che Faktoren die Wechselkurse beein￿ ussen k￿nnten, indem sie Erwartungen ￿ber die k￿n-
ftige Geldpolitik ver￿ndern. Des Weiteren sollten Faktoren, auf die Zentralbanken reagieren
(geldpolitische Faktoren), gemeinsam als Erkl￿rungsgr￿￿ e f￿r die Wechselkursentwicklung
ber￿cksichtigt werden.
Neuere Studien zu Wechselkursmodellen, in denen Geldpolitik in Abh￿ngigkeit von
makro￿konomischen Faktoren modelliert wird und die Erkl￿rungskraft und Vorhersageg￿te
geldpolitischer Faktoren beurteilen, weisen unterschiedliche Resultate auf. In diesen Ar-
beiten gelten restriktive Annahmen bez￿glich der Bildung von Markterwartungen ￿ber die
zuk￿nftige Geldpolitik, was Schlussfolgerungen erschwert. Weil Markterwartungen ￿ber die
zuk￿nftige Geldpolitik notwendig sind, um ￿ber geldpolitische Faktoren Wechselkurse zu
beein￿ ussen, ist die Modellierung dieser Erwartungen von entscheidender Bedeutung.
In Kapitel 2 wird die Wechselkursrendite in drei Komponenten zerlegt: Markterwartungen
￿ber die kurzfristigen Zinsen, Markterwartungen ￿ber W￿hrungsrisikopr￿mien und Fehler in
den Wechselkursprognosen. Darau⁄olgend wird untersucht, ob und inwiefern Faktoren, die
in Zinsentscheidungen von Zentralbanken ein￿ ie￿ en, ￿ber die erste Komponente den Wech-
selkurs beein￿ ussen. Insbesondere wird der Erwartungsbildungsprozess der kurzfristigen Zin-
sen auf Basis von Prognosen befragter Marktteilnehmer sowie alternativer Lernprozesse mod-
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elliert. Dabei wird der Mechanismus, dessen Zinsvorhersagen den Prognosen der befragten
Marktteilnehmer am n￿chsten kommen, als Markterwartungsprozess de￿niert und dazu be-
nutzt, die von Marktteilnehmern erwarteten Zinsen zu berechnen.
Die Analyse der Preisnotierung des U.S. Dollars gegen￿ber der Deutschen Mark und
des Euro von 1979 bis 2008 best￿tigt, dass geldpolitische Faktoren die Wechselkursrenditen
￿ber die geldpolitischen Erwartungen beein￿ ussen. Im Vergleich zur bestehenden Literatur
verbessert das Einbinden von Markterwartungen bez￿glich der Geldpolitik ￿ber Prognosen
von Marktteilnehmern sowohl die Erkl￿rungskraft als auch die Vorhersageg￿te geldpolitischer
Faktoren. Des Weiteren ist die erwartete Summe der zuk￿nftigen Zinsunterschiede ein guter
Ansatz um die Wechselkursrendite "out-of sample" vorherzusagen. Daraus lassen sich zwei
Schlussfolgerungen ableiten.
Erstens nehmen die Outputl￿cke und die In￿ ationsrate eine zentrale Rolle bei der Bildung
von geldpolitischen Erwartungen von deutschen und US-amerikanischen Marktteilnehmern
ein. Die funktionale Form dieses Prozesses ￿ndert sich jedoch ￿ber die Zeit und ist von Land
zu Land unterschiedlich. Zweitens gilt die ungedeckte Zinsparit￿t in der Eurozone nicht, und
f￿r die Zukunft erwartete h￿here Zinsen f￿hren zu einer Aufwertung der W￿hrung.
Kapitel 3 untersucht die internationale Transmission ￿nanzieller Schie￿ agen von Banken
und Unternehmen. Die Finanzkrise hat deutlich gezeigt, wie schnell ￿nanzielle Schie￿ agen
sich innerhalb einer Volkswirtschaft und ￿ber ihre Grenzen hinaus in die Weltwirtschaft
verbreiten k￿nnen. Die US-amerikanische Subprime-Krise hat Bankbilanzen geschw￿cht,
Haushalte und Unternehmen haben Finanzmarktinstitutionen so nahe an den Bankrott
getrieben, dass Regierungen mit umfangreichen Rettungspaketen eingreifen mussten. Die
Verschlechterung der globalen Finanzsituation hat die Verf￿gbarkeit von ￿nanziellen
Ressourcen f￿r Unternehmen aus der Realwirtschaft weltweit reduziert und dadurch ihre
Produktions- und Investitionst￿tigkeit beeintr￿chtigt. Auch der private Konsum wurde in
Mitleidenschaft gezogen.
Der Kreditkanal wird gemeinhin als der wesentliche Transmissionskanal f￿r die E⁄ekte
￿nanzieller Schie￿ agen auf die Realwirtschaft gesehen. Die St￿rke der E⁄ekte h￿ngt dabei
von der Prevalenz des "￿nancial accelerator" ab (Gilchrist et al, 2009). Die empirische Evi-
denz bez￿glich der Transmission ￿nanzieller Schie￿ agen beschr￿nkt sich bislang beinahe auss-
chlie￿ lich auf entwickelte Volkswirtschaften, und nutzt nur in wenigen F￿llen einen Ansatz,
der sowohl makro￿konomische wie auch ￿nanz- und realwirtschaftliche Unternehmensvari-
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ablen ber￿cksichtigt. In den Arbeiten von Cartensen et al. (2008), Pesaran et al. (2006) und
Dees et al. (2007) wird die ￿nanzielle Schie￿ age durch Bankeigenkapital oder das Ausfallrisiko
von Schuldnern gemessen, und durch Spreads in Unternehmensanleihen bzw. Credit Default
Swaps oder tats￿chlichen Kreditausfalldaten approximiert. Die begrenzte Verf￿gbarkeit der
Daten beschr￿nkt die Untersuchung auf entwickelte Volkswirtschaften.
Die Untersuchung in Kapitel vier schlie￿ t durch eine umfassende Analyse der Verbindun-
gen zwischen dem Banken- und dem (realwirtschaftlichen) Unternehmenssektor in der
Weltwirtschaft eine L￿cke in der Literatur. Dies erfolgt durch die Einf￿hrung eines vo-
rausschauenden Ausfallrisikoma￿ es f￿r Banken und Unternehmen in das von Pesaran et al.
(2004) vorgeschlagene globale vektorautoregressive Modell (GVAR). Die Ausfallrisiken f￿r
Banken und Unternehmen werden durch die entsprechenden "Expected Default Frequencies"
(EDFs) aus Moody￿ s KMV Credit Edge approximiert. Die EDFs nutzen Informationen aus
Aktienmarktdaten, Bank- und Unternehmensbilanzen, und werden daher auch oft als aktien-
marktimplizierte Ausfallrisiken (Vassalou und Xing, 2004) bezeichnet, die f￿r eine gro￿ e Zahl
von Schwellenl￿ndern verf￿gbar sind. Zus￿tzlich zu den EDFs werden in das GVAR
makro￿konomische und ￿nanzwirtschaftliche Variablen aufgenommen.
˜hnlich den fr￿heren Studien, belegen auch die Ergebnisse in Kapitel vier Verbindun-
gen zwischen dem Finanzsektor und der Realwirtschaft durch einen signi￿kanten E⁄ekt ￿-
nanzieller Schie￿ agen im Banken- und Unternehmenssektor auf die inl￿ndische Wirtschaftsak-
tivit￿t. Weiterhin sind ￿nanzielle Schie￿ agen im Banken- und Unternehmenssektor auch mit
statistisch signi￿kanten globalen R￿ckkopplungen - mit deutlichen Unterschieden zwischen
entwickelten Volkswirtschaften und Schwellenl￿ndern - verbunden. Internationale Spillovers
sind st￿rker ausgepr￿gt, wenn ￿nanzielle Schie￿ agen in gro￿ en, entwickelten Volkswirtschaften
ihren Ursprung haben (insbesondere in den USA). Die E⁄ekte ￿nanzieller Schie￿ agen von Un-
ternehmen mit Ursprung in entwickelten Volkswirtschaften auf das Wachstum in Schwellen-
l￿ndern scheinen gr￿￿ er als die E⁄ekte ￿nanzieller Schie￿ agen im Bankensektor entwickelter
Volkswirtschaften zu sein. Internationaler Handel scheint demnach eine bedeutende Rolle
bei der Transmission von Schocks aus entwickelten Volkswirtschaften in Schwellenl￿ndern
zu spielen. Wegen der wichtigeren Rolle des Bankensektors f￿r die inl￿ndische Wirtschaft
scheinen im Gegensatz dazu entwickelte Volkswirtschaften st￿rker auf ￿nanzielle Schie￿ agen
im Banken- als im Unternehmenssektor zu reagieren. Des Weiteren scheinen - im Einklang
mit der Theorie des "￿nancial accelerator" - Bank- und Unternehmensbilanzkan￿le wichtige
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Verst￿rkungsmechanismen f￿r die internationale Transmission von Schocks zu sein.
Kapitel 4 analysiert den Zinskanal im Rahmen des monet￿ren Transmissionsprozess in
China.
Zentralbanken entwickelter Volkswirtschaften setzen ihre Geldpolitik normalerweise um,
indem sie die kurzfristigen Zinsen am Interbankenmarkt steuern. Aus diesem Grunde liefern
kurzfristige Zinss￿tze Informationen ￿ber die gegenw￿rtige geldpolitische Ausrichtung. F￿r
China geht man jedoch weitgehend davon aus, dass Interbankenzinsen kein ausreichendes
Ma￿ f￿r die geldpolitische Ausrichtung sind.
Tats￿chlich deutet die empirische Evidenz in der Literatur, wie z.B. Geiger (2006) sowie
Laurens und Maino (2007), darauf hin, dass der Zinskanal im monet￿ren Transmissionsprozess
in China nur schwach ausgepr￿gt bzw. gar nicht existent ist. Wenn man den monet￿ren
Transmissionsprozess in China betrachtet, bietet es sich an (i) die Verbindung zwischen Poli-
tikinstrumenten und Interbankenzinsen sowie (ii) die Verbindung zwischen Interbankenzinsen
und Kosten sowie Verf￿gbarkeit von Einzelhandelskrediten zu unterscheiden. Ans￿tze, die in
der Literatur h￿u￿g zur Erkl￿rung der Wirkungslosigkeit der Geldpolitik in China herangezo-
gen werden, konzentrieren sich im Allgemeinen darauf, dass strukturelle Hindernisse an den
Finanzm￿rkten die zweite Verbindung geschw￿cht haben.
Im Gegensatz dazu untersucht das f￿nfte Kapitel auch die erste Verbindung, da diese
entscheidend dazu beitr￿gt, den gesamten Transmissionsmechanismus der Geldpolitik auf die
Realwirtschaft zu verstehen.
Die chinesische Zentralbank greift in ihrer geldpolitischen Strategie auf eine Vielzahl von
Instrumenten zur￿ck. Diese bestehen aus auch in entwickelten Volkswirtschaften verwende-
ten geldpolitischen Instrumenten und zus￿tzlich - was von entscheidender Bedeutung ist - aus
Einlage- und Kreditzinsen f￿r Nichtbanken. Im Gegensatz zu entwickelten Volkswirtschaften
sind diese beiden regulierten Zinss￿tze wichtig f￿r die Umsetzung der Geldpolitik in China.
Aus diesem Grunde stellt sich die Frage, welchen Ein￿ uss das Zusammenspiel dieses erweit-
erten Instrumentariums mit verschiedenen Marktkr￿ften auf die E⁄ektivit￿t der Geldpolitik
der chinesischen Zentralbank hat.
Um diese Fragestellung zu analysieren, wird im f￿nften Kapitel ein an das chinesische Sys-
tem angepasstes Bankenmodell aufgestellt, das eine Erweiterung des Modells von Porter und
Xu (2009a) ist, die ihrerseits auf das Modell von Freixas und Rochet (2008) zur￿ckgegri⁄en
haben. Das Modell zeigt, wie Interbankenzinsen sowie Menge und Preis von Einzelhan-
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delskrediten in einem Umfeld bestimmt werden, in dem Banken untereinander im Wettbe-
werb stehen und derselben Regulierung in Bezug auf Einlage- und Kreditzinsen f￿r Nicht-
banken unterliegen. Die Ergebnisse des Modells deuten darauf hin, dass die Regulierung
dieser Zinss￿tze einen entscheidenden Ein￿ uss auf den Transmissionsprozess der Geldpolitik
aus￿bt. Insbesondere h￿ngt der Ein￿ uss der Geldpolitik auf Interbankenzinsen und Einzel-
handelskredite davon ab, wie stark die regulierten Zinss￿tze von den Gleichgewichtszinsen
abweichen, die sich ohne Regulierung am Markt bilden w￿rden. Aus diesem Ergebnis lassen
sich zwei Schlussfolgerungen ziehen.
Erstens sind Interbankenzinsen in diesem regulierten Umfeld kein ausreichender - m￿glicher-
weise sogar ein irref￿hrender - Indikator f￿r die geldpolitischen Absichten der Zentralbank.
Um deren gelpolitische Haltung zu beschreiben, m￿ssen alle verwendeten geldpolitischen In-
strumente in Betracht gezogen werden, darunter die Einlage- und Kreditzinsen f￿r Nicht-
banken, die Mindestreserveanforderungen und deren Verg￿tung sowie O⁄enmarktgesch￿fte.
Zweitens, entsprechend dem Ausma￿ , in dem die Zentralbank die Gleichgewichtszinsen
nicht beobachten kann, kann sie nicht wissen, ob eine ˜nderung in ihren Instrumenten geld-
politisch expansiv oder restriktiv wirkt. Die Freigabe dieser regulierten Zinss￿tze behebt
diese Unsicherheit und verbessert die E⁄ektivit￿t des monet￿ren Transmissionsprozesses.
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